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
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Perspectives on Maritime Strategy

Essays from the Americas

Paul D. Taylor, Editor


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The world as seen from the South Pole

Cover

The Naval War College complex on Coasters Harbor Island, in a photograph taken about 2000, looking roughly northeast. In the center foreground is Luce Hall, with Pringle Hall to its left and Mahan Hall hidden behind it; behind them, to the left, are Spruance, Conolly, and Hewitt halls. In the center, partly obscured by Conolly Hall, is McCarty Little Hall. On the extreme right in the foreground is Founders Hall, in which the College was established. In recent years the College has expanded into parts of several buildings of the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, on the northern part of the island. In the middle distance are facilities of Naval Station Newport (the decommissioned aircraft carriers ex-Forrestal and ex-Saratoga are visible at Pier 1) and, beyond that, of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. In the far distance can be seen parts of the towns of Portsmouth and Tiverton, Rhode Island. Photograph © 2008 by Onne van der Wal Photography, Inc.



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Foreword

In September 2005, fifty-five chiefs of navies and coast guards, along with twenty-seven war college presidents from around the world gathered in Newport for the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium. We shared perspectives on a broad range of issues important to the global maritime community and individual countries through the mechanism of regionally oriented seminars (eight of them). The two days produced comprehensive lists of key concerns from each region, the similarity of which was remarkable. As the symposium drew to a close, a consensus was articulated that maritime security was fundamental to address these concerns, that the scope of security challenges reached beyond the waters of individual nations, and most importantly, that the responsibilities in the maritime domain—the great “commons” of the world—were shared. Moreover, the need was expressed for regional and global mechanisms that allowed maritime nations to more routinely and effectively bring their particular capabilities together to ensure a free and secure maritime domain. The host of the ISS, Admiral Mike Mullen, summarized the key proposition of the symposium: “Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of the vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity.”

Acknowledging that “the United States Navy could not, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain,” Admiral Mullen said that “it must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use by others that threaten national, regional, or global security.” So too must each nation count on assistance from other nations.

Over the past two years the Naval War College has found itself in a position of prominence in helping the leadership of our maritime forces, and the leaderships of our global partners, think through the implications of a new set of global security challenges and opportunities. It has been a very productive period since the College—against the fundamental notions of the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium—was tasked to work on a new strategy “*of* and *for* its time.” Critical to our effort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive scenario analysis and war-gaming effort and a series of high-level conferences, symposia, and other professional exchanges with maritime partners here in Newport and at other venues around the world. This collaborative effort has produced great insight and brought into focus the

diverse perspectives necessary to make this strategy robust across multiple arguments and useful for both naval leadership and national policy makers in understanding the key role maritime forces must play in the evolving international system.

We see some interesting new ideas in this strategy: the preeminent value of maritime forces to underwrite stability for the global system and an emphasis on unique capabilities inherent in maritime forces to prevent global shocks and to limit and localize regional conflict. While this enhances the long-standing naval commitment to provide high-end capability, there are clear new demands related to sustaining the global system—unique in the maritime domain. The new maritime strategy also recognizes that capacity must rely increasingly, across the range of military operations, on an expanded set of more robust, global maritime relationships—in effect, partnerships that engender trust, enable prevention, and yield more effective maritime security.

The present volume contributes clearly and significantly to building just this sort of maritime partnerships. As all participants at the ISS recognized, partnerships must be complementary and built on mutual benefit. In subsequent guidance to the Naval War College, Admiral Mullen emphasized that any new strategy must be one viewed through the eyes of our partners.

The essays from the Americas that follow are a compendium of “perspectives on maritime strategy.” They were written and submitted in response to an invitation that provided little substantive guidance beyond the request that they represent perspectives of maritime nations around the world—not necessarily official views but thoughtful and candid comments of men and women in countries of our hemisphere other than the United States.

I commend them without hesitation to anyone interested in maritime strategy generally and in discovering insights into ways in which countries of the Americas that are bound by shared values and enduring interests can work together in the maritime domain to achieve results that cannot be achieved by any nation alone.

Rear Admiral JACOB L. SHUFORD
U.S. Navy
President of the Naval War College

Preface

The chapters that follow offer a rich smorgasbord of insights into maritime strategy from the perspectives of some two dozen experts from five countries of the Americas. The authors include experienced, senior naval officers, civilian scholars, and people with both military and academic experience.

When the President of the U.S. Naval War College invited naval leaders from around the Western Hemisphere to generate articles that could provide insights on maritime strategy, his request was both comprehensive and open ended. He asked only for “the thoughts of strategic thinkers who can bring the long view of grand strategy to [the process of constructing a new U.S. maritime strategy] along with the perspectives of our maritime partners.” He welcomed submissions from any quarter on any relevant aspect of the subject.

In keeping with the academic nature of this project, the entire substance of this publication should be considered the personal views of the authors and not the positions of their institutions or governments.

In editing the papers that were accepted for publication, I have adjusted the translations from the original Portuguese and Spanish to make them accessible to the reader in English while reflecting the original intents of the authors. I have made every effort to avoid changes in content and to let the articles speak for themselves.

Rear Admiral Alvaro J. Martínez of the Argentine Navy writes that the sea is a synonym for nations’ openness to the world. He states further that the progress of nations has always been associated with their openness to the world. Rear Admiral Martínez argues that maritime strategy has undergone a paradigm change so that, instead of fighting and winning wars at sea, countries now can choose to work cooperatively with others to consolidate peace, cooperation, and security in the maritime domain.

In their essay, Captain Juan Carlos Del Alamo and his colleagues from the Peruvian Navy and Air Force address changes in the international environment affecting maritime security. They point to new threats in the forms of international terrorism and of trafficking in drugs and materiel that could be incorporated into weapons of mass destruction, piracy, smuggling, and illegal overfishing. They see these asymmetrical threats as having national and regional consequences, and they suggest strategic responses to them.

Captain Cristian Sidders of the Argentine Navy makes the case for considering distinctive characteristics of the South Atlantic, specifically those of Argentina's maritime interests, in formulating a maritime strategy for his country. He weighs the matter of governance of the sea against the value of freedom of navigation. In this regard, he offers insights into achieving cooperation among countries while also protecting their individual national interests.

Captain Claudio Rogerio de Andrade Flôr, retired from the Brazilian Navy, contrasts what he calls the different approaches of the United States and Brazil. He argues that the United States exercises world hegemony while Brazilian policy is focused on cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind. He asserts that the United States pursues national security through military and technological power, and he offers some observations about how the two countries might work together within the context of their different approaches to cooperate against such common enemies and threats as international terrorism.

Rear Admiral Miguel Angel Troitiño, retired from the Argentine Navy, traces the role of maritime strategy in the development of Argentina from the land toward the sea. He suggests that the sea now offers the means for further integrating his country and connecting it more productively with the rest of the world. The strategy he envisions would require economic, legal, technological, and political measures coordinated at the highest governmental level.

Rear Admiral Federico Niemann F. of the Chilean Navy explains the importance of the exercise of sovereignty and control over the maritime space to the development of an ocean state. He describes the Chilean concept of the "*Presencial* Sea" as similar to the concept of maritime domain awareness and writes that it must be respected without weakening the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or affecting the freedom that governs common areas on the high seas. He examines past Chilean cooperative maritime activities with other countries and identifies issues that need to be addressed in further international cooperation.

Captain Antonio Carlos Teixeira Martins of the Brazilian Navy assesses U.S. proposals for a "thousand-ship navy" and a Global Fleet Station. He wonders whether the United States is sincere in its proposals for international cooperation. While he recognizes that Brazil and the United States share interests in fighting terrorism, reducing transnational crime, and seeking greater maritime security, cooperation, and regional peace, he raises questions about whether it is in the interest of Brazil to join in efforts put forward by the United States for maritime cooperation.

Rear Admiral Jorge Balaesque Walbaum, who is retired from the Chilean Navy, and his colleagues explore the missions of the Chilean Navy and of the U.S. Navy as a means of

identifying areas for mutually beneficial cooperation. They see evident synergy, in that no nation alone can adequately meet the challenges it faces. Cooperation, though, depends on interoperability. At the operational level technological differences have to be overcome by effective and timely data links and code arrangements. Interoperability needs to be improved, too, at the politico-strategic level through comprehensive political coordination and specific agreement on legal issues like rules of engagement.

Captain Luiz Carlos de Carvalho Roth, retired from the Brazilian Navy, discusses the distinct ways in which the Brazilian Navy and the U.S. Navy approach maritime strategy. He identifies areas of convergence between the two approaches and suggests geographic and substantive points of cooperation that could serve the maritime objectives of both countries. He acknowledges that elements of the U.S. Southern Command and the U.S. Africa Command would both have to be engaged for cooperation across the full range of issues in which Brazil is interested.

Professor Francisca Möller Undurraga of the Chilean Naval War College and her team of writers undertake an assessment of international law and maritime security. They cite an extensive body of international agreements and regulations and assert that a key challenge is to achieve effective compliance. They review the commitment of Chile to regional and global legal regimes and conclude that the Chilean Navy shares with the U.S. Navy concepts of cooperation and of the duty to comply with the requirements flowing from the international agreements to which their countries adhere.

Captain Federico Rechkemmer Prieto of the Peruvian Navy and his colleagues point out that the Americas are less plagued by state-to-state conflicts than some other regions but nonetheless face nontraditional threats. They see many of these threats as regional in nature and conclude that a regional response is required. They posit some objectives for regional security cooperation and sketch out some of the key elements that any such regional efforts should incorporate.

Dr. James Boutilier, Special Advisor (Policy) to the Commander, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific, reviews the long-standing partnership between the Canadian and U.S. navies. He recounts methods that have succeeded in meeting the challenge of technological interoperability and worked to some degree in the case of informational interoperability. Also of interest is his discussion of how the two navies have addressed issues of the division of labor between them. He cites the need for closer cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard in an era of global terrorism but acknowledges problems rooted in cultural differences between the two organizations.

Captain James Thornberry Schiantarelli and his fellow writers from the Peruvian Navy and Air Force begin their essay with an assessment of a range of security scenarios that could arise in the Americas. They evaluate the adequacy of existing security

arrangements for handling these scenarios and find them wanting. They propose an overhaul of the hemispheric security system with a hemispheric security council at the political level, a strategic-level hemispheric security system, an inter-American defense board responsible at the operational level, and operational commands to direct forces at the tactical level.

Acknowledgments

The bulk of the work in this volume was performed, of course, by the authors of each of the chapters. Many other people have been involved, though, in bringing the work to fruition. The chiefs of navies and the heads of naval war colleges in the Americas have stimulated much of the work contained here. In addition, several people at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport contributed mightily to the effort. Captain Michael Sherlock, USN, and Professors Richmond Lloyd and Donald Marrin offered invaluable editorial advice; Mr. Pelham Boyer, managing editor of the Naval War College Press, performed countless editorial tasks; and Ms. Elizabeth Davis produced the graphics on the cover and frontispiece. My hearty thanks to each of them.

PART ONE

Formulating Maritime Strategy

A Maritime Strategy for the South Atlantic

REAR ADMIRAL ALVARO J. MARTÍNEZ, ARGENTINE NAVY

The Significance of the Sea in the Twenty-first Century

In the twenty-first century—which, from the geopolitical point of view, we may consider to have commenced in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, or in 1991, with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union—the world has witnessed dramatic changes that have caused our present time to be more dynamic than any before. In this context, three main effects can be perceived, namely: a strong interdependence and interconnection between states; a growing demand for renewable and nonrenewable resources, including energy resources; and a spreading of different cultures with their own ideas and values.

Humanity tends to consolidate a new paradigm of peace and cooperation among peoples of the world, aimed at holding armed conflicts at a distance and encouraging progress. History has shown that the progress of nations has always been associated with their attitude of openness to the world. It has also taught us that such progress can be sustained only if embodied in responsible and internationally oriented behavior, free from any taint of unscrupulous dominance or exploitation.

For us seamen, it is simple to imagine the role of the maritime environment in this new process: just as the sea is a synonym for nations' openness to the world and, as history has shown, the scene of numerous conflicts, it may also be a synonym of peace and cooperation.

The fact that the oceans are the locus of this evolution implies a fundamental opportunity both for human beings and for the planet: seven-tenths of the earth's surface is covered with water, two-thirds of the world's population has settled in territories located less than 150 kilometers away from the coasts, and by 2025, it is estimated, 70 percent of the world's inhabitants will have settled in an even narrower coastal strip of land, about forty kilometers wide. Moreover, globally speaking, more than 65 percent of the world's states are coastal.

In terms of economic significance, the traditional use of the sea for transportation is fully evident. In global terms, 80 percent of commercial products are transported by sea, and in the last fifty years, international trade, as measured in tons per capita, has quadrupled. We may, therefore, assume that international shipping will continue to be the main means of transport of raw materials and manufactured products, given the geographic distance between the world's supply centers and the growing consumption centers; oil and its by-products constitute a highly significant volume of international shipping.

The continental shelves (Argentina has the fifth largest) and exclusive economic zones (Argentina is distinguished for its EEZ) must also be mentioned. These areas take up more than 36 percent of the maritime surface and have more than 90 percent of exploitable fish species, which supply approximately 25 percent of the animal protein consumed in the world. A wide variety of resources can be found in these areas, including about 80 percent of offshore oil fields. In addition, there are a variety of metallic nodules, the exploration and exploitation of which are growing, as would be expected in view of increasing demand and the exhaustion of the terrestrial deposits.

But such a vast and dynamic environment as that posed by the oceans offers a wide variety of possible fields of activity: observance of the international rules and regulations and of the international order; safeguarding of human life; preservation of the marine environment and its sustainable exploitation; provision of humanitarian assistance; scientific exploration; scientific/technological research and development; and integration of economies, even of education. These are only a few examples of the possible fields of work that can be expanded and improved.

So far, we have mentioned a number of factors that emphasize the importance of the sea, without mentioning an even more transcendental dimension of the oceans. In this sense, we can appreciate that the South Atlantic constitutes a space that is distinguished by its potential to embody this new paradigm.

The South Atlantic as a Geographical Area

South America, our subcontinent, mainly extends along the "Oceanic Hemisphere." The dynamics of its countries and regions define it as a huge island, which may be symbolically named "Amerisur." This island extends between two oceans and needs the sea if it is to communicate with the rest of the world. The relative distance between the majority of the countries forming the island and the centers of world power and consumption emphasize this necessity.

We will focus here on the South Atlantic Ocean, which extends along the eastern Amerisur coastline and is of vital interest to Argentines because their country is one of

its coastal states. Before we start talking about the South Atlantic, however, we must specify its limits. The meridian going through the Cape of Needles on the east and the meridian going through the Cape Horn on the west delimit the South Atlantic from east to west; the sixtieth parallel south is considered its southern limit, where the Antarctic Convergence is drawn. As regards the northern limit, although there is no uniform criterion, from the geopolitical point of view it is reasonably considered to be the imaginary line from Cape San Roque in Brazil going diagonally to Cape Verde in Africa—that is to say, the Atlantic area narrowing between both continents.

The South Atlantic has two fronts. One is the South American front, including Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the other is the African front, including twenty-one African countries, with South Africa the pioneer in the development of relationships with South American countries with coasts on the Atlantic.

Additionally, the South Atlantic has particularly relevant geostrategic areas, such as the “Atlantic Throat,” extending between the Brazilian northeastern coast and West Africa, which is a passage necessary for carrying vital provisions to the most developed economies; the southern passages joining the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, constituting an alternative waterway to the Panama Canal, particularly for ships larger than the canal’s locks; and the vicinity of Cape of Good Hope, connecting the South Atlantic with the Indian Ocean and offering also the best maritime access to Antarctica.

From the economic standpoint, the importance of the South Atlantic lies in the fact that it is the main business sea lane. However, the importance of the South Atlantic to coastal countries, mainly of African countries, cannot be overlooked. Suffice it to say that the United States buys 15 percent of its fuel from western African countries, and such purchases are projected to increase by approximately 25 percent by 2015. In this regard, Nigeria and Angola are the first and second continental oil producers respectively and have large gas fields. In light of the new world scenario after 9/11 and in accordance with U.S. economic forecasters, sub-Saharan Africa is the largest crude oil and gas supplier.

We also need to mention the growing offshore oil exploration along the Brazilian and Argentine coasts. The South Atlantic also has important fishing grounds on both coasts and a variety of metallic nodules. All these interests make the maritime domain an area of great value.

The South Atlantic may be projected as a natural economic area and a supplemental land extension of the states on both its coasts. On the one hand is the South American front, with its north/south axis running from the vital geographical Brazilian triangle formed by São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte to its southern end located in the Humid Pampa, Argentina. On the other hand is the African front—of course, the African coast.

It is important to bear in mind that from the point of view of economic integration, sub-Saharan African countries belong to the Southern African Development

Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay belong to the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR).

In terms of defense and international security, these South American countries, which have abandoned any possible conflict scenarios, have converted the subregion into a peaceful area and have worked toward a mutual understanding so as to become real strategic allies. In this sense, we cannot avoid mentioning the Political Statement Declaring MERCOSUR, Bolivia, and Chile as “Peace Areas,” signed by the respective presidents on 24 July 1998 in the city of Ushuaia, capital of the Argentine province of Tierra del Fuego.

The commitment to “strengthen consultation and cooperation efforts between the signatory parties on security and defense issues, to encourage implementation thereof, to promote cooperation in confidence and security-building measures and to promote implementation thereof” is included, *inter alia*, in the foregoing statement. The permanent bilateral mechanisms now in place and the level of military cooperation among the countries of the subregion clearly reflect that policy.

This cooperation among the states forming the South American front can be an instrument of great value to the strengthening of relationships among the twenty-four countries on both coasts. In other words, it may provide a firm basis upon which to expand and redirect the South/South relationships in political, social, diplomatic, economic, and military fields of action.

Argentina and the South Atlantic

Admiral Segundo Storni, an outstanding promoter of Argentine maritime awareness, said in 1916 that naval power must be based upon three pillars: production, transport, and the market. He considered trade and exploitation of resources of the sea as driving forces behind economic growth, creation of wealth, and development. He also foresaw clearly that the destiny of our nation was closely linked to the sea. In fact, our country is defined as “a maritime-Atlantic country,” a point that is particularly important because of the nation’s great influence on the southwestern section of the South Atlantic. An example of such influence would be Argentina’s search and rescue responsibility as assigned by the International Maritime Organization (IMO); another would be Argentina’s situation as a privileged port of entry for bi-ocean passages to the Pacific Ocean and to the Antarctic Continent.

This role derives from Argentina’s geostrategic position in the southernmost part of Amerisur; its 4,275 kilometers of maritime coasts; its large continental shelf (eighth largest in the world) and island system; its significant dependence on the shipping of

imports and exports (90 percent of the foreign trade is conducted through fluvial-maritime sea-lanes); the strategic areas of fishing and nonrenewable resources at a global level; the availability of abundant, high-quality, and varied sea flora and fish fauna; and the great influence of the marine meteorological system as a factor bearing upon the weather conditions of most of the country.

Considering Argentina as a leading actor in the regional and world maritime scene, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCAS), approved as Resolution 41/11 by the United Nations General Assembly on 27 October 1986—with a vote of 127 in favor, one against (the United States), and eight abstentions (Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal, and the former Federal Republic of Germany)—is a significant tool for the nations that form the basin. This tool also serves to guarantee certain vital interests of the nation as established in our constitution: sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, respect for the life and freedom of the inhabitants, and self-determination. In this regard, the president of the nation, Dr. Nestor Kirchner, expressed the following when he delivered his speech on the occasion of Army Day: “These are not issues about which we may have doubts or allow for any distinctions; they are permanent goals of the Government agenda.”

The vital interests of our nation, as well as the strategic interests supplementing them, invariably have an essential maritime component, given the fact that we are a traditional maritime nation.

The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Area

Since its creation, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic has provided a flexible regional mechanism for cooperation on political, economic, technical, cultural, and security issues among its member states. It would be possible to fulfill the expected peace and cooperation objectives only as effectively as democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms are exercised and implemented.

The international community has acknowledged that the South Atlantic is a region with a specific identity and that the twenty-four countries of the area have responsibilities and interests that must be respected. This is well interpreted by George Lamaziere, spokesman of the former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. He observed that ZPCAS is “a region in which security and defense have shifted, since the end of World War II, from an area integrated by the Americas and subordinated to the logic of global confrontation—embodied in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Pact)—to a recognition of South America as an area with its own features and politically, diplomatically and militarily as impervious as possible to

global threats . . . for a better concentration of resources on development and rescue from social deficiencies.”

We know about the potentialities of this basin and about its importance for the overall development of our peoples. This implies the necessity of acting responsibly with regard to its management and preservation. It constitutes an important asset that should be protected from nonregional tensions and confrontations by joint and common actions taken by the countries involved. In this connection, cooperation is being developed based on the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states and on other relevant principles of international law, as well as on all peoples’ right to determine freely their economic and political systems.

Within this framework of action, the proposal is to examine those related interests (shared and complementary) that commend themselves, to set attainable goals without negatively affecting the states’ interests of other regions, and, of course, to carry this out within a legal framework recognized by the United Nations.

Accordingly, among the policies to be established, at least the following must be included:

- To help strengthen international peace and security efforts and promote the United Nations’ principles and aims
- To promote the sustainable development of ZPCAS
- To protect the sea environment: mass of water, seabed, subsoil, and air and coastal areas
- To facilitate and promote freedom of navigation
- To exercise control of the exploration and exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable resources in respective jurisdictions
- To preserve the South Atlantic area from illegal activity
- To prohibit ships violating the regulations in force from navigating the South Atlantic, whatever their natures and origins might be
- To keep the area free from national and international militarization measures (conventional and nuclear weapons) and “urge all States from all other regions, in particular those States which are important from the military point of view, to strictly respect the South Atlantic area as a peace and cooperation area, especially through the reduction and possible elimination of the military presence in the area, the nonintroduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the nonextension of rivalries and conflicts which are alien to them” (Article 3, Resolution 4111, United Nations).

The policies are mere statements; their implementation requires strategies that, in short, constitute policies in process. The strategies to be outlined will require close connection, on different levels of cooperation; they necessarily fall within the context of Argentine foreign and defense policies, which go hand in hand; and they have as their priority the consolidation of an active and committed presence in the South Atlantic, increasing the cooperative activities linked to the area.

Consequently, the Argentine maritime strategy for the area should take into account possibilities based on dialogue and consensus, including

- Coordinated implementation of research and development, technical, scientific, and logistic activities intended to obtain detailed information of the existing and varied natural resources in ZPCAS, allowing the participating countries to envision clearly their maritime potentials and the levels of economic development to be achieved
- Efforts to increase regional development of “areas with poor demographic density” on the maritime littoral
- Efforts to promote sea-related educational initiatives, including the participation of national universities
- Active participation in international forums that favor the discussion of South Atlantic issues and the creation of related commissions with the intention of
 - making the international community aware of the importance of preserving ZPCAS as a world peace reservoir, and
 - reaching common objectives, within the international framework, taking into account the best cost-benefit ratio.
- Drafting of common rules and regulations for the area, in accordance with the national rules and regulations effective in the member countries
- Formulation of joint policies allowing for better economic development of area resources and seeking rational, appropriate, and sustainable exploitation thereof
- Signing of agreements among the diverse productive sectors from each of the countries participating in ZPCAS, with a view to promoting the creation of joint ventures to diversify activity in the whole region, providing more competitiveness and developing commercial relationships with the new regions for the introduction of their products.

The need to control, preserve, develop, and protect the regional jurisdictional maritime area requires military representatives of member states to be present at discussions of the creation of a collective defensive system in ZPCAS. Such military participation will by no means be condemned by the other states, whenever its presence will be in the

best interest of the world. Given both the specific features of the sphere in which such activities are carried out and the characteristics of the operations involved, navies are likely to be the primary military actors.

The defense systems of the ZPCAS-participating countries, especially their armed forces, could then have a distinct key mission in the future—to interpret and join the regional integration in progress. In my opinion, this would be a historic mission reserved to the current military generation of our countries.

A collective system of regional defense such as that outlined here, based on the progressive and growing consolidation of higher levels of mutual confidence, is included in current Argentine legislation—mainly the National Defense Act 23554/88 and its Regulation 727/06, as well as Executive Order 1691/06 on the Organization and Operation of the Armed Forces. This will help create an effective environment for peace and cooperation. Therefore, the following tasks, among others, could be included:

- Achievement of appropriate and effective military compatibility, interoperability, and complementarity among the forces of regional countries
- Ample exchange of information related to ZPCAS among member states
- Protection of maritime communication routes
- Effective presence in the designated areas
- Coordination with other regional organizations to guarantee the achievement of ZPCAS objectives.

Argentina and ZPCAS

As mentioned before, a maritime nation like Argentina, committed to international peace and cooperation, cannot avoid having an interest in, and optimism about, ZPCAS.

There has been a paradigm change in the purpose of maritime strategy. It no longer exists merely to fight and win wars at sea by exercising unilateral control of the oceans. Today this concept of a zero-sum game has been modified, and the maritime strategy should be redesigned in line with a cooperative pattern agreed upon among the participating actors, pursuant to the synergistic principle of playing a win-win game, with a view to consolidating peace, cooperation, and security in the maritime areas. These were the goals that led to the creation of ZPCAS.

This being the case, “the main innovation introduced when the ZPCAS was created was the addition of the word ‘cooperation’ to the expression ‘peace area.’ The intention is to neutralize the ‘negative’ aspect of a ‘peace area,’ intended primarily to preserve the peace and avoid or eliminate any obstacles likely to threaten it, with another ‘positive’

quality which would entail the consolidation and strengthening of intra-zone relationships.”

As has been stated before, there are different courses of action that must be followed in order to consolidate these noble objectives, and they have come to be considered as priorities of navies in the South Atlantic. In this regard, during a ministerial meeting held in Rio in July 1988, it was agreed to establish an integrated system of maritime control for the exchange of data about ship movements in the area, with the purpose of protecting the sea environment.

In this spirit, we understand that it is necessary to continue strengthening the excellent bonds that Argentina has developed for so many years with the navies of South America, which are an example of cooperation and mutual confidence at a global level.

At the same time, it is imperative to continue increasing the historical relationships that our country has established with friendly navies on the African coast, especially the long-lasting relationships developed with the Republic of South Africa, the fundamental interlocutor on the eastern coast of the South Atlantic. It is worth noting the maritime cooperation efforts among the navies of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and South Africa in regular naval exercises, such as ATLASUR.

But our challenge does not end there. We are aware that without neglecting our relationships with the rest of the friendly navies of the continent and the world, we may contribute to building a common maritime strategy aimed at strengthening ZPCAS. This will favor the security, well-being, and the progress of our peoples, as well as international harmony and security.

Changing Asymmetrical Threats Require New Responses

CAPTAIN JUAN CARLOS DEL ALAMO CARRILLO, PERUVIAN NAVY

CAPTAIN JOSÉ CARVAJAL RAYMOND, PERUVIAN NAVY

COLONEL CHARLES LAMBRUSCHINI ACUY, PERUVIAN AIR FORCE

Analysis of Scenes

The Global Scene

The concept of international security has changed as a product of the appearance of international terrorism in all continents, evidenced by the attacks registered in the last years, such as the attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001; on 11 March 2002, against the Metro in Madrid; and finally in 2005 against the public transportation system in London.

These kind of actions show that international terrorism may occur in any country of the world, whether directly against American interests or against states that are allies or friends of the United States in the struggle against terrorism. In that sense, Peru and other countries of the region are not exempted from risks; international terrorism is recognized as a serious threat to internal and external security.

The security and defense policies of countries are influenced in various degrees by the political and military unipolarity that the world has experienced in recent years. Likewise, states, international organizations, multilateral entities, and other forces also influence such policies directly or indirectly, formally or informally. As a counterbalance to the unipolarity and as a part of the globalization process, the world economy is increasingly multipolar. This has generated economic, social, cultural, and ideological changes in the entire world and increased the commercial flows among widespread zones. Most of this activity is carried out by sea, reflecting the complex and increasing

financial and economic interdependence among countries and states. The international scene is increasingly more complex and competitive, which implies as well a critical weakness of countries viewed separately.

This process has given rise to numerous intrastate conflicts affecting world peace, arising from ethnic or religious problems, heightened nationalism, tribal conflict, and political confrontations. Drug trafficking is also a worldwide problem.

The Regional Scene

The American states are devising a new concept of hemispheric security with a multi-dimensional reach and total respect for international law and the rules and principles established in the charters of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN).

Within the context of that effort, the enormous disparities existing in several countries of the region in economic, social, educational, and health dimensions, among others, generate points of political instability, which represent an indirect threat to peace and regional security.

On the other hand, globalization has initiated an accelerated process of change in South American countries, a process that underscores the importance of Latin America in its international commercial relationships. Also, the speed with which several countries of the Pacific basin have become attractive markets for products of the region opens the possibility that the Pacific Ocean will be a communication channel of higher importance in the future, mainly with emerging Asian economies, which are anxious to negotiate in both directions. This will generate a high degree of economic activity that will in turn require a secure and suitable control of the sea to prevent this communication channel from being used to promote illegal activity.

The countries of the Pacific basin have similar deficiencies in the control and surveillance of maritime areas near their coasts; the situation worsens in states that are farther north and nearer to the United States. The poor capabilities for control and maritime monitoring of these countries are largely due to logistical deficiencies that can be classified in two major categories: economic and technological limitations. The first one means that such states do not have enough resources to carry out maritime control and surveillance permanently, whereas the latter involves the lack of modern technologies for such missions, such as the use of satellite systems that would allow better supervision of extensive ground and maritime areas.

The National Scene

Although globalization has generated positive effects for the economy of this country, it also has intensified political, social, and economic problems that could constitute threats to national security. We will review some of them.

- The economic stability of recent years and the intensification of bilateral commerce with countries with which we currently are negotiating free trade agreements will increase maritime traffic. This will project an image of confidence in the country abroad that will attract higher investment, which in turn will increase production and generate jobs, thus consolidating Peru as having one of the higher economic growth rates in the South American region.
- In the realm of internal security, the continuing threat of drug trafficking and the alliance between drug traffickers and remnants of the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso is creating instability in certain regions of the country. Although it is clear that the level of terrorist threat cannot be compared to what we experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, both threats must be controlled, because the highly corrupting power of drug trafficking can destroy values that maintain Peruvian society, creating social problems and thus a fertile field for terrorism.
- The actions of the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in the areas adjacent to the Putumayo River (which forms the border between Peru and Colombia), in financial collusion with drug trafficking, have increased drug trafficking across the Amazonian rivers. This action brings in its wake the destruction of the environment and of biodiversity.
- In the same way, linked with such other illegal activities as the illegal cutting of trees or prospecting for gold using contaminated chemicals, organized groups of dangerous common criminals have arisen, whose transnational activities threaten the security of other states.

Analysis of the Threats

For this study we will bound the analysis to those threats that, even if not actually new, are considered new or emerging. Also, as we are addressing the maritime dimension, we will deal with those new threats that exist in the maritime domain, in internal, territorial, or international waters. Given the character of these threats, we can categorize them as “common” or “unique.”

Common Threats

Common threats are illegal actions that affect Peruvian interests as well as those of other states. Among this kind of threats we can identify the following:

Terrorism: international threats of transnational origin and operations, having no particular nationality but motivated by ideology, religion, ethnicity, or concepts of liberation.

Drug trafficking: criminal activity that now is found almost all over the world, with the potential for increasing and insinuating itself into the networks of international terrorism. In recent decades, air transportation was favored for this illegal activity; today the higher volume of drugs that can be transported by sea is causing drug trafficking by sea to boom.

Illegal traffic of radioactive substances and nuclear waste: a matter of increasing importance since the end of the 1980s. Its repression is a problem of controlling supplies of nuclear and radioactive material for nuclear powers, and it involves both the countries that produce this material and the large chain that effects its commercialization and transport. The main danger involving nuclear materials is the proliferation of nuclear weapons by states, terrorist groups, or arms traffickers. With spent nuclear fuel, the dangers are radiation and its damaging effects on health, goods, and the environment.

Unique Threats

Unique threats are those that directly affect national interests and may have negative repercussions on the interests of other states. Among them we can mention:

Piracy: a criminal practice as old as navigation and not limited to assaults on ships on the high seas. Often these criminal activities are carried out in port facilities or anchorages. The area of highest activity will be states that do not have real control of their jurisdictions.

Smuggling: the entrance and exit of merchandise traded without paying customs duties, thereby defrauding the national authorities and treasury. In the maritime context this kind of illegal activity is most common when ships are in port, permitting the possibility of detecting, intercepting, and seizing such merchandise in one's own territorial waters when the necessary intelligence is available.

Illegal overfishing: a phenomenon that has turned into a challenge of worldwide dimensions. Excessive fishing not only threatens the existence of species but devastates the marine ecosystem. In some cases, fishing operations have surpassed the reproductive capacity of species, in spite of regulations of governments and international organizations, putting those species at risk of extinction and making legitimate fishing less viable.

Actions of foreign irregular forces: the action of Colombian military forces against terrorist groups in that country's territory may result in these groups entering our national territory, disturbing free riverine transit and violating our sovereignty.

The Peruvian Maritime Strategic Approach

The Legal Framework

The political constitution of Peru approved in 1993 considers one of the fundamental duties of the state to be protecting the population from threats against its security (Article 44). One of these threats is illegal drug trafficking, which must be fought and punished throughout the national territory. In order to meet these and other problems, the System of National Defense, coordinated by the Ministry of Defense, in accordance with Article 118 of the constitution, relies on the armed forces.

On the other hand, in 2002 the various political forces of the country reached a consensus, called “the National Agreement,” on long-term policies that lay out guidelines for national security and the struggle against drug trafficking (see www.acuerdonacional.gob.pe).

Finally, several international commitments assumed by Peru, at the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels, imply particular attention to the safety of human life at sea, safe navigation, and the protection of the marine ecosystem.

Definition of Strategic Variables

Several factors can be identified as strategic variables. They are:

Interdependence of Markets and Economies. It is undeniable that as a part of the globalization process, which demands increased competitiveness by companies to serve global demand, a growing process of strategic alliances among organizations in diverse countries is emerging. Apart from factors of an ideological or sociopolitical character, both globalization and strategic alliances have increasing and irreversible importance in the current economic scene, at least in the medium term.

Security and Freedom of Maritime Commerce. The role of navies throughout the history of major powers has been linked to the protection of maritime commerce and support of foreign policy. This role is still in effect, but the increasing interdependence of economies shows us that it is more complex than ever before. Today it is necessary that emerging countries count on naval power that, besides offering security and freedom in its jurisdictional seas, can protect an increasingly diversified foreign trade, acting in accordance with a wider foreign policy.

Surveillance and Control of the Territorial Sea. World peace and the welfare of states depend to a great extent on security in the worldwide maritime domain—ports, coastlines, territorial waters, and high seas—because through it most commerce is carried out and important economic activities take place. As Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy,

mentioned during the Current Strategy Forum at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in June 2006, every year more than fifty thousand large ships cross the oceans carrying almost 80 percent of worldwide commerce, 60 percent of all the petroleum produced, and more than eleven million passengers. All of this makes the sea not only a means of transit for new threats but also the scene in which they can be carried out.

Asymmetric Enemies. Threats are increasingly present that do not fit classic definitions but instead use and have methods, technologies, values, organizations, and perspectives significantly different from those of regular forces of a state. Their primary intention is to exploit weaknesses of the system against which they fight and to maximize their own advantages, obtain the initiative, and gain greater freedom of action. The center of gravity of the actions is located in the minds of their enemies more than in their enemies' armed forces. These threats act through subversive organizations equipped with weapons of mass destruction; international terrorist groups; criminal organizations, drug traffickers, Mafias, and money-laundering networks; hackers; and mercenaries or paramilitary groups. This kind of enemy has drawn on military strategies to conceive a new model of warfare that depends, for the first time, more on cultural elements than on warfighting potential.

A Peruvian Maritime Strategy Proposal

We propose the following new maritime strategy for Peru: "Peru, within the framework of the sovereignty of states and firmly adhering to the rules and principles of international law, will contribute to the security and freedom of maritime commerce, as an integral element of hemispheric security, by surveilling and controlling its jurisdictional waters, and protecting the freedom of international trade in the region and with the world, against asymmetric enemies that could affect the market economies."

To do this, it would be necessary to create a permanent organization in the maritime domain, a kind of task organization, of flexible character and suitable to the threats to be faced, and to exploit the synergy of different operational or administrative components of our naval institution. The proposed organization would be an operational unit of high mobility, centralized command, and decentralized execution, with a capacity for joint and combined operations and for work with other agencies that have the same objectives. That would give it an acceptable capacity to fight against asymmetric enemies in the short and medium terms.

Long-term planning is not applicable, since success in the short and medium terms will cause the new enemies to redefine their ways of operating against the law. This

phenomenon will force a constant redesign of strategies and tactics to fight against them, turning the process for neutralizing them into a permanent cycle of change.

Execution of Strategy

The execution of the proposed strategy would be carried out in two phases:

Phase I

The Peruvian Navy will work closely with other governmental organizations, mainly the National Police of Peru, attempting to maximize resources and the information available to fight against our enemies in an efficient way. To do so the following steps have been proposed:

- Establish a central command post and also subordinate, decentralized command posts in the ports of Callao, Paita, and Mollendo to allow the handling and management of information throughout the maritime domain and zone of responsibility. Each of these command posts would have assigned aviation and naval units, both surface ships and submarines, capable of deploying quickly in the area under control.
- Use the infrastructure and equipment currently available to the Navy, adapting its means and resources for operations under a task organization of high flexibility, specifically fulfilling control functions. Decisions on taking action would fall solely to the commander of the task organization.
- Conduct geographically layered defense, cover, and interdiction operations. Use equipment allocated in coastal zones, the littoral, and on the high seas.
- Carry out coordinated intelligence operations and also independent ones with decentralized detachments. These new organizations must do this work at the outset. The intelligence organization must work full-time, whereas operational units will act “as ordered,” being decentralized and ready to engage.
- Establish and coordinate permanent relations with institutions and governmental and nongovernmental security agencies at high levels in order to receive timely and effective information for the execution of operations.
- In order to optimize interrelations, structure the proposed organization with only one level of coordination, which would act as a unique interlocutor among the different actors fighting asymmetric enemies, at the national and international levels.

Phase II

The institution would work with, in addition to the Peruvian agencies and divisions, other navies and international agencies, seeking to improve its logistic elements and exploit satellite information. This would make it possible to extend the area of coverage and operation of the proposed task organization. For that, the following actions should be taken:

- Sign agreements of cooperation with the navies of countries that are interested in fighting against these threats and can offer satellite intelligence that can be used by the operational commanders for interdiction.
- Implement cooperative security policies with countries of the Pacific basin, consistent with policies of national security and defense. Institutional adjustment to these new complementary roles to the Navy's traditional function should be given priority, allocating equipment and resources to implement the approach in the short term.
- Establish cooperative mechanisms between states so as to create the capability and influence needed to anticipate and respond flexibly to the threats posed by asymmetric enemies. A relationship with the United States is a privilege, because that country can offer superior logistical support and information to achieve success in these kinds of operations.
- Implement systems of control similar to the maritime one for rivers and lakes. To do so it will be necessary to count on international support, because it is much more difficult to control illegal activities in the vast Amazonian region than in the maritime domain.

Conclusion

It is necessary to design new strategies to fight against asymmetric enemies, strategies that have at the same time a particular emphasis on the security and control of seas, both at the regional and at the global levels. Only in that way can the threats to maritime commerce be avoided, thus enabling globalization, interdependent markets, and economies to act on behalf of the country and the region.

From a Local Perspective

Toward a Maritime Strategy for the South Atlantic

CAPTAIN CRISTIAN SIDDER, ARGENTINE NAVY

A New Maritime Strategy?

The invitation to contribute elements that would allow us to define a new maritime strategy leads us to new, innovative thoughts, as if prior considerations had suddenly lost their validity. After a first reflection, however, we notice that the criteria we use today have been established over a long period of time, by applying a logic common to this part of the globe. They have never remained unchanged, as our understanding has been gradually updated in light of the evolution of technology and international relations.

Therefore, we can consider the current situation to be a stage of a long, evolutionary process, one that has involved alternating periods of cooperation and tensions among different actors. Today, the international community seeks to strengthen security through progress and cooperation among peoples.

In the following paragraphs we will try to outline the factors that have guided the evolution of Argentina's maritime strategy.

Elements of the Maritime Strategy

It is necessary to begin by highlighting the most significant elements that make up the concept of maritime strategy. Obtaining and transporting resources, mostly fish and, to a lesser extent, oil and gas, have traditionally been the two main activities carried out at sea. In addition, several engagements, though few decisive battles, have taken place in our waters, where control of the sea was a critical factor for the victor.

The evolution of maritime strategy, both at a national and a global level, is an important matter to the human race and the planet. This judgment is strongly supported by widely known data about the percentage of the earth's surface covered by oceans and the population settled near the coasts or expected to move there. This demonstrates

that shipping will remain a principal means of transportation of goods. In the last decades, international maritime trade has quadrupled. It is worth noting that oil and its derivatives are among the most important seaborne cargoes.

From the local point of view, the growth achieved in these areas has considerably exceeded the previous average. The increase of passenger traffic on pleasure cruises must also be noted.

Geographic Factors

Considered as a route that connects nations, the South Atlantic has distinctive characteristics. First, the South Atlantic's connection with other oceans defines focal areas of particular importance. In a westward direction, the Atlantic's connection with the Pacific is the only alternative path for ships too large to transit the Panama Canal. The Cape of Good Hope area likewise concentrates shipping headed for and proceeding from the Indian Ocean. From south to north, vital supplies for the most developed economies flow through the Atlantic Narrows. Tierra del Fuego has the closest ports to the Antarctic.

From the production point of view, we cannot forget to mention exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. Argentina possesses an EEZ of a size similar to that of the nation's land territory, and a continental shelf whose extension beyond the EEZ amounts to a million square kilometers.

The navigable rivers allow transit between the vast ocean and productive zones inland. New technological possibilities, together with the increasing market demand for raw materials, have drawn the heart of South America into closer contact with the maritime environment. Hence, a comprehensive maritime vision must take into account the importance of major rivers.

We could say that the sea limits, which used to be close to the coast and exclusive to coastal countries, have become remote and mobile frontiers that raise questions about the future evolution of international law. Each nation will be able to enjoy the benefits of international law only by exercising the powers and honoring the obligations prescribed by that body of law.

Customary Concepts versus Evolution of the Law of the Sea—Freedom of the High Seas—New Users—New Threats

Apart from the use of the oceans for shipping, there is a wide range of activity in that vast and dynamic environment: enforcement of international law and order, safeguarding of human life, protection and sustainable exploitation of the marine environment, humanitarian assistance, scientific exploration, scientific and technological research

and development, integration of economies, and education. These are just examples of activities in the maritime domain that may be enhanced and improved. All these considerations emphasize the importance of the sea and its use, giving it an even more transcendent dimension.

In carrying out such actions, in response to single current issues, conflicts with ancient principles such as the freedom of the high seas may arise. To what extent may countries advance toward the governance of the sea? When crossing the ocean from one shore to the other, shipping will navigate through highly exclusive zones, then through those where it may enjoy freedom restricted only by the flag state, finally reaching the maritime jurisdiction of individual coastal states.

The challenge, therefore, is how to cope with this situation without failing to respect the international order and each nation's interests and within a framework of indisputable cooperation. In this sense, it is widely believed that multinational organizations play a key role in helping countries arrive at understanding.

The Concept of the Use of the Sea—National Expectations—Argentine Interests in the Sea

The strategic area where the Argentine Navy operates is defined as the “maritime and riverine areas of national jurisdiction or interest.” It is not geographically delimited but covers the zones where naval assets can be employed for pursuing the goals established by legislation in force, in line with national interests.

In this context, and following the trinity of naval functions laid out by Ken Booth, the Argentine Navy directs its actions toward three institutional goals:

- Protecting maritime and riverine interests
- Supporting the nation's foreign policy
- Contributing to the national defense.¹

If we observe the evolution of maritime jurisdiction throughout the last century, we may observe that it has been considerably extended in favor of coastal states, as far as exploitation rights are concerned. But at the same time, new duties aimed at the ocean's preservation and care have also been imposed for the future benefit of mankind.

The southwestern Atlantic and its bordering nations have begun to assume increasing economic importance. In the last two decades, interstate relations within this regional strategic area have made highly satisfactory progress in defense and security affairs. The security atmosphere existing in South America is unprecedented, as a consequence

of the degree of dialogue, cooperation, and agreement achieved, distinguishing it as a region with one of the highest levels of stability and predictability in the world.²

Naval power has always been an efficient tool of state policy, and it has been increasingly used given the will of nations to reinforce their bonds of friendship, guarantee agreements, and form coalitions. Within the region, conventional challenges are currently tempered by the implementation of confidence-building measures.

In recent years, the global and regional security scenes have been marked by the emergence of nonmilitary phenomena, usually called “new threats,” such as transnational terrorism and organized crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. At present, these threats constitute a large part of the security agendas of the international community as a whole and of individual states, in line with their national policies and domestic legislation. The maritime environment is particularly susceptible to these dangers. These factors pose a dilemma as to whether to preserve the customary principle of freedom of the sea or to exercise increased control over all maritime areas—that is, by guaranteeing their use to those who have the right to use them and denying their use to those who intend to carry out unlawful acts.

Guaranteeing the benefits of the sea to Argentina and the international community as well as providing maritime transport with security, protecting human life, contributing to the preservation of the marine environment, and ensuring compliance with national and international laws call for a basic capability to control maritime and riverine areas of national jurisdiction and interest. Control is intended to protect our resources and rights and to undertake our responsibilities in such areas.

The wide range of missions and tasks to be carried out at sea to turn it into a safer environment require the upgrading of many current capabilities. Today many navies are redefining the concept of security in a way that provides a basis for the development and constitution of each force. At present, when a critical situation arises, the immediate response is provided by an ad hoc coalition. Cooperation among nations must be based on respect for each other’s domestic law. In this regard, much progress has been made. Many long-standing combined activities occur in the region. Most nations carry out bilateral exercises with their neighbors as well as multilateral exercises with countries from distant regions. The forums held to discuss sea-related issues are no less important. In line with Admiral Mullen’s proposal to create a “thousand-ship navy,”³ the establishment of a Hemispheric Naval Cooperation Network, as approved by a recommendation of the XXII Inter-American Naval Conference, is aimed at providing immediate responses to incidents involving maritime security or assistance in the event of natural disasters.⁴

A combined capabilities assessment based on a principle of strategic complementarity would probably arrive at a more effective and efficient solution for the region. This assessment should be made not only by all participating navies but also by their corresponding governments, which are ultimately responsible for providing the strategic framework required for the success of the naval network.

The concept of global security is focused on the important fact that responses to incidents occurring in this new dynamic scene are to be provided by the nations of each region, which will organize and coordinate the relevant activities to be carried out within their areas of responsibility. In this respect, the exchange of information would be useful for the development of a “common surface picture.” In 1965, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination (CAMAS). Since then this organization has worked daily in the areas of management, control, and protection, in order to contribute to a safe use of sea lines of communication. Through the analysis of several exercises done regularly doctrine is updated in line with the present-day scenario.⁵ The U.S. Navy and the South African Navy have recently joined as observers. Integration through this kind of organization would contribute to improving the conditions for the use of the sea.

Maritime Strategy Elements to Remain Unchanged

There are some factors that will not undergo any significant change:

- The importance of maritime shipping, because there are no other feasible alternatives for the massive transport of goods.
- The value of focal areas, which are weighed differently according to temporal criteria but tend to increase in value in times of crisis.
- The immensity of the sea makes the presence of “manned” assets irreplaceable for effective control, although technological advances facilitate the gathering of information. The presence of naval assets in maritime areas of interest helps reduce potential conflicts and provides a progressive response to different kinds of incidents.
- Coastal states and flag states will continue to be key players in legitimizing the actions resulting from the evolution of maritime strategies.

Conclusions

Going back to the concept of maritime strategy as an evolving process, it is appropriate to highlight some aspects that deserve to be analyzed when updating the principles in force today. The first to consider is that a maritime strategy is, by definition, the strategy applied by a particular actor to the maritime scene consistently with its own

interests. It is by no means an abstract construct. Second, like any other strategy, maritime strategies of various actors should somehow link together, taking advantage of the synergistic power of cooperation, which multiplies the gains of all participants. Moreover, they should realistically assess the direct and indirect costs of policies of confrontation at present and in the future.

Third, reciprocity, as a measure of cooperation, should be understood in terms of mutual benefit beyond our own interests. Fourth, the concept of evolution itself implies that many things are already in place and provide a point of departure for any update. Fifth, the search for cooperation and integration in naval issues requires establishing mechanisms designed to bridge the technological gap among the different actors involved.

Finally, cooperation among states does not suppose the absence of conflict but the search for a solution to facilitate lasting arrangements for the greatest benefit of the participants involved. The current state of affairs has allowed the United Nations General Assembly, by virtue of Resolution 4111 of 27 October 1986, to declare the South Atlantic region as a peace and cooperation zone, a status that strengthens day after day.

Notes

1. Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 1980), pp. 19–32.
2. The current state of affairs has allowed the United Nations General Assembly, by virtue of Resolution 41/11 of 27 October 1986, to declare the South Atlantic region as a peace and cooperation zone. The will to increase cooperation in areas of common interest was arrived at by consensus in the statement given in the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Zone (1998) and the following plan of action made to develop the objectives agreed in said document.
3. Admiral Michael Mullen, International Seapower Symposium 2005. Admiral Mullen's concept, originally called the "Thousand-Ship Navy," is now known as the Global Maritime Partnership.
4. 14th Recommendation (XXII Inter-American Naval Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, 3–7 April 2006).
5. Naval control of shipping exercises conducted regularly are COAMAS, with AMAS navies; TRANSAMERICA, among the Inter-American System navies; and TRANSOCEANIC, between the Inter-American System navies and the South African Navy.

Two Approaches to Security Cooperation and Obstacles to Cooperation

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At the request of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), the Brazilian Naval War College agreed to write essays on the topic “Global and Regional Security Cooperation: Implications for a New U.S. Maritime Strategy.” That seems to be a difficult task, especially if we believe our studies will have implications for a new maritime strategy. We are talking about suggestions aimed at a country that, according to some scholars, has or believes it has “command of the commons”—command of the sea, air, and space.¹ No doubt this supporting pillar of U.S. hegemony is at least an ultimate goal to be sought and achieved. However, it would be a more reasonable target if the United States could count on the cooperation of allies and partners.²

This essay is intended to examine concisely our vision of the impending threats to maintaining U.S. hegemony and the proposed cooperation signaled by NWC. Next, we will proceed with identifying partnership issues that may be of interest to Brazil. However, we cannot be misled by the ambiguous factors involved in a cooperation agreement under the leadership of President George W. Bush, which may cause—deliberately or not—irritants in the relationship with regional countries.³

Development

A Theoretical Platform

For the purpose of this essay, we will use Robert Gilpin’s theory of “hegemonic war,” as it is closely tied to the current scenario and the topic proposed by the Naval War College.⁴ Thinking about the underlying aspects of the issue, we understand that the current international system is anarchic and comprises independent states. According to Gilpin, the international system consists of three dimensions: hierarchical prestige, territorial division, and international economy.⁵ Once the international system is structured under the hegemony of one dominant state, power can be distributed among the

strong states.⁶ Transforming one or more such strong players may impact the established international system, which resists change.⁷

The situation described above is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for hegemonic war. A challenge is also required. In other words, internal changes may occur, provided that they do not pose threats to the vital interests of dominant states, at the risk of being understood as a challenge. Nevertheless, other states may threaten vital interests within the international system. That would give rise to another kind of war, aimed at maintaining order. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars exemplify a situation of system instability.


According to Gilpin, international relations have a close causal connection with a differential in the growth of state power. An alteration of this power differential can unbalance the international system. In the case of war to maintain order, we have one state that has no increased power to threaten but challenges the hegemonic state.

Contextualizing

Based on this theoretical approach, we will summarize conceptually the post–September 11th situation of the United States.

No doubt the United States exercises world hegemony. The country's military, economic, and technological power is undeniable. Nonetheless, some time ago China began to present itself as a potential challenger of U.S. hegemony as a result of its economic and—in particular—military growth.⁸ Based on figure 1, which compares Chinese and U.S. military spending, a certain trend toward a reduction in the difference is apparent, with the narrowest gap witnessed in 1999.⁹ We do not wish to claim that

FIGURE 1
Chinese and U.S. Military Spending



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

China will challenge the United States but to point out the impending Chinese threat to U.S. hegemony, which could set off a war—hot or cold—in the competition for world hegemony.

However, September 11th showed the United States that a new threat had been mounted against the country—one that takes advantage of its vulnerability and causes damage, particularly to its prestige as the world's greatest power. No doubt that event has had an impact on the international system. Yet the cause of such a threat is not one of the traditional components of that system; in addition, it can be posed by any state in the international system. Compared to a missile that is fired into the defensive system and follows through by its immutable logic until hitting the target, the terrorist works with a changeable logic, destroying himself along with his targets. Therefore, while he is not a state, he poses a threat to the foundations of the international system. In this respect we can identify a departure from Gilpin's theory, but the effect on stability is similar.

While its perpetrators did not act in the name of one or more states, the September 11th terrorist attack can be seen not as a consequence of a variation in the power relationship but as a challenge to the existing hegemony, resulting in a “war to maintain order,” or the “war against terrorism” declared by President Bush.

In view of the above, the international system is assumed to be unstable, for two reasons: the variation in the power differential with China and the challenge posed by transnational terrorism. In other words, the hegemonic power is witnessing the growth of a country that may challenge its vital interests, while continuing to be challenged by a type of non-state organization whose logic and rationale differ from Western standards.

U.S. Strategy

The strategies announced by the Bush administration after September 11th include the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (NSHS) and the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS), published in July 2002 and March 2006 (currently in force), respectively.¹⁰

The NSHS sets forth the following three strategic objectives to maximize U.S. security:¹¹

- Preventing terrorists' attacks on the United States
- Reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism
- Minimizing damage and recovery from an attack.

Two initiatives from the “critical mission area” called “border and transport security” can be pointed out, as both are relevant to this study.¹² These initiatives consist of creating “smart borders” and enhancing maritime container transport security.

Finally, the following principles of homeland security should be considered: law, science and technology, information and system sharing, and international cooperation.¹³ Science and technology, we note, constitute a strength that Americans are not willing to share. The fourth principle—international cooperation—is set aside from the other three. An obstacle to international cooperation is imposed on American universities by the U.S. government in the form of the Technology Alert List.¹⁴

The core strategy is the NSHS; all other strategies and actions derive from it—including the NSS. The NSHS can also be evaluated for its consistency, as it has not been amended since publication, in contrast to the NSS, which was issued in September 2002 and again in March 2006.

U.S. Southern Command

This analysis will be based on the lecture delivered by Rear Admiral James W. Stevenson, commander of Naval Forces, Southern Command.¹⁵ We will identify important points so that we can be aware of the kind of cooperation suggested—an early aspect has already been reviewed—and its impact on Brazil’s vital interests.

The basic text consists of a proposal from the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to the U.S. Navy, and it comments on the capabilities the Brazilian Navy may consider in the next twenty or twenty-five years.¹⁶ According to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, “Cooperation is of the utmost importance as no individual country is able to do what has to be done.” The admiral emphasizes that “we have to work in a combined environment,” and, we add, it is obviously important for U.S. security and reduced instability in the international system.

Two points are highlighted by Rear Admiral Stevenson: that the U.S. Navy must “continue to be the prevailing force in the open seas” and that it must “have increased capacity to operate in both green and brown waters.” Therefore, it wishes to capitalize on the “ability of partner nations to develop a working relationship, as well as to communicate and operate both at sea and ashore.” Given such “cooperation in the various world scenarios,” it can reduce its U.S. fleet support infrastructure and “maintain a global maritime supremacy.”

Meanwhile, we can say that in this way the U.S. Navy achieves two goals—extending outward the U.S. line of defense and improving maritime container transport security—in accordance with the NSHS principle of international cooperation, thus contributing to a reduction in U.S. vulnerability. All that can be summarized in the words of Rear

Admiral Stevenson during his lecture: “We would like to see a scenario of cooperation among the world’s navies, in order to ensure security in certain areas.” Again, it is important to add that those are areas of interest to the United States.

Once the strategic goal of reduced vulnerability is addressed, Rear Admiral Stevenson moves on to the next goal—the terrorist threat—and the “global war against terrorism” campaign. The proposal to fight terrorism consists of sharing U.S. “global supremacy” at sea in a regionalized manner—so that, in other words, the United States is able to operate in green waters and conquer the brown waters of other states by means of regional partnerships.¹⁷ On the other hand, we could say the Southern Command agrees to build partnerships with other navies in green waters, which in turn would accept U.S. cooperation in their brown waters.

That cooperation requires encouraging trust and interoperability, according to the same document, which states: “We want to increase the capacity of our partners, the capacity of their navies.” We understand that interoperability may be an interesting aspect if the Brazilian Navy is provided with state-of-the-art technology and financing. While not an incentive for the domestic industry or, in particular, for our science and technology in terms of defense innovations, that alternative would offer enhanced equipment with beneficial consequences for the readiness of the Brazilian Navy in the short term.

Trust, to paraphrase Vinícius de Moraes, “will be eternal while it lasts.” Remember, once the United States is no longer interested in the subject, Brazil may be required to cut its military budget back to what it once was.¹⁸

We can finish Rear Admiral Stevenson’s thought with his own words, according to which it is important to the Brazilian Navy to “maintain security within one’s own country, territorial sea, and EEZ [exclusive economic zone]. That is what navies are for.” In this case, he includes at least the Paraguay/Paraná and Amazon river basins, located “within the domestic territory.”

The 1988 Constitution and the National Defense Policy

According to the Brazilian constitution, international relations are governed by ten principles: national independence, prevalence of human rights, self-determination of peoples, nonintervention, equality among states, defense of the peace, peaceful settlement of disputes, rejection of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind, and granting of political asylum.

We can see that terrorism is at the same level as the principle of cooperation. Yet, in contrast with the NSHS proposal, where cooperation is aimed at U.S. national security, the Brazilian proposal is aimed at the progress of mankind. That difference can be

easily understood if we look back on the U.S. president's visit to Brazil in March 2007.¹⁹ Figure 2 illustrates such differences.

FIGURE 2

TECHNOLOGY	U.S. POSITION
In U.S. universities	National security issue (Technology Alert List)
Brazil's ethanol	Access to Brazilian technology

As far as the Brazilian National Defense Policy—NDP—is concerned, terrorism is highlighted explicitly in sub-item 2.6: “Currently, nonstate players, new threats, and the tension between nationalism and transnationalism pervade international relations and state security arrangements. Varied transnational violations and international terrorism pose a potential threat to peace, security and democratic order—usually countered by state intelligence and security instruments.” Continuing, the NDP defines Brazil’s areas of interest as including the South American subcontinent and adjacent countries in Africa, where the country seeks to “build stronger cooperative relationships.”²⁰

Sub-item 3.3 shows a concern with processes that contribute to reducing the likelihood of conflict within the strategic zone. Those processes include “the strengthening of the integration process, close relations among Amazonian countries, intensification of cooperation and trade among African countries, facilitated by ethnic and cultural ties; and the consolidation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.” Again, the term “cooperation” comes up as a way to achieve peace, not as a way of increasing our military power. Therefore, “the process of integrated and harmonic development of South America becomes a priority, which covers the regional defense and security area.”²¹ We can see that Brazil is not concerned about hegemony but about “an international order based on democracy, multilateralism, cooperation, the banning of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and a search for peace among nations.”²²

Finally, the NDP sub-item 4.8 states that “Brazil believes terrorism puts world peace and security at risk. It emphatically condemns terrorist actions and supports UN resolutions, recognizing that the world’s nations need to work together toward preventing and fighting terrorist threats.” Based on this premise, the Brazilian Navy—through the Port and Coast Management Office—helps create initiatives based on the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.²³ It is a post–September 11th kind of cooperation involving member countries of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

In short, Brazil is in search of a way to peace for the sake of its own security, however utopian that may seem. While admitting that threats do exist, it believes they are not likely to have an impact on the Brazilian territory and people. In addition, the banning

of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is expected to enhance the country's security.

Conclusion

First, let us point out the differences between two concepts of security. For the United States, national security is dependent upon the military and technological power that undergirds the country's hegemony. The United States intends to increase its hegemonic power as much as possible, in an attempt to meet any challenges in the international system. For Brazil, in contrast, national security is based on a belief in peace among the world's peoples and on a kind of cooperation quite different from that proposed by the United States. The case of technology transfers facilitated by partners in the South but blocked by Northern partners is an example of the different approaches.

All agree that terrorism poses a threat to peace and the international system. In order to fight terrorism, the United States is seeking to build partnerships to expand its borders and field of activity. The country is willing to enter the green and brown waters of partner countries upon the consent of the latter. Should it not find partners and be forced to invade a country in the name of U.S. national security, it will do so, spending billions of dollars. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent cases in point.²⁴

The Brazilian Navy–U.S. Southern Command partnership in green or brown waters to prevent and fight terrorism is not of interest to Brazil, as it could lead to a form of intervention. That would contradict one of the principles of international relations established in the Brazilian constitution. In order to cooperate with international peace and security—including U.S. security—the Brazilian Navy must stand up to any terrorist threat identified within its scope of jurisdiction, which it has done in compliance with the ISPS Code. In addition, it may integrate naval means of communication in missions like those of the U.S. Southern Command. That kind of interoperability may be key to the success of a military operation against terrorism.

In the short term, such prospects as interoperability and the increased capacity of the Brazilian Navy suit the interests of defense against enemies of both countries. However, in Brazil, interoperability cannot be dissociated from the national defense industry and must not affect strategic developments and innovations.

Finally, Brazil understands that U.S. ships that come to participate in any cooperation effort should not carry chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, as those are certainly not appropriate to fight the terrorist threat and may even pose a threat to Brazil's interests in the consolidation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic.

Notes

1. See Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003).
2. In the pragmatic sense of the cost-benefit relationship.
3. See Alyson J. K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey, "Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century," chap. 4 in *SIPRI Year Book 2006: Armament, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), p. 1, available at yearbook2006.sipri.org/.
4. Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 15–37.
5. These three dimensions are dependent upon demonstrations of political, social, economic, military, and technological power.
6. That does not mean a few other strong states may not exist.
7. Transforming, for example, through economic, military, and technological development. Theoretically, components of the international system would not be willing to surrender their power, in whole or part.
8. *Jornal da Ciência*, available at www.jornaldaciencia.org.br/; and BBC Brasil, available at www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/.
9. Chart design data were extracted from SIPRI and are available at first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php.
10. Other derived strategies include: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004), and The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005).
11. *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002), p. vii, available at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/.
12. *Ibid.*, p. viii.
13. *Ibid.*, p. x.
14. Denying developing countries access to key science and technology for their development poses a great barrier to international cooperation. An example is the Harvard University list, available at www.hio.harvard.edu.
15. Rear Adm. James W. Stevenson (lecture, Brazilian Navy Seminar, Escola de Guerra Naval, Rio de Janeiro, 17 November 2005).
16. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, whose position is an equivalent to that of the Brazilian Navy Commander.
17. According to Rear Admiral Stevenson, that means twenty-four-hour capacity, seven days a week.
18. In the early 1990s, Brazil had to abide by U.S. hegemony and accept the changing priorities of public spending as limits were established for military spending, thus affecting the country's defense policy. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Formação do império americano: da guerra contra a Espanha à guerra no Iraque* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2005), pp. 518–20.
19. Orientation given by President Bush to his ambassador to Brazil, Clifford Sobel, on the ethanol agreement: "Bring their scientists over here, bring their universities" [in free translation], available at clipping.planejamento.gov.br/.
20. Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *National Defense Policy*, approved by Decree No. 5,484, 30 June 2005, sub-item 3.1.
21. *Ibid.*, sub-item 3.6.
22. *Ibid.*, sub-item 4.7.
23. The ISPS Code was prepared by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee and approved by Resolution 2 of the 1974 SOLAS Diplomatic Conference during a meeting held 9–13 December 2002 in London.
24. In the second half of the last century, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti were examples of Latin American countries invaded by the United States.

Toward a Maritime Strategy

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When we review our origins, the birth of our nation, and our early years of national life, and then travel through time until we reach the present moment, we may clearly appreciate a series of national interest groups that must be harmonized with the life and existence of the Argentine people. These interest groups have sequentially accompanied the growth of our nation. The national interests embraced by these groups gave rise to the public policies that have provided, together with the particular circumstances governing life among the different nations, the foundations for the maritime strategy of the nation. Although in all the stages of our national life there was a need to develop a maritime strategy, this need became stronger as our nation developed.

A Country Is Born

During the colonial period preceding its birth, our nation, Argentina, unlike most South American countries, did not have its origin in the sea. On the contrary, Argentina was born from the need of the Spaniards in the Viceroyalty of Peru and in the Captaincy of Chile to take their wealth and treasures to Spain safely. The Spaniards considered that the best way to do that was to cross the vast plain from the Andes to the River Plate, from which they would set sail toward Europe, instead of trying to navigate the dangerous sea-lanes to the south of the continent.

Trade encouraged this movement, and the need for security in trade promoted the development of a maritime strategy. It was necessary to safeguard the maritime traffic from the River Plate to the port of destination in the mother country. From the beginning, this situation clearly transformed the River Plate into a major strategic point, at which the main fleets of those times would call.

By 1799, some years before the birth of our nation, Manuel Belgrano, a lawyer who would later become an army general, was encouraging the creation of the National Merchant Marine School, arguing that “no nation is free if it has not secured its foreign trade.”¹ After the birth of the nation, illustrious patriots made their own

contributions—like Francisco de Gurruchaga, who would make all his fortune available for the new navy, and Juan Larrea, whose fervor for maritime power would become a determining factor in the naval future.

When our country was born in 1810, our founders had to settle two major issues requiring urgent attention. First, the events that unfolded on 25 May in Buenos Aires were replicated in other cities along the roads connecting both Alto Perú (currently the Bolivian altiplano) and the Captaincy of Chile with the port of the River Plate. The dream realized in Buenos Aires had to extend to the rest of the cities. The second issue referred to the way this emerging nation would relate to the rest of the world, so as to be accepted and even assisted in doing what was needed to ensure its survival.

The greatest threat to these goals obviously came from the sea, and was directed at the aforementioned strategic point: the mouth of the River Plate. General José Francisco de San Martín, our liberator, considered that a good naval strategy would provide the best contribution for his liberation effort in America. Thus, he appreciated the naval combat in Montevideo, where naval control was obtained in the region of the River Plate, acknowledging it as the best support provided for his liberation campaign. In turn, Juan Manuel de Pueyrredón, another patriot serving in the government, recognized—as General San Martín did—the significant contribution of naval action in the River Plate estuary and its vicinity to the development of the nation.

Developments through the 1880s

Once the national organization was in place and the fundamental law—the constitution of 1853/60—was in force, the leaders faced three major problems involving the national interests at the time.

First, it was necessary to integrate the provinces that had been annexed within the Argentine nation. To that end, Juan Bautista Alberdi, one of the authors of our constitution, suggested that President Nicolás Avellaneda “educate” the Argentine people so that they would know how to produce wealth from the land. This is how the “granary of the world” emerged in the northern half of the country.

Moreover, the southern half of the country, Patagonia, was to be united into the national patrimony. The national government, complying with a resolution of the National Congress, undertook the so-called Desert Campaign and effectively incorporated the southern territories under Argentine sovereignty.

Finally, our nation had to develop a relationship with a changing world that recognized the United Kingdom as the dominant power. With the support of this power, trading activity with foreign countries commenced, and in a few years the country’s

transformation was so spectacular that Argentina had become one of the foremost and most promising nations.

The maritime strategy demanded moving away from the coasts, accompanying trade, and fully exercising national sovereignty. Therefore, Commodore Luis Py deployed to the south with the first fleet in 1878, bringing about the transformation of the “brown water” navy into a “blue water” navy. In that time also, Commander Luis Piedra Buena showed the world our naval skills, helping sailors of different nationalities who were navigating these austral waters, and the corvette *Uruguay* introduced the Argentine flag in Antarctica, on having rescued Otto Nordenskjöld’s expedition in 1902, constituting a definite landmark.

Today

History unfolded differently in the years that followed. The world changed in 1930 as a consequence of the deep global economic crisis, but Argentines did not become fully aware of those dramatic changes. The national government continued to follow the former policy without accommodating it to the changes dictated by global developments, and our nation went into a slow decline, which continued until the present time.

Today we are beginning a century in which nations will appropriate the sea. Coastal states have a huge responsibility to keep under their sovereignty those waters prescribed by the Law of the Sea. Argentina possesses the eighth-largest continental shelf, a vast and rich area with a high potential for sustainable exploitation of very valuable resources. This is the current situation—in a world in which players are closer and multiply everywhere, and in which differing trends impel nations to act quickly and wisely in the interests of their welfare and development.

Unlike preceding generations, today’s Argentines have four major interests before them:

- We need to develop the northern half of our country, the same area that in the 1880s had been transformed into the granary of the world. We need to do that in a way that exploits its rich resources in the best way and to the greatest extent.
- Besides, we feel a strong urge to integrate Patagonia fully into the life of our country, making this integration both sustainable and appealing to the other Argentine regions.
- We are faced with the task of incorporating the sea—that area of it constituting our legitimate possession and recognized as such by the world—into our national patrimony. We cannot merely claim sovereignty.

- Finally, it is desirable to maintain our connection with the world in the best possible way, taking into account that the hegemonic power is the United States; that there are two other focal points of power in the world—Europe and Asia; and that globalization has brought everyone closer together and turned interdependence into an unavoidable reality.

The maritime strategy calls for abandoning the coasts and also projecting our power in depth to prevent existing threats from reaching the shore and the sea-lanes used by our foreign trade. In other words, if we want to secure our land today, we have to commit ourselves as far offshore as possible. In reviewing our history, we understand that the moments in which our navy performed most efficiently were those in which the design of the force was based on rationality, consistent with foreign policy goals. It is important to remember this factor, because by analyzing it we will know how to seek the most relevant solutions.

But let us analyze the life and existence of the people of Argentina today, in terms of four sets of interests. The first is concerned with the “development of the northern half of the country, mainly the River Plate Basin,” namely, a “geostrategy for regional integration.” The development of the potential of the richest basin in the subcontinent depends on the decisions adopted by the countries bordering it. This potential is huge and will be even larger and more sustainable if decisions taken result from reasoning and negotiation among such countries. The River Plate basin does not present difficult problems, since it runs in the same direction as the meridians, making it totally exploitable in different ways according to each latitude.

Most of the Argentine wealth that is traded with the world departs from this area and follows two trade routes: the first route heads for Europe or the United States along an Atlantic sea-lane northward and bordering Brazil or western Africa; the second route heads for the rest of Africa, Asia, or Oceania by crossing the Cape of Good Hope. From this perspective, the mouth of the River Plate is a major strategic point, just as it was before our nation was born. A third route goes southward and crosses the bi-oceanic corridors between Chile and Argentina. Although it is less important from a commercial point of view, it demands continuing attention. Many issues arising from this simple description represent incentives for particular and operational strategies.

The second interest relates to the integration of Patagonia. Due to its unique hydrography (rivers running in the direction of parallels of latitude), preceding generations of Argentines believed that the different sections, or compartments, between parallels should provide different, rich resources and that harmony among them and with the rest of the country would be easy to achieve because each was located in a different latitude. Like the first set of interests, this one reflects strategic importance. Patagonia

is the territory that generates the most important arguments concerning the exercise of our rights over the eighth-largest continental shelf in the world. Rights are given by the land, and in this case, most of the land is in Patagonia.

The issue addressed by the 1880 generation comes up again: the “maritime highway” (defined as the maritime area between the mouth of the River Plate and the southern bi-oceanic corridors) will be the best tool for the integration of Patagonia within the nation. It is exactly for this reason that leaders in the 1880s decided to build bases and maritime support locations to the south of the River Plate. We must enhance that effort by providing the support required for the “exploitation of the best route to Antarctica”; performing the tasks derived from future foreign trade in relation to each of the aforementioned territorial compartments; and supporting the incorporation of the sea into our national patrimony consistently with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The third interest is, precisely, “incorporating the sea into our national patrimony.” From a strategic point of view, this interest may well create more tasks. If we are going to incorporate the sea, titles and claims do not suffice. We have to go to sea and be present in it. In that sense, we, the Argentines, have just begun to develop our real calling to integrate the aforementioned territories into our national patrimony. As mentioned before, Argentina was built as a nation *from* the land and *toward* the sea, following the same sequence or order in which the interests have been described. This has recently led us all to acknowledge the significance of our sea. What has always been the concern of men of the sea now arouses the interest of all the Argentine people. From a strategic perspective, this situation demands an urgent and serious educational effort.

Finally, our existence as a nation and the work of our predecessors has created international obligations and agreements (for example, search and rescue at sea) that we must honor and that demand our effective presence in locations far away from our naval stations. These efforts involve the permanent and unavoidable use of significant resources. Our relationship with the world constitutes our fourth interest. This increasingly interdependent relationship is characterized by permanent demonstration of reliability, threats beyond those arising from the relationship between states, increased cooperation, a tendency toward geopolitical regional integration, lasting problems related to adaptation to the global economy, uncontrolled migratory movements, difficult-to-control transnational structures, and a growing gap between rich and poor nations.

The maritime strategy must help preserve the South Atlantic as a peaceful and harmonious zone. Correct and safe communication between the North Atlantic and South Atlantic, the connection through the Cape of Good Hope and the Atlantic–Pacific corridors, and facilitation of movement to Antarctica are all aspects that must be incorporated in such a strategy.

To conclude, we may state that we must

- Enhance our vocation for the sea through intensive, relevant education, supported by international maritime law and the Law of the Sea.
- Develop the necessary capabilities through, first, the construction or acquisition of naval assets to build a navy capable of having effective presence at least in the western South Atlantic and, second, the necessary regional alliances to safeguard our foreign trade and international commerce in the South Atlantic.
- Develop our own technology through research and the acquisition of technical knowledge.
- Continue, increase, and facilitate third countries' involvement in Antarctica through the technical, port, and logistical support that such countries may require.
- Understand that developments in the maritime domain do not pertain exclusively to the military but are rather joint responsibilities, to which all strategies must make valuable contributions.
- The conduct of this strategy must be centralized at the highest governmental level.
- The foregoing goals entail the search for a role to be played by our country in this globalized world, in the understanding that such a role must not only be useful for us but also appealing to a world that is pursuing development and welfare in an orderly framework. Our actions should be both consistent and lasting.

Note

1. Argument used by the secretary of the Royal Consulate, Don Manuel Belgrano y Gonzalez, to create the Royal School of Navigation

in 1799, "the first Nautical School of the Viceroyalty," www.escueladenautica.edu.ar.

PART TWO

Suggestions for a New U.S. Maritime Strategy

Views of the Chilean Navy on a New U.S. Maritime Strategy

REAR ADMIRAL FEDERICO NIEMANN FIGARI, CHILEAN NAVY

This essay attempts to make a clear definition of the areas of cooperation that can be established between the Chilean Navy and the U.S. Navy, taking into consideration the different alternatives for a new naval strategy for the United States. We will start by referring to the phenomenon of globalization and its influence in the contemporary reality as a whole. Then we will analyze the problems derived from globalization and how they have affected the international system, highlighting the deficiencies of the organizations that were meant to solve them. We will then show the way in which Chile involves itself in a world affected by globalization, indicating that it does so by observing and exercising international law as an active member of the United Nations and regional organizations.

Then we will discuss the fact that an ocean state like Chile can prosper only in an environment of stability, security, and respect for international law. In this regard, we will review the similarities between the concepts of U.S. Maritime Domain Awareness and Chilean “*Presencial Sea*,” for they pursue very similar objectives related to maritime security.¹ We will emphasize the facts that maritime security is the responsibility of all and we must therefore contribute proportionally and according to our capabilities, laws, and national interests. We will compare U.S. strategic objectives and Chilean national interests, determining potential fields of cooperation.

We will examine the concept of a “thousand-ship navy,” concluding that it is a realistic and practical way to define a cooperation initiative. We will identify activities of mutual support between the two navies, taking as an example 2007 and making special mention of the support and restrictions to the cooperation. We will also compare the mission areas defined in the concept of operations of the U.S. Navy with the ones defined by the Chilean Navy. This comparison will show that there are several opportunities for cooperation. Finally, we will review those conditions that may facilitate

cooperation between the navies, suggesting methods to achieve them, and then arrive at some conclusions.

Strategic Vision

Globalization is a political, economic, and cultural reality that has brought enormous benefits to mankind, such as meaningful progress in technology, communications, and the exchange of people and goods. However, the concept of globalization is perceived differently depending on the region, the culture, and even the social status of people within a community. Some cultures and countries reject globalization, claiming that it violates their beliefs and traditions, generating antiglobalization movements that have developed into anti-Americanism, in some cases even a rejection of Christian Western society as a whole.

Inequality in the effects of globalization generates tension and polarization and has created conflicts. Also, together with the advantages, there are a number of negative aspects of globalization and threats to international peace and security, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, illegal immigration, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, and illegal fishing.

Another crucial element of today's world is the concern for human beings and their rights, as well as democracy, free trade, and interconnectivity. Furthermore, even though the state is still the main actor, there are several others: international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals whose opinions must be taken into account.

Changes that occurred in the past decades have affected the international system, exposing deficiencies of some organizations that were originally created to satisfy the needs of other eras and to solve problems that no longer exist. Ignacio Walker, former Chilean minister of foreign affairs, describes this situation:

The main weakness and at the same time the main challenge of globalization is the lack of institutions to support it. . . . If we do not want to be governed by globalization, then we have to find a way to govern it. The way to do it is via solid institutions and rules of the game that are clear, stable and fair. Therefore, besides making use of the advantages and opportunities associated with the phenomenon of globalization, we have to face the challenge of redesigning its institutions; that is, the need for a new architecture of globalization.²

Chile is a democratic, developing country with a rule of law that respects the international legal order. Chile is involved in and related to the world order by the observance and exercise of international law and by its active membership in the United Nations and other, regional organizations. Chile is an enthusiastic promoter of peaceful coexistence at the global, regional, and local levels, regulated by international treaties of maritime, economic, social, and political natures.

Chile is committed to promoting comprehensive reform of the United Nations, seeking to adapt that organization to the demands of the twenty-first century. Chile has supported such measures as the universal recognition of democracy; the concept of human security, which consolidates a new vision of international security; the strengthening of the ability of the United Nations to react to massive violation of human rights; assistance to nations in a postconflict stage (consolidation of peace); and support for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Chile agrees with the need for the United Nations to engage actively when confronted with extreme situations, such as civil war and significant internal disturbances, and it supports reform and modernization of the Security Council. In the economic field, Chile strongly supports the World Trade Organization and efforts to achieve trade liberalization.³

The improvement of international security must be a shared effort; countries that seek to gain influence and respect must do their best, based on their national capabilities and possibilities. It is unethical to benefit from the security conditions and subsequent stability without participating actively in their achievement. A lack of commitment to these efforts would be politically and morally unacceptable. It is for that reason that gaining international peace and stability must be a shared effort involving economic, diplomatic, and military involvement and contributions.

The exercise of sovereignty and control over the maritime space is essential for the development of an ocean state. This fact places Chile in a security environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty, surprise, and quickly changing and highly mobile threats. In this scenario, Chile has decided to pursue development based on free trade. Therefore, its prosperity, to which its welfare is firmly linked, depends on stability, security, and respect for international law and the commitments Chile has assumed with the international community.

In the maritime area, Chile has participated actively in the creation of the law of the sea; Chile has been part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) since 1997 and encourages the observance and reinforcement of this law.⁴ Therefore, Chile rejects any initiative that may endanger the rights that were agreed upon through significant effort. We believe that this convention has built for the seas and oceans a legal order that facilitates international communication and promotes their peaceful use. Chile considers of paramount importance the protection of maritime areas, natural resources, and the marine environment. Chile has also fought against illegal fishing in the South Pacific.

Chile has developed the concept of the *Presencial* Sea and incorporated it in national legislation. The idea is to be attentive to, observe, and be part of the activities that take place on the high seas, to be prepared to defend against the threats that may come from

the common space, without weakening the UNCLOS or affecting the freedom that governs those common areas. The concept of Maritime Domain Awareness has caught our attention because it contains certain similarities to the concept of the *Presencial* Sea.

We are aware of the fact that maritime security is a common responsibility and that we must contribute according to our capabilities. That is why Chile participates actively in maritime conferences related to this subject—in particular, in the International Maritime Organization.

Chile also participates in regional cooperation related to maritime security with a number of organizations, such as the Operational Network of Regional Cooperation of Maritime Authorities of Latin America, Panama, Mexico, and Cuba (ROCRAM).⁵ Chile was the first Latin American country to become part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and is involved in APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and in its activities related to maritime security.⁶

Given the geographic location of Chile and the active maritime trade that takes place along its coast, maritime security is a priority. That is why Chile has signed a number of international agreements, such as the Eastern South Pacific Coordinator for the International Hydrographic Organization, Naval Control of Maritime Traffic, and the treaty on Tsunami Warning. Chile is also in charge of a huge area (even bigger than its *Presencial* Sea) for maritime search and rescue.

We also cooperate on maritime security and order at sea by controlling our maritime spaces and observing the *Presencial* Sea, preventing as much as possible illicit activity in the maritime areas adjacent to our coasts. Chile also exercises the power conferred by national and international law, such as the laws of the flag state (*estado de pabellón*), coastal state (*estado costero*), and port state control authority (*estado rector del puerto*).

We concur with the idea that global maritime security is not only the task of the navies and coast-guard services. “Maritime security is more than physical security and deterrence from patrolling ships and aircraft of a global fleet. Maritime security is achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats. Maritime security demands a close partnership between governments and the private sector to put in place a rigorous maritime security regime for prevention.”⁷

Accordingly, Chile would be willing to cooperate—according to its capabilities—with the U.S. maritime strategy, taking into consideration the national interest, humanitarian motivations, and the international legal order.

Common Commitments, Interests, and Restrictions

U.S. Strategic Objectives

The U.S. strategic objectives are:

- *Secure the United States from direct attack* by actively confronting, early and at safe distances, those who would threaten us—especially those who would do so with catastrophic means.
- *Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action* by ensuring that key regions, lines of communication and the global commons remain accessible to all.
- *Strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships* to address common challenges.
- *Establish favorable security conditions* by countering aggression or coercion targeted at our partners or interests.⁸

From the above, it is obvious that the last three U.S. objectives are directly related to Chilean national interests. We also find a similarity in the basic guidelines to “preserve freedom of the seas, facilitate and defend commerce, and facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material.”⁹

It is interesting to note that some U.S. articles consider South America an “emerging” area of interest.¹⁰ Our economic development plan states that marine areas are essential. Chile depends heavily on maritime communications (totally, in terms of fuel). This, plus the growing traffic of post-Panamax ships carrying dangerous cargo through Cape Horn/Strait of Magellan and the expected growth of maritime traffic between Asia and countries of the Southern Cone through Chilean ports, makes it easy to understand our interest in this area and the clear need for cooperation with the United States.

Chilean and U.S. Navy Missions

The United States envisions a series of tasks for its navy to which the Chilean Navy could contribute via our strategy. These tasks fall into three areas of action: *national defense*, accomplished through joint action with the Chilean armed forces; *international* participation, which includes joint and probably combined work; and tasks related to the protection and promotion of *maritime interests*, which are carried out in coordination with other governmental organizations and are of paramount economic importance.

The interesting cooperative initiative called the “Thousand-Ship Navy” seems to be a realistic and practical instrument with which to face one of the biggest challenges of the globalized world, where success depends on maritime communications. An interruption, even partial, of maritime transport could cause an economic failure of unimaginable proportions. Chile is participating actively in this initiative, through a number of agreements that seek a “positive order at sea.”

Situation of Mutual Support

Our navies have been participating in combined exercises for the last fifty years, and these activities have increased significantly lately. Take the year 2007 for example (see table below): a Chilean frigate has been integrated into a U.S. surface expeditionary group for almost five months, a Chilean submarine has supported training with the U.S. Third Fleet for five months, and Chile has participated in the PANAMAX, UNITAS, and TEAMWORK SOUTH 2007 exercises. This is a reality, and even though they are only exercises, Chilean participation highlights our interest in enhancing interoperability in all areas, because we strongly believe that this is the best way to be as ready as possible to contribute in effective, not token, terms when the time comes.

Naval Operations and Exercises 2007

DATE	PLACE	ACTIVITY
26 Feb–11 July	USA	Frigate <i>Latorre</i> joins the U.S. Navy Surface Expeditionary Group (UNITAS Atlantic, TWS, and UNITAS Pacific).
23 Apr–4 May	USA	BELL BUOY international exercise.
June	Chile	Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise. Combat diving exercise and land operations between Chilean Buzos Tácticos and U.S. SEALs.
11–24 June	Chile	CENTAURO (SOUTHERN EXCHANGE) Phase Chile. Chilean–U.S. Marine Corps Exchange.
16–29 June	Ecuador	UNITAS Pacific 2007, international exercise with U.S. units.
1 Aug–20 Dec	USA	USS <i>Simpson</i> participates in support of the U.S. Navy battle group training, in San Diego, Calif.
27 Aug–7 Sep	Panama	PANAMAX 2007, multinational exercise for the protection of the Panama Canal with units from the United States and fifteen other countries.
13–23 Nov	USA	CENTAURO (SOUTHERN EXCHANGE) Phase USA. Chilean–U.S. Marine Corps Exchange.

Other Ongoing Support

Equally important are the growing interactive efforts of other agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the Chilean DGTm (Directorate General of Maritime Space), to include short-term ship-rider activities for officers and enlisted personnel on board U.S. Coast Guard ships, a project derived from the U.S.-Chilean Operational Naval Committee (ONC); Chilean visits to U.S. Coast Guard bases; exchange of naval experiences in formal conferences, such as the ONC; multinational exercises like PANAMAX; and training for officers at the U.S. Coast Guard station in Georgetown, South Carolina.

Restrictions

A realistic approach to the problem under analysis will reflect the fact that the Chilean and U.S. national interests are different in magnitude. This conveys different motivations for the use of force. Chilean Defense Policy accepts the coercive use of force for self-defense and other actions supported by UN resolutions.

On the other hand, in spite of the slow pace of UN efforts to establish suitable norms and the fact that “bilateral agreements” may be more expeditious, it is preferable for our democratically elected political leaders and for the civilian society in general to develop naval cooperation with the United States within the frameworks of UNCLOS and the International Maritime Organization.

Potential Contributions of the Chilean Navy

Mission Areas as Defined by the U.S. Navy

The mission areas defined in the U.S. Navy Concept of Operations¹¹ include

- Forward naval presence
- Crisis response
- Expeditionary projection of power
- Maritime security operations
- Sea control
- Deterrence
- Security cooperation
- Civil-military operations
- Counterinsurgency
- Counterterrorism
- Counter-proliferation
- Air and missile defense
- Information operations.

If we compare these thirteen mission areas with the areas of action defined by the Chilean Navy, we can expect willingness for cooperation in the following:¹²

- Naval presence
- Crisis response
- Projection of power

- Maritime security operations
- Control of the sea
- Deterrence
- Security cooperation
- Civil-military operations
- Information operations
- Counterterrorism
- Counterinsurgency.

In general terms, these opportunities arise not only from the mission areas common to both strategies but from the decision to participate cooperatively under the command of the United Nations when, where, and with what the government deems necessary.

Counterterrorism deserves a special comment. Under national policy, the Chilean Navy can participate in counterterrorism activities only in local waters via the National Maritime Authority, which is exercised by the U.S. Coast Guard–equivalent DGTM and the merchant marine.¹³ Such tasks are spelled out in the ISPS Code, ratified by our country. The participation of the Chilean Navy in counterinsurgency can be carried out only for the purpose of neutralizing the insurgency via a “peace enforcement operation” under a mandate of the United Nations.

Others

Chile has offered the United Nations a number of reserve assets with a lead time of fourteen days for operations under UN command, to include:

- One frigate with a helicopter
- One Chilean Marine Corps company
- One section of logistic support
- One command element
- One section of military police
- One team of combat engineers
- One public affairs officer
- Staff officers and military observers.

Chile has the capacity to offer other naval assets as well, depending on availability and approval of the national command authority and the Chilean Congress. Together with maritime activities in international territory, the Chilean Navy is carrying out a

number of tasks inside the national territory, executing operations that also benefit the international community in the area of maritime security. There is a certain level of cooperation in the logistics area. A memorandum of understanding that allows mutual support for fuel replenishment has operated satisfactorily for a long time.

Conditions for Participation: Interoperability

One of the main principles of the U.S. Navy is interoperability. The ability to operate with others is a basic condition for achieving effective cooperation. The participants are responsible for developing mutual knowledge and common procedures, reinforcing trust, training the units, and sharing real-time information, goods, and services, in order to unite efforts so as to meet common interests.

The Chilean Navy and the U.S. Navy have both advanced in this respect. The latter has made significant contributions, but this support needs to become permanent. It is also important to keep in mind that though we are developing interoperability between navies, in order to achieve effective cooperation that interoperability must be built among such other entities as governmental law-enforcement agencies (e.g., customs and police).

Conditions for Participation: Methods

The U.S. Navy's *Naval Operations Concept 2006* includes an annex with methods of organization, training, equipment, deployment, and operations. Two main aspects of the annex are operations in globalized networks and building capabilities to become partners.

Operations in Globalized Networks. One aspect of interoperability—where technological development presents an ever-changing situation—is connectivity, defined as the capacity to connect information management systems in order to function in a globalized network and maintain a common operational picture. Connectivity is a very sensitive aspect that includes access to a highly protected database, a *sine qua non*.

At the tactical level, the acquisition by the Chilean Navy of new units with NATO equipment and the U.S. Navy's willingness to support the needs of combined operations have contributed to a high level of connectivity between the two navies. This connectivity has been tested successfully during the RIMPAC multinational exercises and other bilateral navy operations.

Building the Capacity to Become Partners. Common training is a key aspect in developing interoperability. In this respect, the interaction between the navies at the tactical level has been constantly improving. Such interaction started in exercises many years

ago with UNITAS, followed by BELL BUOY, TEAMWORK NORTH/SOUTH, and RIMPAC, among others, helping the Chilean Navy improve its interoperability.

Exchanges at the operational level have been less significant. There are Chilean officers stationed with the Pacific and the Atlantic fleets as well as in the U.S. Southern Command, but it is not possible to compare this level of interaction with that at the tactical level described above. However, there are opportunities to improve in the human resources and other areas, such as sharing the maritime picture of zones of common interest.

Another important element in achieving an effective contribution to global security is a structure for rapid response. The Chilean Navy, besides efforts made to improve and complete its information networks, is responding to this challenge in two areas:

- By making a commitment with the United Nations to keep its forces at a high level of readiness for rapid response, in accordance with the rules of that organization
- By developing goods and assets that allow a quick response to challenges that may appear in national waters.

Final Considerations

The Chilean Navy is aware of the fact that we live in a changing world and that Chile cannot avoid possible new scenarios and the effects these changes may have. Those changes drive new challenges that must be met.

Chile's prosperity is based on free trade. Now that the country is open to the world, it can grow only in an environment of stability, security, and respect for international law and of agreements with the members of the international community. The protection of this environment is vital for Chile's security and progress. This is why Chile has to cooperate. Isolation is not an option; on the contrary, history requires Chile to participate actively in the international scene, contributing to the governance of globalization and to the development of our region.

Every member state in the international community is responsible for international security. This is especially true for countries that seek influence and respect; these have to contribute as much as possible, according to their capacity. Taking advantage of the benefits of security and stability while avoiding commitment to effective participation to maintain them would be politically incorrect and morally unethical.

Based on the above, the Chilean Navy is ready to contribute to advancing regional and global interests. This contribution stems from the fulfillment of national interests, humanitarian motivations, and support for the regional and multilateral international systems.

Notes

1. The Spanish word *presencial*, for which there is no direct equivalent in English, carries the sense of “actual” or “in person.”
2. Ignacio Walker, “La política exterior chilena” [Chile’s Foreign Policy], *Revista de Estudios Internacionales*, 2006, p. 14.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
4. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at www.un.org/depts/los/convention.
5. ROCRAM, *Red Operativa de Cooperación Regional de Autoridades Marítimas de América Latina, Panamá, México y Cuba* [Operational Network of Regional Cooperation of Maritime Authorities of Latin America, Panama, Mexico, and Cuba].
6. In April 2006, Chile hosted the ninth Forum of the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Agencies, created by the Secure Trade in the APEC Region initiative.
7. Capt. Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG (Ret.), “Making the 1000-Ship Navy a Reality,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 133, no. 1 (January 2007), p. 60.
8. U.S. Navy Dept., *Naval Operations Concept 2006* (Washington, D.C.), p. 7.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 8, fig. 1.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
12. Rear Adm. Eri Solis (Ret.), *Reflexiones político-estratégicas* (Academia de Guerra Naval de Chile, 2006), p. 166.
13. However, the *Book of the National Defense of Chile* (the *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile 2002* [Ministerio de Defensa, 2003]) states on page 64 that “the role of the Armed Forces is to support the authorities of the country (that is, Order and Security).”

A Brazilian View of U.S. Maritime Initiatives

CAPTAIN ANTONIO CARLOS TEIXEIRA MARTINS, BRAZILIAN NAVY

The sea is the pathway for about 90 percent of total international trade, a basic activity that ensures the economic expansion and the stability of nations. In addition, a significant portion of the world production of oil and gas comes from the sea. Besides, the sea represents a considerable source of mineral resources, although not currently, inasmuch as a huge amount of mineral resources below the sea floor is not yet recoverable economically. The exploitation of renewable marine resources, such as fish, is another factor of great importance for the economies of a number of nations.

This rich patrimony remains relatively secure, although occasionally it is disturbed by fairly insignificant terrorist actions and by criminal actions perpetrated by pirates. However, many world leaders consider that due to its importance for their nations and in view of the difficulty of maintaining effective control, the sea is likely, in the rather near future, to become the target of not a few threats to maritime security. These would include piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking and slavery, trespassing in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), interruption of trade, movement of weapons, organized crime, environmental attacks, political and religious extremism, and terrorism.

The actions referred to above, besides other actions that will be discussed later in this paper, were a determining factor that drove many nations, led by the United States, a hegemonic world power, to initiate studies to examine an integrated approach among all nations for the purpose of guaranteeing marine security around the world. The participation of a large number of navies in the evacuation of Lebanese citizens during the recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah was an example of such cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze such actions, especially those that concern a new maritime strategy to be implemented by the United States.

A New Strategy for the United States

The Strategic Scenario

Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, the director of the U.S. Navy's Strategy and Policy Division, included in a lecture on U.S. naval strategic planning a discussion about the main topics in the American strategic scenario, according to the U.S. Navy.¹ Principal topics include the global war against terrorism, nonconventional warfare, homeland security and homeland defense, the traditional threats that still exist (e.g., regional powers with considerable conventional and nuclear capacity), unrestricted war with weapons of mass destruction, and disruptive high-technology systems.

According to this view, *homeland security* is the first priority for the nation, and the country's first line of defense is located abroad. Therefore, the threats to the North American territory are to be suppressed at their very origins and with the effective cooperation of allied countries.


According to Admiral Martoglio, the American strategic objectives include defending the country against direct attacks, ensuring strategic access and guaranteeing global freedom of action, strengthening partnerships and alliances, and establishing favorable security conditions.

In order to attain these objectives, certain vulnerabilities will have to be eliminated or at least substantially reduced: the North American ability to cope with global security challenges is insufficient; allied and partner nations may decide not to act in an integrated way or may lose the ability to act in an integrated way; not a few nations are resentful of the North American predominance in the solution of world problems and object to the way the United States acts; and, finally, the United States and its allies will be the main target of terrorist attacks.

Admiral Martoglio talked about those topics he considered to be the main points in the national strategy for attaining maritime security and the ones most likely to assume highest national priority in ensuring the freedom of the seas, access to ports, freedom of navigation in international waters, and innocent passage. Admiral Martoglio closed his speech by presenting a diagram of partnerships and coalitions on which the desired integration of nations seeking to establish and maintain maritime security would be built.


Another diagram represented the "global network." The structure supported by the diagram is divided in three parts. The first part, the base, would include ports, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and boundaries. This level refers to the nations individually. The intermediate part would include international straits, regional waters, boundaries, and archipelagic waters. This level is directly linked to initiatives in

FIGURE 1
Coalition Partner Opportunities



regional security and is based on such regional associations as the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination, or CAMAS. With the participation of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina, CAMAS manages maritime traffic to enhance the safety of sea lines of communication. The top of the pyramid would include the boundaries and the open sea.

FIGURE 2
Building the Global Network



Reasons for a New Strategy

The breakup of the former Soviet Union brought with it a new and major challenge for U.S. Navy. U.S. naval strategy, which used to be focused on the fight against one single enemy and emphasized strategic deterrence, power projection, sea control, and naval

presence, became meaningless. A new situation came about, and to this new situation the U.S. Navy has no satisfactory answer.

This new situation is represented by globalization, whose three main effects point to the need for a new maritime strategy. These effects include the ever-increasing interdependence of markets and world economies. Most of world trade is dependent on the sea, which causes maritime security to be key for all nations. The search for new oil wells and maintenance of existing oil wells in the sea could generate conflicts among nations, which introduces another security consideration. Finally, globalization has introduced what some authors refer to as “fourth generation” enemies—terrorists, traffickers in weapons of mass destruction, criminal organizations, smugglers, drug dealers, and pirates.²

Another reason for a new strategy is that the nature of the changes in military operations is forcing all powers to reassess their structures and doctrines, because information may have become the most valuable resource of war.

If the reasons referred to above were not enough, the 2001 terrorist attacks, which occurred when the United States was facing a recession, led to an increase in homeland defense expenses, besides the increased cost of the Afghanistan war and, later, the Iraq war. These wars forced an increase in the budget deficit. As a consequence, the budget of the Navy came under severe pressure. Cornered by such facts and pressed by former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s statement that “the Global War on Terror gave new impetus and urgency to transformation efforts already well underway, and a new determination to remake the U.S. military into a more agile, efficient, and expeditionary force, ready to meet the asymmetric challenges of a new and uncertain time,” the U.S. Navy was forced to choose between proportionally reducing its fighting resources, prioritizing one type of combat over others, or taking new steps to increase its capacity without increasing the number of ships.³

According to some American writers, the U.S. Navy needs both a threat and a strategy that enables it to cope with asymmetrical threats. Without that, it will be competing in a disadvantageous position with other forces for scarce budget resources.⁴

The New Strategy according to the Chief of Naval Operations

In 2006, responding to the situation faced by the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), then Admiral Michael Mullen, decided to start a discussion about a new maritime strategy by presenting some assumptions regarding the study of this issue. The first of these assumptions, and certainly the most relevant, is that “no country, no matter how strong it is, is capable of doing what needs be done.”⁵ This led to a discussion

about the participation of allied countries and partners in the new strategy. The second assumption, of critical importance for the countries involved, is that

the strategy would require a multilateral dimension and have to be governed by clearly defined principles of international law, such as respect for sovereignty and self-determination, nonintervention, and equality between states, always in keeping with the legislation and the interests of the participants, taking account of the stability and well-being of an area. Internally, the strategy has also to be aligned with the demands of the society, emphasizing the major topics of the time—that is, the effort to reduce the social inequalities and ensure the valorization of human life and the environment.⁶

Thus, the new policy should result from a consensus among all sectors involved, including citizens, politicians, armed forces, allied countries, and private companies, besides considerations related to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and pre-conflict operations. In the U.S. internal context, the CNO considered it critical to bring the discussion about the maritime capacity of the country and the relevance of the Navy for the future of the nation to the level of the national agenda.

In the strictly military field, he believed that the key to the success of the new strategy was to avoid classified information, in view of the restrictions for disseminating it. He also believed that establishing a permanent and international naval force was not the goal. To his mind, the new strategy should be based on three basic characteristics of naval forces—that is, to influence, anticipate and respond flexibly, and build friendships and partnerships.

The effects to be attained by the new strategy were as follows: to hold sway over the open sea and over inland and coastal waters, as necessary, in order to provide naval capability to combined naval forces, as well as other capacities of interdependent nature, as requested by the combined force; to maintain a frontline presence aimed at attacking and dismantling both terrorist networks and conventional campaigns; to provide support to the combined force acting to deter any other potentially opposing nation-state, as well as transnational threats; to deepen cooperation with the naval forces of strategic partners, as well as with emerging partners; to build and align the coastal infrastructure in order to provide effective support to the fleet; to size, train, and motivate human resources; and to reduce the stress of the combined force.⁷

Regarding joint action with other navies, increased cooperation at the operational level and in technological issues should be undertaken. Increased exchange of information and a larger number of multinational exercises should also be foreseen.

In summary, the new strategy is expected to gain support from the American people, as well as international backing, and should be appropriate for the challenges of the twenty-first century. The new strategy must be capable of both fighting a single enemy, just like previous strategies, and attacking fourth-generation threats. It should stress elements that provide regional, cooperative, and multilateral security, including shared

responsibilities and nimble mechanisms capable of timely operational action. It should also ensure free lines of communications and free sea traffic; prevent and fight terrorism and criminal activity on the sea, in waterways, and in port areas; provide humanitarian assistance or help to the victims of natural disasters; and restrict damage to the environment.

The Thousand-Ship Navy and the Global Fleet Station

As discussed previously, the U.S. Navy is facing significant cuts in budget, which forces us to believe that a reduction in the number of ships may occur. Besides, as also discussed above, the Navy believes it to be virtually impossible to fight alone against all such threats.

On the other hand, it is well known that the economic welfare of the American people and people worldwide will depend strongly on the trade that transits the seas, a fact that causes maritime security to be critical for everybody. All nations regard defense against terrorism to be as critical as protection of sea trade. As a consequence, the new maritime strategy should consider that if everybody benefits from collective security, it is everybody's responsibility to share the obligation to preserve such security by controlling threats within each one's domains.

The idea of a thousand-ship fleet, the building block of this new strategy, is based on these facts. Such a force, to be formed by three hundred American ships and seven hundred ships from other navies, builds on the idea of reestablishing lost strategic depth and global maritime awareness.

Another idea, conceived together with that of the thousand-ship navy, is the "Global Fleet Station" (GFS). The GFS would consist of a "command" and a "base" to be used by military, nongovernmental, and international organizations, with a focus on regional maritime security. Each GFS would include one command ship, one or more smaller surface ships, and perhaps one riverine unit, as well as helicopters. The GFS would also rely on an information center, medical facilities, and other sorts of support. The idea of creating such a GFS was proposed by the CNO, who believes that GFSs may provide the means for creating a flexible response capacity.⁸

An important aspect to be considered regarding the implementation of this fleet has to do with the necessary interoperability among the forces. Navies usually have their own rules, systems, and procedures. Therefore, issues related to command, control, and technology may arise as challenges to be overcome, thereby requiring standardization of equipment and procedures.

The United States believes that the ideas of a thousand-ship navy and GFS have been receiving effective support from a number of nations, which is evidenced by

international cooperation in the evacuation of citizens during the recent invasion of Lebanon, relying on the participation of 170 ships from seventeen countries. The installation of a base on the African coast is also in full swing, specifically in São Tomé and Príncipe; it will be capable of watching over a significant portion of the South Atlantic Ocean. In return, and within the spirit of the new strategy of collaborating with all countries, the United States affirms that the center will collaborate with the Africans in the control of illegal fishing, piracy, and illegal immigration.⁹ Recently, during a symposium held in Europe that included countries from that continent as well as Mexico, Singapore, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the subject was thoroughly discussed and, in principle, accepted by the countries attending.

Hindrances to Implementation

The world is facing insurrections, ethnic shocks, and regional competition, phenomena against which the new strategy will have to act, although such issues have been known for a very long time. The complexity of the current time has to do with one new aspect, referred to by some as “the individual holding a significant power of decision (person or group capable of inflicting strategic damage to a nation by applying advanced technologies).”¹⁰

The new strategy has to be able to overcome three different types of obstacles. First, the new strategy has to gain the trust of those in charge of making it work—that is, the U.S. Navy staff. Second, it has to convince the politicians who will analyze it. Finally, it has to be persuasive to friends and allies, as well as pose a threat to adversaries. The latter seems to be the most difficult challenge. As a matter of fact, the new strategy may be seen as a contemporary revision of Mahan’s theory of naval power and also as a new form of American imperialism.

On this latter aspect, a relevant comment is in order. The ascension of the United States to the condition of world leader, notwithstanding the undeniable advantages that stem therefrom, places on the United States the responsibility of being the policeman of the world, which is not always an enviable situation. It also invites rejection by some countries of positions advanced by the United States or of policies adopted by many American administrations—as in the recent case of Iraq, when the U.S. government acted without regard for the decisions of international organs. It is also relevant to say that this country that is willing now to rely on international support in the area of maritime security is the same country that so far has refused to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Although in the beginning of this paper a reference was made to the position of the CNO that the sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples should be fully

respected, most countries will not trust someone who, backed by his military power, ignores the decisions made by a consensus of nations.

Brazil: Interests in the Sea, Threats, and Strategic Thinking

Some 95 percent of our international trade—U.S. \$191 billion in 2005—is moved through our 4.5-million-square-kilometer sea and forty ports. About 90 percent of our oil production comes from the sea. Such figures are enough by themselves to give an idea of how important the sea is to our country.

Therefore, our main security areas include the South Atlantic, where our main sources of energy are located (gas and oil), and the Amazon, both the Blue Amazon and the Green Amazon. The Green Amazon is, of course, the internationally recognized Brazilian Amazon region, whose rain forest has been called the “lungs of the world.” It encompasses four million square kilometers, vast freshwater supplies, extensive mineral reserves, and the greatest biodiversity on earth.

The Blue Amazon—a term created by the former commandant of the Brazilian Navy, Admiral Guimarães Carvalho—is the maritime area off the coast of Brazil, which is recognized by UNCLOS as the exclusive property of the coastal state. This Amazon extends to 4.5 million square kilometers, which increases the country by an amount equal to 50 percent of its landmass. This area is extremely rich in petroleum and has great potential for the exploration of a variety of metallic nodules found on the seabed.

For these reasons, the idea of increasing international maritime security seems to be relevant, as supported by the United States, because, although we are not likely to face any kind of military threat in the short run, we should not overlook the fact that in the future we may come to be threatened by disputes over our supplies of water and energy or over our borders; actions against our biodiversity; international terrorism; and transnational crime. Politically our government recognizes the need of a strong, integrated effort of all nations to prevent and to defend against terrorist threats, which brings us even closer to the American security ideas.

Still, in the political realm, Brazil has acted with self-confidence on behalf of the integration of all Southern Cone countries, seeking to strengthen the South American regional integration process.

Background of Brazilian–U.S. Navy Joint Action

During World War II, two factors drew our navies closer together. First, the Brazilian government granted permission to the United States to use the facilities of the naval base of Natal. The second factor, focused more specifically on naval operations, had to do with the protection provided by Brazilian warships to the Allied fleets. In both

situations, there was a significant exchange between the two navies, with an emphasis on the fact that modern antisubmarine equipment was installed in our ships.

After the war, the close relationship between us was sustained, both through the transfer of naval goods and in the form of an officer exchange program. The Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) was started at that time. This program, on the one hand, enabled new equipment to be passed to our navy; on the other hand, however, it prevented the building of naval ships in our country. It should be highlighted that our officers were for a long time influenced by American thinking, mainly in the activity then of most interest for the United States—that is, antisubmarine warfare. MAP also caused us to be dependent on the supply of spare parts for the equipment installed on our ships.

As for joint exercises, the Brazilian Navy always took part in UNITAS operations and in many other operations. Currently, the presence of ships originating from the U.S. Navy in our navy is significantly lower.

Thus, we believe that increased cooperation between our navies is possible if such cooperation includes mutual support in the field of military security, in the exchange of intelligence, in the implementation of joint exercises, in academic and doctrine exchanges, and in the exchange of technology. The interests that bring us together have to do with the new ways of fighting terrorism; enhancing maritime security, cooperation, and regional peace; and elimination or reduction of transnational crimes.

The Brazilian position, with regard specifically to participating or refusing to participate in the world network proposed by the United States, will depend largely on whether that country takes a position as a true participant and not as a mentor, and also whether the United States shows a genuine willingness to implement an operational and tactical exchange.

Conclusion

After analyzing all the facts related to the American proposal of implementing a new maritime strategy with a view to considering the effective participation of navies from other countries, coast guards, nongovernmental organizations, and international organs, we can conclude that the objective of increasing the level of international maritime security meets the desire of most countries, which also wish to attain such a goal.

In the particular case of Brazil, considering that a pillar of Brazil's defense policy is increased international security, this conclusion will apply fully. The ties that have united Brazil and the United States since World War II should also be taken into account. However, it should be remembered, following the CNO's reasoning, that the key to a successful strategy is that the U.S. Navy listen to the American people and major political leaders. Our navy should act similarly.

In view of the above, one can anticipate that not a few problems will have to be overcome before Brazil may integrate itself into such a new international network. Although this may be fairly convenient and appropriate for the Navy specifically, the political leaders and the Brazilian people may think differently, inasmuch as both have become used to seeing our country ignored in the discussion of the major international problems.

Finally, it is relevant to consider that, although the American discourse points to the need for international trade to be free and exempt from protection, practice shows that in fact the opposite is true. That is easily evidenced by the hindrances often posed by the United States in the Doha round of international trade negotiations, with significant damage to the Brazilian economy though an effective inhibition of free trade between the two countries.

Notes

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3. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, *Facing the Future: Meeting the Threats and Challenges of the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: February 2005), p. 3.
4. Sam Bateman, "Analyzing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy," *International Relations and Security Network*, 15 August 2006, www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?i=16527.
5. Rear Adm. James W. Stevenson, "Marinha dos Estados Unidos tem em mente para os próximos 20 ou 25 anos" (lecture, International Conferences Cycle on Maritime Power, Brazilian Naval War College, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 2007), p. 2.
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8. Amy Klumper, "Traction: The 1,000-Ship Navy," *Sea Power* 49, no. 12, pp. 10–13 (December 2006).
9. "EUA vai financiar um centro regional de supervisão marítima," *S.T.P. Vitrine*, ano 4, no. 14 (June 2006), available at www.estome.net/vitrine/EUA.htm.
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A New U.S. Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-first Century Viewed from an Institutional Perspective

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In Admiral Michael G. Mullen's introduction to *Sea Power for a New Era*, we find all the elements that provide clear guidelines to his subordinates—that is, the U.S. Navy—of his vision and what he expects from his institution.¹

When we examine his paper, some questions inevitably arise as to the method used to set such an important and fundamental strategy. If a strategy has objectives, alternative ways, and means, it is apparent, without discussing which of these elements is the most important, that objectives must come from the superior level, which means in this case, from the politico-strategic realm. Likewise, it is this superior level that—if it has set the objectives—must provide the means to accomplish them; further, if those means are going to be put to use, that higher level should be the one that authorizes their use.

This sequence follows “top down” logic, similar to what is seen, for example, in the British government's periodic defense policies published as “white papers” or “strategic reviews,” where the government clearly defines future scenarios, objectives, and means for the armed forces. Admiral Mullen's paper appears to represent a professional appreciation from a subordinate to a superior—that is, “bottom up” logic.

Although in theory a top-down approach would seem to be better (although in some cases that has meant very painful reductions for the armed services!), the bottom-up road is not necessarily bad or undesirable, because it constitutes professional judgment coming from a service with more than a century of expertise achieved by active and successful participation in various conflicts. So it is an absolutely valid proposition that, in the end, can be totally or partially accepted or completely rejected at the political level. Only when it has been accepted will it be effective, through the acceptance of

scenarios, setting of objectives, and allocation of resources to obtain the means. In that sense a bottom-up proposal can achieve a top-down resolution.

Another interesting thing to highlight is that the admiral's view seems to be an exclusively naval perspective. The degree of coordination with the other services is not clear.

Important changes in the international environment, especially if nobody knows for certain who will be the probable enemy, will always be very difficult to confront. Historical examples are abundant, and failures have been very costly. In the First World War, large fleets were not only insufficient to prevent the war, they were not even decisive, nor did they play the predominant role expected of them. In the Second World War, German and British naval forces again confronted each other with inappropriate and insufficient means to accomplish their objectives.

The "appropriate balance" between ends and means will be very difficult to reach. In a relatively fixed scenario like the Cold War, it was "easy" to develop and integrate means with new technologies to meet the selected strategy—to deter the Soviet threat. There was no other.

Today, we are in the midst of a *Pax Americana* scenario. The *Pax Britannica* period after the battle of Trafalgar succeeded in preventing big conflicts (not "less significant" or local ones) for a hundred years, through the Royal Navy's unmatched naval power and global reach. At the zenith of its enormous power, however, the Royal Navy was not able to prevent the biggest war until that time. Now, the equally unrivaled power of the U.S. Navy finds itself facing an asymmetrical adversary, very probably not traditional, that may attack at all levels, utilizing unconventional means from commercial airliners to very sophisticated, more conventional means and weapons of mass destruction.

All this is happening in a globalized world that depends on maritime transportation for its functioning. Big problem! Difficult solution!

The New Scenario Viewed from the South

After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the United States realized that its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East had created a profound aversion among the most radical Islamic sectors. This aversion was manifested in the very violent response characteristic of state terrorism. The characteristics of September 11th's attacks presented an enormous challenge for U.S. national security. With the attack on the U.S. homeland, it was evident that the military instrument designed for traditional scenarios in the post-Cold War period was inappropriate for these new threats in a globalized world.

Thus national security analysis concluded that the problem—apart from requiring a complete reformulation of the nation's operational strategies—had no solution within its own defensive capacities. Thus global collaboration was required. For global threats, global responses were needed! Consequently, the United States undertook various analyses and efforts to design strategies and configure its own means and those of its allies that wished to join in reaching common objectives of international security, following the objectives established by the U.S. national defense:

- Secure the United States from direct attack
- Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships
- Establish favorable security conditions.²

What has been analyzed so far deserves some comment regarding strategic options for the U.S. Navy. These options are studied at the U.S. Naval War College from the perspective of the interests of likely allies, including countries with smaller navies, like Chile. Given their special relevance, we will mention them briefly.

Maritime Strategy of the United States

The United States, with no traditional threats near its boundaries, has asserted and obtained global supremacy through the application of a maritime strategy capable of projecting military power from the sea (in a Mahanian sense) anywhere in the world, where threats to its national security are perceived.

The new post–Cold War scenarios, the nonconventional asymmetrical threats of a globalized world where the boundaries are more permeable and any terrorist group can have access to the homeland by sea, make the proven strategy of combat and power projection insufficient. Now it needs to be complemented with a defensive maritime strategy of a global nature.

While yesterday's enemy was confident, homogeneous, inflexible, hierarchical, and resistant to change, today's enemy is dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, and networked. The enemy benefits from new technologies and materials easily available illegally in world markets and uses them to interrupt vital systems, such as command and control, communications, roads, and energy grids and even to build weapons of mass destruction. This kind of enemy does not operate on conventional battlefields, and it flourishes within weak states and obscure zones where terrorists can mount organizations to pursue transnational crime. The U.S. Navy for years has enjoyed dominion and control of the sea at the tactical level, employing aircraft carrier groups, but now, in the context

of a global war on terrorism, the maritime domain takes on a strategic dimension for which such forces are not sufficient.

In order to respond to multiple threats of this nature, it is necessary to deny the use and exploitation of the maritime environment, including transportation systems, to these adversaries. The first step for increasing maritime security is to get better information related to the maritime environment. The concept of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is another way of expressing this point. Maritime Domain Awareness has been defined as the collection, analysis, and dissemination of a great quantity of information and intelligence to be processed for governmental agencies, commercial entities, and U.S. and allied forces. The information obtained from different sources is processed so as to shape a common operating picture. Without intelligence, counterterrorism operations and enforcement of international maritime law will rarely succeed.

U.S. Strategic Options

With the emergence of new nonconventional threats, the rise of new powers like China and India, and highly unstable areas like the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, the United States faces the challenge of structuring new maritime strategies to serve the political objectives of hegemony and national security.

Considering various strategic schemes, several centers of strategic studies have considered various options that included some common elements:

- Action of conventional forces (sea-strike groups) designed with an increased capability of power projection from the sea, complemented by marine forces (for combat and projection)
- Homeland defense emphasizing Maritime Domain Awareness, where the U.S. Navy works closely with the Coast Guard.

As to the question of where to focus the effort, taking into account relationships and the levels of different states, it is necessary to see that although short-, medium-, and long-range analyses can be made, situations can change very quickly. Logic would suggest developing flexible and agile maritime power to be present where required, emphasizing areas where future powers are emerging. In both approaches, integration of allied forces is possible and desirable, notwithstanding a large difference between traditional U.S. allies from the West and forces from other states that might be able to help meet new nonconventional threats by accepting the MDA initiative.

The first approach to international cooperation is easily recognized and involves countries from the European Union that have helped the United States in recent crises and

conflicts in the Middle East (e.g., in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Other programs with small navies, like the Latin American, have been so far of little operational relevance.

With regard to the second approach, we can foresee integration and cooperation in defense against such nonconventional or asymmetrical threats as international terrorism, piracy, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and failed states, because we see it as the most feasible option akin to our national interests. The U.S. Navy has developed the “thousand-ship navy” concept in order to illustrate the idea of a union of the efforts of all the organizations and forces of those countries that are interested in sharing the burden of providing multinational security—that is, ensuring freedom of navigation, maritime commercial transport, protection of marine resources, and good order at sea.

As to the integration of small navies, it is possible to foresee schemes whereby they can be part of U.S. operational groups (as in PANAMAX) or simply assume surveillance of their own maritime spaces, with an organization in charge of common, networked information and operational control. Whatever these options, one must take into account a realistic and objective vision of Latin American allies.

Some Considerations for Operational Integration

Political

The relations of Latin American states with the United States are unequal. This is more evident in the political field than in the commercial (Venezuela and others, for example); the Chilean government assigns a high priority to its relations with its Latin American counterparts. This is why full operational integration with the United States is highly complex politically. Therefore, a regional agenda reflecting objective and reciprocal interests is required so that initiatives of strategic integration can gain backing and authorization at the political level.

A basic requirement for obtaining the necessary support is that any initiative for joint employment of forces must be undertaken in the letter and spirit of international agreements approved by the United Nations. Every integration initiative must be based on common multilateral security objectives, as there are no understandings or legal tools against nonconventional threats. State terrorism is not considered a real menace by many Latin American countries, and their means to neutralize it, according to their particular legal standards, are diverse. The majority consider it an internal problem against which only the state security organisms must act, expressly forbidding the employment, or even the cooperation, of the armed forces.

Undoubtedly, the most sensitive aspect for the international community is free access to areas where coastal states have sovereign rights, or to adjacent areas. The key for a proper international relationship is deference to the authority established by

international maritime law. Failure to observe and interpret it in the same way could become a source of conflict or at least of discrepancies that could affect any multilateral cooperation initiative.

Strategic

A favorable legal situation exists in Chile because the person authorized by law to act in the field of maritime security is the Director General of Maritime Space, whose organization is part of the Navy. The organizations share their assets and operate jointly, in a complementary fashion. These are important factors to be considered for achieving objectives successfully and efficiently when facing challenges or maritime threats. These, then, are the Chilean tools for defending good order at sea.

However, considering that the majority of nonconventional threats originate, or at least consolidate and reinforce themselves, within nations and mainly use the sea as a means of transport, it is essential to cooperate strategically with related organizations, such as the police and national intelligence services, in order to act effectively in maritime operations.

On the other hand, since the characteristics of a future crisis will be less related than in the past to traditional competing interests and conflicts between neighbors, it would seem that the navies of medium-sized powers like Chile should assume expeditionary roles, participating with multinational operational organizations in an attempt to stabilize areas of common political interest and to mitigate the impact on their particular economies. Toward that end and taking into account the political considerations already mentioned, it will be essential to achieve a strong international commitment to address the needs of certain nations under a UN authorization (peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance).

In any case, given the relationships among countries of Latin America, where long-standing and sensitive boundary disputes still remain, the use of armed forces, while maintaining a long-established policy of action in national defense, must be well thought out each time that the Chilean Navy is required to participate in multinational efforts, especially under the operational and logistic considerations described in this paper.


How, Where, and in What to Participate

The center of effort of the United States is defined by its “homeland,” and its operational theater is the world. To that end the United States has developed a force that allows it to operate in that huge area. The U.S. Navy’s strategy that involves “Sea Shield,” “Sea Strike,” and sea basing reflects this reality. Nevertheless, despite the

enormous capabilities that the U.S. armed forces have developed, they cannot operate simultaneously everywhere, whereas smaller countries are effective in their respective areas of influence. Therefore the U.S. armed forces need collaboration from these countries.

Chilean Area of Responsibility

The maritime territory of Chile, including its exclusive economic zone plus its continental shelf, comprises more than 4.5 million square kilometers, and if we consider the *Presencial Sea*, this area increases to 17.5 million square kilometers. Ultimately, the area of responsibility for Chile of maritime search and rescue under international agreements is over 26.4 million square kilometers. These details are shown in the figure below.



Compatible Mission Areas

Having analyzed the mission areas defined in the operational concept of the U.S. Navy and comparing them against the scope of action defined by the Chilean Navy, following its Three-Vector Strategy, we can conclude that commitment and will to cooperate in the fields stated below exist, taking into account that this congruence will depend on the political will of the government, which has a very clear posture, as stated, of observing commitments to participate cooperatively under UN mandates, as well as the resolution to do it:³

- Naval presence
- Crisis response
- Power projection
- Maritime security operations
- Sea control
- Deterrence
- Cooperation to security
- Civilian-military operations
- Information operations
- Counterterrorism
- Counterinsurgency.

In counterterrorism, it is worth mentioning that the Chilean Navy can act only under the National Maritime Authority, the Directorate General of Maritime Space, and merchant marine—which is part of the Navy in the Chilean organization. Activities within this area are derived from the application of the International Ship and Port Facility Code, ratified by our country.

Together with these activities in the maritime areas outside national territory, the Chilean Navy, in its own jurisdictional territory, executes operations aimed at maintaining sea control and the general protection of its own marine environment. This implies the will to perform the relevant actions within the Chilean *Presencial* Sea.

Implementing Mutual Support: Interoperability

Just as Rear Admiral Federico Niemann declared during a seminar held in Valparaíso in March 2007, in his presentation on the “Views of the Chilean Navy toward a New U.S. Maritime Strategy,” interoperability is an important consideration for operating in a combined way, interacting, or simply exchanging information.⁴ In other words, interoperability is vital to achieving effective cooperation. It is the responsibility of both parties to achieve mutual understanding, confidence building, commonality of procedures, training, and information sharing in real time. Achieving these, we will be able to share goods and services to be able truly to complement efforts in pursuit of common interests. Much has been accomplished between the two navies. One of the major contributions of the U.S. Navy is, for example, the supply of fuel for special activities. This cooperation should be made permanent.

We cannot forget that the interoperability that we have been building so far is among navies; it is necessary to advance farther in order really to achieve effective cooperation, that is, to implement this interoperability in other areas, like law enforcement (police, customs, etc.).

In order to integrate any scheme of multinational security it is fundamental that the participating forces have the capability to interact, both to complement capabilities and to avoid mutual interference that endangers the success of any operation. In this respect interoperability acts on at least two levels:

- *The politico-strategic level:* interoperability at this level is reflected in rules of engagement (ROE), tools designed to allow political leaders to apply forces gradually and manage the political consequences. Coordinating these political and operational aspects is one of the major problems the coalition commander has to solve.
- *The strategic-operational level:* if a multinational operation is conducted by the United States, great technological differences become the main factor affecting interoperability. If no interface and code arrangements are made to permit fast, effective, and timely data links among units and commands, the operations will lose the synergistic benefits of cooperation, and we will have only modest, or perhaps even risky, operational results.

Thus interoperability is the major incentive for medium- and small-sized navies to join in multinational operations with the United States. If interoperability cannot be obtained, it will generate frustration, and all the operational and logistic potential will be lost.

Integration of databases for exchanging information and intelligence with the United States must safeguard the national security of the participating countries.

The lesser logistical capabilities of Latin American navies require, considering the need for training to perform their priority roles in the field of national defense, “compensations” that facilitate the use of budgetary resources on tasks or activities not always well understood by the national political community. Agreements on access to professional training and education, exchange of personnel, no-cost use of U.S. naval bases, supply of fuel for operations under UN authorization, opportunity to purchase naval material of interest, and support for upgrading weapon systems are all elements that could undoubtedly enhance political support and facilitate the execution of these operations.

Conclusions

Nobody should be allowed to bring globalization to a halt. All nations depend on the world economy for their social and economic development; it is in that way that we can safeguard worldwide peace and stability. This is a global challenge that requires a global response, and therefore the United States, beyond its own political realities and objectives, needs international cooperation, at least in dealing with those scenarios that require responses beyond its particular resources.

Any alternative for cooperation or integration will require political resolve, which, in the case of Latin America, means an international political involvement manifested on collective organizations such as the UN, Organization of American States, etc. Unilateral solutions made in the United States will probably handicap any Latin American attempt at cooperation.

Integration of smaller navies to cooperate with U.S.-designed forces in keeping good order at sea, or in expeditionary operations to mitigate international instability that affects world commerce, in particular that of countries in a coalition, requires enough interoperability for the operational effort to be effective.

At the same time, and given the strategic and budgetary realities of these small navies, it is desirable to have material compensation to allow their participation in multinational activities, as well as reciprocity in access to American forces, provided that sovereign safeguards are maintained in conformity to the standards of international maritime law.

Notes

1. See U.S. Navy Dept., *Sea Power for a New Era 2007* (Washington, D.C.: 2006), available at www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/seapower/spne07/top-spne07.html.
2. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005).
3. Sea control is executed by the Chilean Navy under the "Three-Vector" naval strategy, comprising the Defense Vector (strategic perspective), the Maritime Vector (socioeconomic perspective), and the International Vector (multilateral perspective).
4. Rear Adm. Federico Niemann F., "Views of the Chilean Navy toward a New U.S. Maritime Strategy" (NCC seminar, Valparaíso, Chile, 7 March 2007).

Contributions to Designing a New U.S. Maritime Strategy

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A strategy may be understood as the road to be followed between “where we are” (the present) and “where we want to be” (the future). This extremely simple concept serves to show us that in achieving the goal that is envisioned, the reason for the strategy ceases to exist, thus requiring a new strategy to be designed in the light of a new goal. Therefore, every strategy is finite. Similarly, while a successful strategy is in force, corrections must be implemented in order to prevent deviations from hindering the achievement of the established goals.

In charting this course several steps must be followed. First, we must understand “where we are” and, therefore, be aware of the prevailing circumstances. Second, vital interests must be established. Finally, a vision of the future must be created, in which scenario techniques play a major role. More often than not, a strategy—though not yet written—has its main lines drawn up beforehand. This is the case because a strategy normally is the result of concepts set forth in high-level, periodically revised documents.

Our aim is to comment on three topics underlying the approach to a proposal for cooperation: What is the strategy to be discussed? In which areas of strategic interest are the agreed actions to be implemented? How can we work together? Additionally, we will introduce a few thoughts on the designing of a new maritime strategy by the United States.

A U.S. Maritime Strategy or a U.S. Navy Strategy?

In order to facilitate a few contributions that may assist in designing a new strategy, we must ensure that the concepts employed by both parties are at least understood in much the same way, thus avoiding misunderstanding.

The United States defines the “maritime domain” as “all areas and things of, under, related to, next to, or limited by the sea, ocean, or any other navigable body of water, including all maritime activities involving infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels and the

like.”¹ This concept is quite similar to that contained in the Brazilian definition of elements of maritime power, in which the means a nation employs to achieve its own objectives associated with the sea, rivers, lagoons, and navigable lakes are “of a political, economic, military and social nature and include, among other things, the maritime awareness of its people and political class, the merchant marine and the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, the ports, and the maritime trade structure.”²

According to the Brazilian concept, the Navy comprises naval power, with its naval/air-naval units and marines, and material and staff infrastructure. It is the military component of maritime power. However, in U.S. texts the term “seapower” is employed as meaning either “naval” or “maritime” power. Some U.S. authors flag this dichotomy.³ The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has ordered that the term be given a new interpretation:⁴ “We have a pretty good idea of what we can’t do without [seapower], but do we really know all the things that we can accomplish with it?”

Though this discussion may seem merely semantic, it has much to do with how we contribute to a future strategy. In view of the above, a maritime strategy, by encompassing all of the elements of naval power (or rather, included in the maritime domain), is validated by detailed studies specially prepared by governmental and nongovernmental agencies and bodies associated with foreign trade, the merchant marine, the international relations community, shipbuilding and maritime equipment industries, and the Navy, among others. In addition, each of these sectors can relate to counterparts in other countries, whether on a global or a regional basis. Because of its comprehensive scope, a maritime strategy has to be drafted by a country’s highest echelon—the presidency of the republic. In this spirit, the United States designed on September 2005 the *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (NSMS), which, supplemented by eight supporting plans written by various cabinet-level bodies, is fully targeted on maritime security.⁵

On the other hand, in determining that a new maritime strategy should be designed, the *CNO Guidance for 2007* establishes that “such strategy shall reflect the roles and missions that we [the U.S. Navy] intend to carry out: in the war against terror, in conventional campaigns, in national defense, and in ‘shaping’ and ‘stabilization’ operations.”⁶ It must strike a proper balance between the long-term requirements of traditional naval capacities and those required to face and influence “the highly dynamic security environment of the 21st Century.”⁷ The American society has not been left out of the process of designing this new strategy. The CNO himself has included in the process a number of seminars called “Conversations with the Country.” However, that is not to say that the focus is not on the U.S. Navy.

It is worth pointing out that in the United States responsibility for the naval power is shared by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. In Brazil, responsibility for those

three institutions is embodied in the Navy, with few exceptions. The principal exceptions involve maritime activities of the Federal Police and inspection functions in the marine environment of the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources. Therefore, in seeking to achieve a balanced vision of conceptual understandings, we can infer that the problem entails establishing a U.S. Navy strategy that contributes to the nation's maritime strategy. Such understandings seem to be most appropriate, considering the U.S. effort toward designing the NSMS and bringing actions to guide the future strategy under the scope of the CNO.

Where Will Cooperation Take Place?

Another relevant aspect is elaboration of a common strategy among the parties when the interests of two countries may be in conflict. On the part of the United States, the first indication can be found at the beginning of the text of the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which states that

seeking and supporting democratic movements and institutions of each nation and culture is an integral element of U.S. policy in order to eliminate tyranny in the world. Today, the fundamental character of the world's regimes is just as important as the distribution of power among them. Our government is determined to help create a world of well-governed democratic states committed to meeting the needs of their citizens while conducting themselves responsibly within the international system. This is the best way to provide long-term security to the American people.⁸

Notwithstanding the various interpretations of tyranny and democracy, it is clear that the United States will have to play its role at a worldwide level.⁹ Also at the beginning of its text, the NSMS concisely and objectively establishes the coverage area of naval power by stating that "the safety and economic security depends above all on the secure use of the world's oceans."¹⁰

In order to be militarily active on the global scene, the United States has created the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system, whereby general officers of the highest rank hold the combined command of military forces, both within predetermined geographical areas of responsibility and in the performance of specific functional activities around the world.¹¹ Civilian officials from various governmental agencies also participate in the unified combatant commands.

In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, those commands report to the president through the secretary of defense. Command-and-control channels among them are conducted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹² Figure 1 is a map of UCC areas of responsibility, effective October 2002 through 6 February 2007, when President George W. Bush authorized the creation of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), placing Rear Admiral Robert Moeller in charge of the transition team.¹³ USAFRICOM was to be fully operational by September 2008. That command will be responsible for areas previously assigned to three other UCCs, according to figure 2.¹⁴

FIGURE 1





FIGURE 2

Draft Areas of Responsibility



On our part, the National Defense Policy (NDP) notes that “the South American sub-continent is the regional environment of which Brazil is an integral part. In an attempt to narrow its cooperative relationships, the Country envisions strategic surroundings that extend beyond the subcontinental territory into the Southern Atlantic and Africa’s bordering countries.”¹⁵ It further mentions that “defense planning includes all regions and, in particular, the core areas of political and economic power. In addition, it prioritizes the Amazon and the South Atlantic on the grounds of their resources and vulnerability to access through land and sea frontiers.”¹⁶ It states that “Brazil gives priority to South American and African countries—particularly those in southern and Portuguese-speaking

Africa—with a view to deepening its relationships with those countries. Increased cooperation with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, comprised of eight countries spread over four continents connected by the common components of history, culture and language, is another relevant element of our foreign relations.”¹⁷ Finally, it provides that “because of their strategic importance and wealth, the Brazilian Amazon and the South Atlantic are priority areas for National Defense.”¹⁸


This geostrategic dimension stemming from aspects of the NDP that were previously explained has been brought into the naval scenario by the Chief of Staff of the Navy (CEMA), who introduced “the key strategic maritime areas for the deployment of Brazil’s Naval Power,” in order of priority:¹⁹

- Core Area: the area covering the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and Continental Shelf (CS).
- Primary Area: the South Atlantic area located between parallel 16° N, the West Coast of Africa, Antarctica, Eastern South America and the Eastern Lesser Antilles, except for the Caribbean Sea.
- Secondary Area: engulfs the Caribbean Sea and the South Pacific area located between the Beagle Channel—the Coast of South America, the 085° W meridian, and the Panama Canal parallel.
- Other areas of the globe.²⁰

In order to illustrate the points we have been discussing, we have drawn figure 3, where the areas of responsibility of Southern Command, Africa Command, and the core and primary strategic maritime areas of the Brazilian Navy are highlighted.²¹

This figure highlights two important aspects. First, it shows that the strategic interests of the Brazilian Navy are not just associated with the U.S. Southern Command, as we have traditionally thought, but extend over the future USAFRICOM area. Second, at an

FIGURE 3



operating level, the agreed actions must be coordinated by the commander of the U.S. Southern or Africa Command (according to the area of responsibility involved) and Brazil's Chief of Naval Operations, or CON (considering that the fleet, the Fleet Marine Force, and the district forces report to him).

How to Cooperate?

The former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, personally advocated the idea of building “global maritime partnerships”—the “thousand-ship navy.” That initiative is aimed at encouraging all of the world's navies to engage in the fight against terrorism and sea piracy, in addition to promoting economic and political stability as a way to offer maritime nations the benefits of globalization. According to this vision, the U.S. naval force, consisting of an estimated 313-ship fleet by 2020, would be supplemented by naval units of friendly and partner countries of the United States.

Both the concept of the thousand-ship navy and the future maritime strategy will be based on the following principles:

- The objectives of the U.S. armed forces, included in the *National Military Strategy*: protecting the United States against a direct attack, ensuring strategic access and retaining the freedom for global action, reinforcing alliances and partnerships, and establishing favorable security conditions.
- The mission of the U.S. Navy, consisting of organizing, training, maintaining, and preparing combat-ready naval forces capable of winning the global war against terrorism and any other armed conflict, countering any enemy attack, preserving freedom of the seas, and promoting peace and security.

Introducing the actions carried out on behalf of the thousand-ship navy in 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations mentioned the multinational efforts undertaken in eastern Africa to curb piracy; training operations conducted with navies of the Gulf of Guinea and Latin America;²² search and rescue exercises conducted with the Chinese navy in waters off Hawaii, southern California, and Zhanjiang; a deployment of the hospital ship *Mercy* on a five-month humanitarian mission in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, East Timor, and the Philippines; and the evacuation of thousands of U.S. citizens from Lebanon. He further mentioned the contribution of supplying small boats and automatic identification systems (AISs) to the nations of the Gulf of Guinea, thus expanding control of maritime traffic in that area.

The Chief of Naval Operations also commented on the idea of creating a Global Fleet Station (GFS), a support center for the thousand-ship navy within the area of regional interest, structured on the “sea basing” concept. A GFS is a maritime operations base primarily focused on “shaping” operations, on security cooperation in the operational

theater, and on global maritime domain awareness. According to the CNO, the GFS provides the means for increased regional maritime security by exploiting the combined efforts of military forces, agencies, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations, without the necessity of a presence on land.

For our part, the vision of the future of the Brazilian Navy consists of becoming “a modern, balanced and appropriate force possessing surface and aviation resources and marines that are consistent with the political and strategic role of our country in the international scene and, consistent with the desires of the Brazilian society, permanently ready to act—individually or jointly—in ‘blue,’ ‘brown,’ and inland waters, in order to carry out its mission.”

In discussing the Brazilian Navy’s mission, the CEMA has made a point of clarifying our understanding of such terms as “modern” (consisting of up-to-date resources, twenty years old or less), “balanced” (ensuring simultaneous deployment in blue, brown, and inland waters), and “appropriate” (capable of gradually carrying out the basic tasks of naval power—controlling maritime areas, denying the use of the sea to an enemy, projecting power over land, and contributing to dissuasion).²³ In blue waters, or areas off the coast, Brazilian Navy units will be deployed on naval war and naval patrol operations and activity; in brown waters, or coastal and inland areas, those units will be deployed on naval patrol operations and naval inspection actions for the purpose of complying with maritime authority responsibilities.

The CEMA has argued that today Brazil is threat free from a military point of view, but that does not mean it will continue to be so in the future. Therefore, our naval power must be able to dissuade possible threats, enforce our laws, and defend our economic interests in Brazilian jurisdictional waters, ensure the safety of maritime traffic within the areas of interest to Brazil, project power over land, participate in peace operations and coalitions with allies, and influence neighboring navies in the South Atlantic.

In addition to these actions, the Brazilian Navy often takes part in activities similar to those introduced by the CNO that fit within the context of the thousand-ship navy, such as

- Civil and social actions carried out by our vessels in the rivers of the Amazon and Paraná-Paraguay basins (figure 4), not just on behalf of the Brazilian people but also our Bolivian, Colombian, Paraguayan, and Peruvian neighbors.
- Preventive naval patrols conducted within the “Blue Amazon” and focused on two specific areas. One, in which the Navy acts independently, involves a commitment to defend our national sovereignty, in cases such as non-innocent passage of vessels or inappropriate exploitation of natural resources in our EEZ. The other, in



Brazilian Navy has transferred the former corvette *Purus* to that country. In addition, we have supported the education of Namibian officers and enlisted personnel at our schools and training centers, the building of a patrol vessel and four patrol boats, and the implementation of that country's continental shelf delimitation program—similar to that of our Blue Amazon.

We can conclude that in the realm of cooperation, the areas covered by the Brazilian Navy and the U.S. Navy coincide considerably, especially as far as the issue of the thousand-ship navy is concerned.

A Few Thoughts on a New U.S. Maritime Strategy

This document is intended to answer three questions. First, it is aimed at defining the level at which cooperation proposals should be submitted, according to the Brazilian Navy's scope of action. Second, it is intended to identify the areas of common interest to both navies, while establishing the parties responsible for implementing the cooperation effort. This approach points to the importance of bearing in mind the interests of both parties and the relevance of interactions between the Brazilian Chief of Naval Operations and the commanders of the U.S. Southern and Africa commands. Finally, it is intended to offer a wide array of converging efforts of cooperation between the Brazilian Navy and the U.S. Navy.

However, while these answers may contribute to designing a maritime strategy for the United States, they are not sufficient for actually doing so. That leads us to reflect on a few additional points. The first one refers to the beginning of this document, stating that a strategy is a road to be followed. Such a road may only be followed by those who have paved it. Outsiders—whether friends or partners—can offer no more than “contributions” that may be taken into account or not, and, even in the former case, be assigned a relative weight by their contributors and confirmed by the strategic decision maker. A strategy adds value only to those who have to carry it out.

Another factor to be considered is the “act of consulting.” This act may be understood in two distinct ways: a positive way (seen as a search for cooperation, closer friendship, and mutual trust) and a negative way, corresponding to an effort or action intended to win support for a future decision (since the strategy has not yet been designed and approved) that may be disputed by any interested party. In this case, the answer to objections may as well be, “But you have been heard and had the opportunity to voice your opinion on this matter.” Such an attitude would only reduce the level of trust initially earned by the call for cooperation, thus weakening the initial effort to build the partnership, which seems to be a higher goal to be achieved by this strategy.

Finally, the success of any strategy involving international partners must be focused on a desire to share “intelligence.” Technological superiority allows a greater amount of data to be obtained in the shortest possible period of time. Yet unprocessed data are just data. Data analysis conducted in the light of other information available between the parties, thus turning data into “intelligence,” is what actually adds value. Exchanging the results of such intellectual activity may be what makes a difference within the context of the thousand-ship navy. A single vessel in the right place, at the right time, and under the right conditions to curb a threat is worth more than several vessels wandering through the vastness of the ocean.

Notes

1. *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2005) [hereafter NSMS], p. 1.
2. *National Maritime Policy* [Brazil] (Presidency of the Republic, 11 October 1994), p. viii.
3. See Bruce B. Stubbs, “The Maritime Component: Coast Guard Plays Expanded Role in U.S. Sea Power Equation,” *Sea Power*, August 2001, available at www.navyleague.org/sea_power/avg_01_06.php.
4. See Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, “CNO Calls for New Definition of Sea Power,” Navy.mil, 6 September 2005, www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=19924.
5. They are: *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness* (October 2005); Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan; Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan; *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy* (November 2005); *Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan* (April 2006); *Maritime Transportation System Security Plan* (October 2005); *Maritime Commerce Security Plan* (October 2005); and *Domestic Outreach Plan* (October 2005).
6. Shaping operations are actions aimed at building partnerships with governmental and nongovernmental organizations at the local, regional, or international level, carried out continuously and proactively to address heightened instability and thereby terminate or mitigate a conflict or a crisis, or to create a global environment that is secure and favorable to U.S. interests. See Lt. Col. Matt Lopez, “Military Support to Shaping Operations JOC” (presentation, Combined Joint CDE Conference, 9 January 2007), available at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/cdeday1_shaping.ppt.
7. M. G. Mullen, *CNO Guidance for 2007: Focus on Execution* (Washington, D.C.: 2 February 2007), p. 5.
8. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006), p. 1.
9. Definitions include: tyranny—a form of government exercised by one who uses power for self-benefit; and democracy—a form of government in which power emanates from the people. These interpretations alone might generate various other understandings.
10. NSMS, p. ii.
11. Including U.S. Space Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, and Transportation Command.
12. See *Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, U.S. Code* 10, secs. 151–55, available at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm.
13. See www.cdi.org/issues/usforces/commands_Oct02.html.
14. See “United States Africa Command,” *Wikipedia*, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Africa_Command.
15. *National Defense Policy*, June 2005, item 3.1.
16. *Ibid.*, item 4.3.
17. *Ibid.*, item 4.9.

18. Ibid., item 6.12.
19. Alte Esq Kleber Luciano de Assis, "The Brazilian Navy—Strategic Aspects" [in Portuguese] (lecture, Brazilian Naval War College, 5 March 2007), available at www.egn.mar.mil.br/eventos/ocorridos/2007/aulaInauguralCEMA.zip.
20. Ibid., p. 18.
21. Although not shown in figure 3, it is easy to see that the secondary strategic maritime area falls in the area of responsibility of the Southern Command.
22. *CNO Guidance for 2007*, p. 6.
23. Alte Esq Kleber Luciano de Assis, "The Brazilian Navy—Strategic Aspects," p. 11.

A Chilean View of Regional and Global Security Cooperation and the Implications for a New U.S. Maritime Strategy

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The purpose of this essay is to examine how the Chilean Navy, from a strategic perspective, sees maritime security cooperation at the regional and global levels, and its implications for a future U.S. maritime strategy. We will start by examining the meaning of international law in relation to maritime security. In doing that, we will analyze some specific responses to maritime security threats, ranging from actors who prefer to take preventive actions to the use of force, and finally to the unrestricted enforcement of international law.

Then, we will emphasize, from a geopolitical approach, the relevance that maritime security acquires in regional and global security regimes. The new global network of exchange and the form in which it has been affected by “new threats” are also examined, leading to the conclusion that these threats tend to exceed the individual capacity of states to address them, requiring multilateral responses. Some thoughts are presented in relation to the cooperative contributions to maritime security and our particular regional situation, where, as a result of many agreements, a multistate response has been achieved. Likewise, some reflections are made about the concepts of effective sovereignty and enduring friendship.

Then, we will examine the concrete commitments undertaken by our country as to regional and global security. We will review our posture, which favors the use of multiple agendas. We stress that Chile promotes multilateralism and participation in peace operations. Also, we reiterate that Chile cannot refrain from contributing to

international stability through commitments linked to international law and international operations.

We will also examine the strategy of the United States for maritime security and its implementation on a global scale. That examination leads us to conclude that the United States itself believes that it will not be able to reach the goal of its strategy alone but must do so through a powerful coalition of nations and in conformity with international law. Then, we refer to the general guidelines for cooperative participation of the Chilean Navy with a new U.S. maritime strategy. We will present the bases for the participation of Chile and the efforts of that nation to comply with the requirements of international agreements related to maritime transportation to which it has subscribed. Chile's aim to work collectively in facing hemispheric security threats and to use that kind of response in other parts of the world where its interests are at stake is also emphasized.

Lastly, in the conclusions, we indicate how the Chilean Navy could participate cooperatively with its U.S. counterpart within the framework of a new U.S. maritime strategy.

International Law and Maritime Security

Nowadays, the threat of war has decreased, but other menaces have emerged. Though they are not new, they broadly affect the interconnected world in which we live. In the face of these threats, there are different responses: some countries emphasize preventive actions but encourage the use of force when they fail; others promote multilateral responses; and there are some others that act regionally or bilaterally, and in some cases unilaterally. In doing that, some are more respectful of international law than others.

Not all the actors implement and comply with international rules in the same way, particularly some developing countries that, more often than not, do not take their treaty obligations as seriously as they should. For this reason, and despite the efforts to harmonize legislation and its application and interpretation among various states, differences still exist in subjects relevant to the application of the law of the sea, the use of force, and the law of armed conflict, among others.

Considering the impact of international law on international security, we believe that in order to have a more secure world, it is indispensable to act through the international community and under the rule of law. In this context, it is interesting to underline what is expressed on the Princeton Project on National Security, referring to what the U.S. performance should be. In our judgment, this should also be applicable to the other members of the community of nations.¹

Still, some of the greatest moments in our history have come from standing for our values and defending them on behalf of others as well as ourselves. We have recognized at those moments, as we should recognize today, that we have to stand *with* other nations rather than above them, and that we must play by the same rules that they do if we are to achieve common goals. And if we truly believe

that our values are universal, then we cannot think that we have a national monopoly on their interpretation or implementation.

Pursuing liberty under law both within nations and among them is a grand strategy for making America more secure. . . . Recognizing the complex balance that must be struck between order and liberty to secure true liberal democracy means engaging some governments on securing order and others on promoting liberty, but without sacrificing order.²

On the other hand, we agree with those who claim that order and security can best be achieved if international organizations are adapted to the new times, which make absolutely necessary overall reform of the United Nations organization and other international organs.³

It is indispensable that all international actors feel that they are participants in the new institutionalism and have confidence that they will be heard, and that smaller and needier nations perceive that they can count on the support of developed countries in helping them to resolve their vital problems.

In the naval and maritime context, Geoffrey Till states the need to have “good order at sea”: “Because the sea is increasingly important, in relative terms, to local economies, disorder at sea only makes things worse ashore. The success of transnational crime such as drug smuggling elevates the power of the kind of people who challenge civilized states and the ability to connect with other countries. Countries that fail for such reasons tend, moreover, to become the security concerns of others. . . . [T]he maintenance of good order at sea requires an improved level of awareness, effective policy and integrated governance.”⁴

When referring to order at sea, it is important to highlight first the significance of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the preamble of which recognizes the need to establish, “with due respect to the sovereignty of all States, a juridical order for the seas and oceans.” In the International Maritime Organization (IMO), various agreements, protocols, codes, recommendations, and guidelines on maritime security and pollution prevention, as well as other matters, have been adopted. As a consequence of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a great many measures on maritime security were intensified—amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) were passed, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was approved—all of which provided the basis for a set of regulations creating an international arrangement aimed at detecting and preventing acts on board vessels and in port facilities that endanger maritime shipping.⁵

In May 2006 another security mechanism was adopted for maritime safety and protection: the Long Range International Tracking System (LRIT), incorporated in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which establishes multilateral arrangements to share information about search and rescue at sea.⁶

It is true that a reasonably adequate juridical framework to keep order at sea exists through many international agreements and international and national regulations but, as already stated, the problem is its implementation, because states occasionally are unable or unwilling to enforce the agreements.⁷ Therefore it is important to establish adequate, realistic, achievable, and effective standards for compliance.

Regional and Global Security Regimes and Maritime Security

Having established the scope and the relationship of maritime security to international law, it is necessary to underscore its relevance to regimes of regional and global security, taking account of the changes and trends affecting previous security strategies.

The expansion of the geographic scope of the economic interests of nations has created an intensive network for the exchange of goods and services, making the states participants in, and at the same time dependent on, a global system. In that context, international security—together with potential conflicts of interests beyond their borders among big, medium, and even smaller powers—has been affected by the appearance of new threats. In some cases these threats are due to the effects of a serious socioeconomic situation within a country or region not benefiting from globalization. In other cases, they are the results of actions by nonstate actors—such as corporations, religious groups, terrorist organizations, drug-trafficking cartels, and organized crime—that attack any country or society opposed to their own ideological, religious, or political concepts, or accomplish illegal objectives of material benefit to them but to the detriment of important sectors of society.⁸

Particular features of these emerging threats tend to exceed the individual capacities of states to neutralize the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats to their vital interests, resulting in the need for coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral responses that must be incorporated into a multidimensional, mainly transnational scenario. This fact has led to the reformulation of traditional theories and the design of new strategic schemes based on international cooperation at regional and global levels, conceptually called “cooperative security.” This approach allows for preventive and constructive confrontation of new threats to global stability that previously were not part of the international security agenda but now are perceived as risks and threats to the security that nations desire in order to achieve development and provide for the welfare of their peoples.⁹

Under the concept of cooperative security, the international community seeks to achieve security by institutionalized consent among the international actors involved rather than using force or the threat of force to settle disputes. It assumes that the partners’ security objectives are common and compatible, amenable to the establishment of easy, collaborative relations. This implies that the regional and global security systems

depend on flexibility, providing a capacity for coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral responses to new threats and the changing demands and characteristics of the world market. Likewise, these systems must serve to reduce, not increase, the gaps between developed and developing countries, while allowing growth in the global commitment to free trade. In sum, the security systems must accommodate to new technologies, changing trade practices, emerging markets, and other forces guiding the course of free trade.

In the regional context specifically, increasing disparities in development among various countries of the Americas make unequal the effects of globalization and render it impossible to come up with a relatively uniform formula for their contributions to cooperative maritime security.

Regional and global security regimes must take responsibility for maritime security, which, now more than ever before, demands cooperative and coordinated action by states and between states and private enterprises to neutralize the threat of terrorism, which finds in the maritime environment favorable conditions for achieving its ends; trafficking in weapons and dangerous materiel; the use of weapons of mass destruction; piracy and armed attacks on vessels under way; and drug smuggling.

Within the parameters provided by international law and the institutions that enforce its rules, the system at the global security level should operate through common efforts oriented toward creating harmonious development and the expansion of world trade in an environment of cooperation among beneficiary countries. In the maritime environment, that purpose is accomplished by the actions of navies and the commitment of their respective countries' foreign policies to maintain peace, stability, and security, not only in trade routes but also in the geographic areas where their shared interests are affected. Each state's involvement makes a concrete contribution to international maritime security and, at the same time, a legitimate and inescapable payment for the benefits of the globalization process.

A similar situation can be seen at the regional level wherein geographically close countries work through established agreements in activities intended to maintain conditions of peace and security at sea and restore them when they are upset. As one state alone might not be able to do this, it is indispensable to develop cooperative strategies and joint actions among navies of neighboring countries that can.¹⁰

This scenario has guided Latin American actors to take important steps toward major economic, commercial, and political integration. Chile particularly has undertaken various initiatives to strengthen relationships among the navies of the region. These initiatives include three combined naval exercises between the Chilean and Argentine fleets in the southern zone, increased measures of mutual confidence, study of large-scale joint projects, reciprocal visits of naval authorities, and participation in peace

operations. All of these have resulted in a more stable regional environment and protection of shared interests.

Furthermore, countries of the region are developing efforts intended to establish “effective sovereignty” by means of presence and control over their jurisdictional maritime area, which in U.S. terms is seen more as a duty than a right.¹¹ At the same time, those whose navies have major capabilities provide permanent contributions and cooperation for maritime stability, participating in combined large-scale exercises, controlling oceanic accesses, supporting the war against terrorism, and taking other steps that the United States defines as part of an “enduring friendship.”¹²

In sum, maritime security achieved within a cooperative security system forms an integral part of the regional and global security regimes and is indispensable in the current globalized scenario to neutralize new threats and, consequently, to achieve the benefits of international trade, for developed countries and developing countries alike.

Chilean Commitments to Regional and Global Security Regimes

After examining regional and global security regimes from a geopolitical point of view, it is necessary to mention the concrete commitments of our country in this respect. According to a former Chilean minister of foreign affairs, José Miguel Insulza, “In this new and complex international reality, the interests of different nation-states have been diversified, leading to multiple agendas that require mechanisms that guarantee more cooperative and solid relations.” He adds: “It is not only to prevent conflicts and war tensions, but also to face the new risks emerging from political, economic and social instabilities.” He concludes: “With that purpose, [we] have sought to increase international cooperation on such issues as the promotion of democracy and human rights, peace enforcement, cooperation for economic and social development, encouragement of equity among states and individuals, preservation of natural resources and protection of the environment, regulation of common spaces, liberalization of world trade and the fights against drug trafficking and terrorism.”¹³

Considering these challenges and without changing Chile’s essential objectives of protecting its territorial integrity and national interests, Chilean foreign policy has increased the scope of its international action. Chile has made a moderate but sustained contribution to international security, participating selectively in multilateral initiatives oriented toward peacekeeping, supporting and promoting the creation of rules and regimes that facilitate the collective prevention and management of problems directly affecting stability at the regional and global levels.

At the Global Level

The government of Chile has repeatedly stated its willingness to participate actively, within its means, in the strengthening of the United Nations and its various organs, especially in the security area.¹⁴ In the 2006–10 program of the Chilean government, President Michelle Bachelet stated: “The relative size of Chile conditions its international policy. For that reason, we will promote multilateralism, respect for international law, the peaceful solution of conflicts, the inviolability of treaties and International Humanitarian Law.”¹⁵ The president went on to say that “multilateralism is a strategic commitment of Chilean foreign policy at the subregional level (MERCOSUR [the Southern Cone Common Market]), the regional level (Rio Group, OAS [the Organization of American States]), and especially the global level (UN, WTO [World Trade Organization]).”

Important examples of such commitment are the total observance of the Tlatelolco Treaty; the permanent deployment of Peace Forces in Cambodia; Chile’s participation in the UN Security Council, 1996–97; a governmental directive that regulates the conditions under which Chile contributes to peace operations; the organization of the first conference to promote measures of mutual confidence, held in Santiago, 1995; the commitment to the convention that prohibits chemical and bacteriologic weapons; the observance of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; a recent agreement that prohibits nuclear tests; and ratification of the Ottawa Treaty.

In the context of peace operations, within the regional and the United Nations frameworks, Chile has a long history of participation in multilateral mechanisms to maintain international peace and security.

At the Regional Level

As to the defense and security agendas, there is a great difference between the Andean region and the Southern Cone. While many of the Andean governments consider their armed forces responsible for combating drug trafficking, in the Southern Cone the governments insist that the military must be kept away from that task, because it is the responsibility of the local police forces.

However, in relation to drug trafficking, Latin American actors have had the political will and the ability to develop increased cooperation when common criteria have been established. The agreements provided for a multilateral mechanism of evaluation and a wide agenda of cooperation through the International Commission for Drug Control and Abuse. Recently, they have also recognized that terrorism is a new, common threat.

Ultimately, the region presents a situation of changing and dynamic security conditions, but in general, it also exhibits a very high degree of cooperation. Some steps have

been taken to reduce the level of conflict among states and to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, cooperative security measures have been developed that have improved transparency and stabilized relations in the realm of defense, such as mutual confidence-building measures, defense publications, and the development of methodologies for comparing defense expenditures between Argentina and Chile, Peru and Chile, and between Peru and Ecuador.

At the Institutional Level

Following its government's policies, the Chilean Navy bases its international action on two pillars: deterrence and cooperation. Both concepts are important in keeping peace and stability in a globalized world and thus contributing to the development of our country. According to the former commander in chief of the Chilean Navy, Admiral Miguel A. Vergara, "No country is big enough to act alone and none is too small not to contribute something." In the international maritime context, Admiral Vergara added, "The international commitments of Chile and its Navy are not limited to geographic space, because in the context of maritime interests, boundaries do not exist."¹⁶ He concluded that "security in itself is an indispensable component of economic and social development, Chile could not refrain from contributing to the achievement of peace and stability in international relations. This implies being willing to participate, as far as our capabilities and resources permit, in international operations like crisis or peace management, or humanitarian assistance."

In a world of growing and irrevocable interdependence, the search for common security or cooperative security is one of the main features of any strategy intended to prevent and resolve conflicts. Undoubtedly, international law is the core of this interdependent system.

The United States and Maritime Security

The present essay attempts to offer some thoughts about the way in which the Chilean Navy would cooperate with its counterpart in the United States in the international implementation of a strategy for maritime security. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the way in which that large country understands and implements its strategy.

The *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, published in September 2005, asserts that the economic and general security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world's oceans.¹⁷ Overcoming the threats to maritime security demands common understanding, joint effort, and action on a global scale. Maritime security is required to assure freedom of the seas, facilitate free navigation and trade, improve world prosperity and liberty, and protect marine resources.

On the other hand, nations have a common interest in achieving two complementary objectives: facilitating maritime commerce that supports economic security, and protecting themselves from hostile, terrorist, criminal, and other dangerous acts in the maritime environment. Due to the fact that all nations benefit from collective security, all must share in the responsibility for maintaining maritime security against the threats that emerge in this domain.

The threats identified are state support to terrorist and unlawful activities, terrorism, piracy and transnational crime, environmental destruction, and illegal immigration. Therefore, the U.S. maritime strategy considers four objectives that must guide national activities related to maritime security: “prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts,” “protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures,” “minimize damage and expedite recovery,” and “safeguard the ocean and its resources.”

The United States recognizes that because of the extensive global connectivity among businesses and governments, its maritime security policies affect other nations, and also that significant local and regional incidents will have global effects. Success in securing the maritime domain will not come from the United States acting alone but through a powerful coalition of nations that maintains a strong, united front.

A secure maritime domain can be achieved only by simultaneous employment of all U.S. measures in concert with those of other nation-states, in a highly coordinated way and under international law. In this context, the following strategic actions are envisioned:

- Enhance international cooperation to ensure lawful and timely actions against maritime threats
- Maximize Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) to support effective decision making
- Embed security in commercial practices to reduce vulnerabilities and facilitate commerce
- Deploy layered security to meld public and private security measures
- Ensure continuity of the marine transportation system to maintain vital commerce and defense readiness.

Finally, the United States has concluded that because of the challenges that remain, the adversaries it confronts, and the environment in which it operates, it is compelled to strengthen its ties with allies and friends and to seek new partnerships with others. Such collaboration is fundamental to worldwide economic stability and growth, and it is vital to the interests of the United States. It is only through such an integrated approach among all maritime partners—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—that the United States can improve the security of the maritime domain.

Participation of Chile in a Cooperative Scheme of Maritime Security

Ultimately, we must think realistically about the cooperative participation of the Chilean Navy under the guidelines laid out in a new international maritime strategy of the United States. Owing to a consensus that the security of states depends on global security, the principle of international cooperation as the basis for development and stability of nations is increasingly accepted, strengthened, and promoted. In this respect, naval cooperation exists among states when certain political, economic, and military conditions are shared by all.¹⁸ In this sense, and from the fact that our country is an oceanic country, the exercise of sovereignty and control of its maritime area become a fundamental element in its overall development.

Chilean security and stability are achieved through an international legal framework. In that sense, and having in mind the international legal framework in force, as well as the ideas of Admirals John Morgan and Charles Martoglio concerning a “thousand-ship navy,” Chile shares the need to cooperate in the safety, surveillance, and protection of the world’s seas.¹⁹ This commitment to the protection of the seas is reflected in our participation, through our navy, in a series of multinational exercises attempting to protect specific maritime zones that have particular importance for both our country and the international community.

Special attention must be given to Operation PANAMAX, which since its creation in 2003 has brought together the Chilean and U.S. navies and lately other navies, along with the coast guard of Panama, with a single aim: to secure the Panama Canal, as well as to protect free transit in its adjacent waters. Chile is highly dependent upon a secure and efficient Panama Canal for its growth and prosperity. The maritime cargo that is shipped to Atlantic coasts via the Panama Canal ranks Chile fourth among the users of the canal, after the United States, Japan, and China. This motivates our permanent concern for the safety of the canal itself and the other choke-point areas associated with it, both in the Pacific and the Caribbean.

Therefore, international cooperation is paramount for the protection and defense of our interests, and at the same time, it is imperative that Chile act jointly with other states. That leads us to consider as a key element of our maritime and naval strategy the increase in our interoperability with other navies and development of strategic capabilities in relation to the international participation we seek. It is in this sense that we have called our strategy the “Three-Vector” strategy—it is aimed at establishing control over the sea in three different conditions or situations.

This strategy aims for international participation and cooperation, given the limitations of our national power, which by itself cannot secure our national interests or

those of the broader community. In the context of international maritime security, the Chilean Navy believes that to serve the highest national interests, it must participate not only in the promotion and maintenance of global, hemispheric, and regional security but also in the identification of opportunities for cooperation to consolidate this security. The same perception is the leitmotif that moves Admirals Morgan and Martoglio to think of a thousand-ship navy, under the principle of “thinking globally and acting locally.”

In other words, we need maritime friends and allies with whom, sharing similar interests, we can act jointly in order to create, maintain, or restore peace, security, and order at sea that our own national interests require. That means, if Chile wants to accomplish its national objectives, it must have an active international participation and be willing to cooperate and accept cooperation by other states that share its interests. From the foregoing, we can draw various premises, which we would like to underscore:

- The stability, prosperity, and progress of our neighborhood are good for us.
- States and groups that threaten the freedom of movement, particularly in the maritime environment, and introduce uncertainty into the international system (e.g., terrorism) harm us and thereby become our opponents.
- States that take elective and unilateral action to settle their political, commercial, financial, or other disputes go against our interests. We feel committed to the United Nations; therefore, we support its actions, and we work to reinforce that organization in everything related to peace, security, and international order.
- Our interest in free trade is shared with the international community.

It is in the context of this strategy that the development of our naval forces is situated, within the limits of our available resources. However, having in mind that we share the same conception of cooperation, the Chilean Navy and the U.S. Southern Command believe it necessary to continue developing more deeply the Naval Operational Committee, as well as other organizations such as the Pacific Fleet.²⁰

This is in addition to the Chilean efforts to comply with the standards that arise from the international agreements that secure maritime transportation, mainly the whole implementation of the ISPS Code, the last-generation system in service associated with the Vessel Traffic Service and automatic identification systems, and the adoption of the new maritime transportation control system (Naval Cooperation and Guidance Shipping, or NCAGS).

Having mentioned what Chile and in particular its navy are now doing that could be useful in the future to cooperate with the new U.S. maritime strategy, we will examine new ideas that will contribute to implementing this strategy effectively.

Chile has assumed enormous international commitments in its jurisdictional area, such as the role of south-east Pacific coordinator of the International Hydrographic Organization, naval control of maritime traffic, tsunami warning, and responsibility for maritime search and rescue within a zone even greater than our “*Presencial* Sea.” In order to cooperate better with the new U.S. maritime strategy, our country should increase its means for those activities; for its part, the United States should provide without restriction the necessary information, knowing that our country will act reciprocally.

At the same time, better cooperation with the new U.S. maritime strategy would be possible if we intensified control and surveillance over our maritime spaces, over such important oceanic passages as the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, the Drake Passage, and our *Presencial* Sea, preventing any illegal activity from being carried out in the high seas adjacent to our coasts. Furthermore, Chile could exercise more rigorously the authority supported by international and national laws as a flag state, coastal state, and port authority state. Therefore, and in light of the new U.S. maritime strategy, it is evident that our country should be willing to cooperate, according to its capabilities, with all those activities consistent with the national interest, humanitarian motivations, and the international legal order. We should think constructively, then, about how to translate that political will into commitments and restrictions agreed upon together, serving the strategic objectives of both countries.

Chile’s opportunities to act in a coordinated way with the United States will emerge essentially from cooperative commitments under UN mandates and the national political will. The action of the Chilean Navy within its own jurisdictional territory and its *Presencial* Sea, in support of a new U.S. maritime strategy, would be always framed in international law. In addition to this we must consider our ability to coordinate the action of multiple national and international agencies seized with facing “new threats.”

Interoperability will be an indispensable condition for reaching effective cooperation in support of a new U.S. maritime strategy. It will be the responsibility of both sides to understand the other, build confidence, develop common procedures, train in the means, and share information in real time, in order to be able to complement each other’s efforts in pursuit of common interests.

Conclusions

Changes affecting the naval and maritime environment create a need to maintain good order at sea, which must be the concern of everyone. Our country, through its state policies, believes that in order to have a more secure world, it is indispensable to act through the international community and under the rule of the law. The UNCLOS and

the regulations passed by international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization constitute the proper tools for that purpose.

Emerging threats tend to exceed the capabilities of individual states to meet them, which generates a need to respond in a coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral manner. At the regional level, acting through agreements among neighboring countries, it is possible to share the burden of maintaining conditions of peace and security at sea.

The inter-American region presents a changing and dynamic security situation, but also a very high degree of cooperation, shaping a new phenomenon: the appearance of a cooperative agenda among the majority of states in the region. Multilateralism is a pillar of the foreign policy of Chile. The Chilean Navy is willing to participate, according to its capabilities and resources, in international operations such as crisis management, peace operations, and humanitarian assistance. For our country, the international commitments it accepts must be linked to international law.

The United States, on the other hand, states that security in the maritime domain can be attained only by the simultaneous employment of all the tools of its national power, in concert with other nation-states and under international law. Likewise, it recognizes a common interest with other nations in obtaining economic security and protecting against hostile acts performed at sea. The United States believes that all the nations that benefit must be jointly responsible for maintaining maritime security. It asserts, at the same time, that only through an integrated approach among maritime partners—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—will it be possible to increase security in the maritime domain.

To Chile, the exercise of sovereignty and control of its maritime territory are essential for overall development. Our country requires peace and stability with its neighbors, within the region, and in the critical areas where its trade is developed. In addition, it is obliged to seek international cooperation to achieve better defense and protection of its vital maritime spaces. The security and stability that Chile needs are accomplished by means of an international legal framework that ensures them. Chile shares and is committed to cooperate in the safety, surveillance, and protection of the world's seas, especially choke-point areas. Cooperation is crucial for the defense of our interests, as well as the capability to interact with other navies.

The Chilean Navy shares with the U.S. Navy a similar concept of cooperation and of the duty to comply with the requirements flowing from the international agreements to which their countries adhere. Therefore, it is willing, under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and regulations passed by international organizations, to cooperate at the regional and global levels in order to achieve adequate maritime security within the conceptual framework that the new U.S. maritime strategy establishes.

Notes

1. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century*, Princeton Project Papers (Princeton, N.J.: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2006), p. 59, available at www.wws.princeton.edu.
2. Ibid.
3. United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility; Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes* (New York: United Nations, 2004), available at www.un.org.
4. Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century* (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 333.
5. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, adopted by the International Maritime Organization, 2002, together with new provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, aiming to increase protection of the maritime shipping sector.
6. "Long Range Identification and Tracking," *International Maritime Organization*, www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=905.
7. Geoffrey Till: "Enforcement problems are frequently mainly attributable to degrees of state failure and difficulties in governance ashore. . . . Often the most serious adversaries are not competing nations but non state actors of one sort or another, bent on extracting benefit from the sea in total disregard of everyone else. Even for effective countries, differing sea uses overlap, often compete, and need supervision." *Seapower*, pp. 340–41.
8. Miguel Vergara Villalobos, "Acepción ampliada de la interoperatividad," *Revista de Marina* (Chile), 2003, no. 1, pp. 7–13.
9. David Hardy, "La seguridad cooperativa, un modelo de seguridad estratégica en evolución," *Revista de Marina* (Chile), 2003, no. 5, p. 532.
10. See Francisca Möller, "La gobernabilidad: El desafío de América Latina," *Cuadernos de Difusión* (Academia de Guerra Naval, Chile) 5, no. 11.
11. Fernando Thauby, "La armada en la seguridad naval y marítima," *Revista de Marina* (Chile), 2003, no. 5, p. 435.
12. Ibid.
13. José Miguel Insulza, former minister of foreign affairs of Chile, presentation (II Jornada Internacional de Defensa y Seguridad Regional en el Cono Sur, November 1997).
14. See the intervention of Jaime Ravinet, former minister of defense of Chile, "Global and Regional Security as an Opportunity for Latin America" (paper, "Strategic Opportunities: Charting New Approaches to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere," Miami, Fla., 11 March, 2005), available at www.gobernabilidad.cl.
15. Michelle Bachelet, *Programa de Gobierno 2006–2010* (Santiago, Chile: November 2005), p. 98.
16. Adm. Miguel A. Vergara, "Desarrollo y poder naval chileno en un mundo globalizado" (paper, Seminario Inaugural Mes del Mar 2003, Naval Base Talcahuano, Chile, May 2003), available at www.armada.cl/site/noticias/pags/20030430104747.
17. See *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2005), p. 1, available at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html, revised March 2007.
18. It could be added that the first attempt to achieve cooperation on naval security matters was undertaken at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the third president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson (served 1801–1809), sent a naval fleet to the Mediterranean to restrain and eliminate piracy from the Barbary States (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli), which threatened commerce between the United States and Europe. However, this idea did not flourish, mainly because of the war between England and Napoleonic France and because of differing European and American perceptions of that threat.
19. In Vice Adm. John G. Morgan, Jr., and Rear Adm. Charles W. Martoglio, "The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (November 2005), pp. 14–17.

20. In matters related to, for example, the support of a tanker and surveillance aircraft (P-3 Orion) that allows an increase in operational and surveillance capabilities in the Pacific.

PART THREE

Cooperation through Regional Maritime Partnerships

A Regional Maritime Strategy against New Threats

CAPTAIN FEDERICO RECHKEMMER PRIETO, PERUVIAN NAVY
CAPTAIN RICARDO MENÉNDEZ CALLE, PERUVIAN NAVY
CAPTAIN CARLOS PILCO PÉREZ, PERUVIAN NAVY

In a context of increasing globalization, the external and internal aspects of security are firmly related. The capital flows, the development of new technologies and the progress of democracy associated with globalization contribute to prosperity and freedom for many people, but others perceive globalization as a source of frustration and injustice. The states of the Western Hemisphere have to confront traditional threats and new ones of diverse natures and multidimensional reaches that have grown in importance in recent years. Since these threats include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects, we have to fight against them in all those fields.

In this context, some of these new threats have spawned organizations formed by networks with different bases and purposes. This problem will bring as a consequence the need to draw on technological resources to control activity on the sea, an area that is used by those who represent these threats and mount actions in the name of inequality or religion, or through eagerness to engage in criminal activities against humanity.

In comparison with those of other regions, the recent history of the Americas and the Caribbean demonstrates a smaller proportion of interstate armed conflicts than elsewhere, and this area can thus be considered one of the most stable regions. On the other hand, the region has experienced numerous internal conflicts that have resulted in armed confrontations of a domestic character, caused, among other reasons, by the absence or weakness of institutional mechanisms for prevention or resolution of conflict, within the frameworks of both authoritarian and democratic systems. Unlike interstate conflicts, which tend to promote national unity and fortify social cohesion, those of a domestic nature generate and exacerbate divisions within the citizenry.

Changes in the international system since the 1980s have introduced a new set of factors that have the potential to increase armed conflicts, associated with the weakening

of states and public institutions, the emergence of new actors at the transnational and local levels, and the emergence of new threats, mainly of a transnational character.

In a world of new threats and global markets and mass media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on the existence of an effective hemispheric security system. In that sense, establishing a regional maritime strategy that identifies new threats and defines the strategic targets of the Americas will enable the creation of a new cooperative system of preventive, deterrent, and effective regional security, one that contributes to conditions for lasting peace, stability, and sustainable development in the region.

Development of the Regional Maritime Strategy

The regional maritime strategy ought to be a management mechanism of the American states to carry out multinational combined naval operations within the framework of regional security cooperation, aimed at addressing the new threats.

With the purpose of obtaining a balance among the numerous variables that allows us to view regional maritime strategy with a long-range vision adapted to the current surroundings and the foreseeable future, we can outline the general features for the strategic development, taking as a reference the model proposed by Professor Henry C. Bartlett.¹

The Scenario Expected in the Middle Term

Unless dramatic changes occur, armed conflicts between states in the region will not emerge, as opposed to internal conflicts and tensions (linked to transnational crime, migration, environment damage, drug trafficking, radical transnational ethnic movements, and international terrorism) that could transcend national borders. Although this last kind of conflict does not necessarily entail armed confrontations, it may give rise to them. This could contribute to the proliferation of all kinds of arms in the region and an increase in transnational crime, especially drug trafficking.

Consequently, although the possibilities of interstate conflicts have diminished, the character of overseas expansion of the new threats brings singular challenges to more than one state. This is particularly dangerous, because these kinds of threats are generated by players or agents who do not represent governments or states.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, against the United States set a new international agenda in security matters. The axis of this new agenda is focused on the frontal fight against global terrorism, as well as against the networks and states that can maintain it, support it, or give rise to its development. Nevertheless, the perceptions of proximity or imminence of this threat vary radically in different regions of the world.

For many countries of the Americas, terrorism is also perceived as a serious threat, along with drug trafficking, but terrorism is often identified with local movements. On a secondary level are poverty and social problems, arms trafficking, environment problems, and natural disasters. On a third level, we have organized crime, although this too could be related to arms trafficking, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

Globalization, banking deregulation, and free trade agreements no doubt facilitate economic development in the region, but they are also exploited by drug trafficking organizations and organized crime, which themselves sometimes act as great multinational enterprises. Malefactors use maritime transportation widely, and it is likely that they will continue doing so as a matter of cost-effectiveness, just like great corporations in their legal commerce. Such a situation generates a sense of uncertainty, or “fog,” where the weak presence of states facilitates other kinds of illegal activities, like arms trafficking and terrorism.

One of the greater vulnerabilities foreseen in the region comes from a crisis of governability that affects some countries. This obviously makes it difficult to offer proper levels of security to the citizens of these countries; it also generates anxiety, in the form of the fear that social violence could break out as a consequence of claims of a wide sector of the population whose basic necessities are not satisfied. Bad management of public affairs (e.g., corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and a failure to fulfill obligations) feeds internal unrest and may give rise to social conflicts that corrode states from inside, destroying or seriously affecting their institutions. The weakness of the states is an alarming phenomenon that undermines governance and contributes to an increase in regional instability, because in those countries new threats arise more easily.

The International Normative Framework

The charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) motivate member states to behave proactively to keep the peace and international security, to take collective and effective measures to prevent and to eliminate threats to peace, and to suppress acts of aggression or other violations of the peace.

At the hemispheric level, the organs operating this security architecture are the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), and the Inter-American Committee on Natural Disaster Reduction (CIRDN). Additionally, one can include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Defense Board (IID). Also, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) establishes a system of hemispheric security against possible external aggression and, along with the American Treaty on Pacific

Settlement (the pact of Bogotá), establishes mechanisms for avoiding conflicts among the states of the continent.²

In addition, diverse agreements and bilateral and subregional mechanisms in security and defense matters contribute to fortifying the hemispheric security structure. The dispute related to the TIAR that arose over the Falklands War, as well as the increasing preoccupation of American states with new threats, led the OAS to issue a declaration on security in the Americas (28 October 2003) reaffirming its commitment to revitalizing and fortifying the organs, institutions, and mechanisms of the security system in the hemisphere.

All these treaties and declarations constitute the legal framework on which a better American security system can be constructed, but the main precondition for achieving it is that norms evolve in harmony with events. In that sense, it is urgent to review this regulatory framework and to adapt it to the current and future security and defense needs of the continent, thus building a truly cooperative system of regional security that can provide effective answers to the new threats to peace and continental stability.³ Suitable operation of that system will require the determined support of the participating states.

Objectives

The Objectives of Regional Security.

- To prevent the security of the hemisphere from being affected by the new threats, concerns, and other diverse challenges, countering them by political, diplomatic, and defense means
- To contribute to the strengthening of organs, institutions, and mechanisms of the inter-American system, as well as subregional elements
- To collaborate, with the creation of an atmosphere of confidence among member states
- To contribute to the strengthening of democracy in the hemisphere, favoring cooperative action by various national organizations and, in some cases, the private sector and civil society.

The Objectives of Regional Defense.

- To establish and operate multinational military organizations that can act against the new threats in a timely and forceful way
- To control maritime and aerospace areas of common interest, establishing efficient systems of intelligence to ensure access and the interchange of timely and accurate information

- To establish cooperative mechanisms to contribute to the collective defense effort and thereby improve regional security.

Regional Maritime Strategy

Strategic Assumptions.

- The new threats cannot be resolved by negotiation.
- The most effective way to fight the new threats is direct, rapid, and timely military intervention.
- Political instability and the resource limitations of some countries represent a danger to the effective operation of a cooperative security system in the region.
- The new threats will continue to use maritime means to pursue their activities.
- Combined multinational operations will be handicapped by different degrees of recruitment and training of forces from country to country, as well as by technological differences among them.

Strategy. In order to fight effectively against the new threats in the maritime domain, it will be necessary to employ a regional or continental security model that provides for carrying out multinational combined operations. This system will be based on the following concepts.

An atmosphere of confidence and true commitment: it is essential to discover new channels of information exchange and mutual support among the participating navies, which can reduce technological differences, establish common operational doctrines, standardize procedures, and make communications equipment compatible, as well as develop capabilities of mutual logistic support. These factors will make it easier to identify and fight against the new threats.

A multinational combined task force: the characteristics of the new threats and the difficulty of identifying them create situations of uncertainty and crisis in the maritime domain that require a response by means of the proper use of the force. For that reason, it will be necessary to have a very versatile task organization, one that ensures a rapid and effective response. This organization would be formed by multinational and combined forces, directed from associated command posts, under the authority of a temporary or permanent task force commander, as merited by the situation.

The multinational forces would need great capability for reaction and flexibility, and for rapid deployment, nationally and internationally. Forces of this kind provide an initial and urgent answer to collective security because they are standby organizations, capable of being mobilized on short notice for specific emergencies. Their high

mobility and readiness allow them to be in the zone of conflict in a short time, able to engage in time to neutralize a threat.

For this to be carried out, each member country of the system should contribute a certain quantity and type of units to carry out the tasks and operations required, ready in their home ports to incorporate themselves into task organizations in a relatively short time. Task organizations would be formed in regions, as described below, and the forces would be classified according to their degrees of availability.

This initiative will stimulate greater regional security cooperation, supporting a professional dialogue in which the authorities of the various countries can take part, in strict compliance with the legal framework in force. It will also have an impact at the national level, stimulating the modernization and standardization of units and all their systems. All that will have an obvious impact on national naval organizations, which will have to adopt more agile and flexible structures and maintain a high level of training and versatility so as to act in different scenarios and fulfill diverse missions.

As for the operational level, effective integration will have to be arranged, starting with the establishment of a multinational combined staff. This will encourage a common defense culture and allow development of doctrine and strategy accepted by all the states.

Also, the proposed structure will adjust the unique capabilities of each navy and improve interoperability of systems and national capabilities to harmonize logistics. In a cooperative regional security effort, lack of interoperability among navies can diminish the quality of the multinational task organization. In order to avoid this negative result, it will be necessary to reduce technological disparities, as well as to adapt and standardize doctrines, techniques, and operational procedures, stressing continuous and high levels of training.

Facing new threats can imply situations of crisis or conflict, which require the development of specific strategic concepts, such as

- *Dissuasion*, through the demonstration of real capabilities during the systematic training of a force that is suitable in structure and magnitude.
- *Containment*, carrying out permanent surveillance and maritime patrol operations.
- *Interdiction and cooperation*: patrolling and monitoring operations in the maritime domain in coordination with other governmental organizations, as well as implementing plans of maritime interdiction at subregional levels, with the objective of achieving effective control of areas of interest, which must always be within the national and international legal framework in force.

- *A cooperative regional security system:* taking into account the extent of the concept and the great number of actors involved, we consider that a cooperative regional security system must be organized into five subregions, each one assuming control of a maritime area. Each subregion will establish its own organization reflecting the capabilities of the forces involved, receiving the support of other subregions if the situation deserves.

A security architecture founded upon and developed from a subregional perspective will be flexible, modular, cooperative, and collective. Navies with greater means will act in one or more subregions, collaborating in the protection of areas of common interest.

SUBREGIONS	COUNTRIES
Southern South America	Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
Andean Region	Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
Central America and Mexico	Central America and Mexico
Caribbean	Caribbean island nations and environs and Venezuela
North America	United States and Canada

Subregions as established by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS).

- *Compatible information technologies:* in order to facilitate horizontal integration of intelligence, monitoring, and naval reconnaissance (IMR) platforms compatible information technologies should be employed that allow appropriate and efficient command and control. The characteristics of the new threats make it necessary to reduce technological disparities in order to establish a means of timely exchange of information among the institutions responsible for control of areas of interest in real time.

Necessary Tools or Means

These means include treaties and regional security agreements, and economic resources. The member states of the system will have to use their respective budgetary resources efficiently as well as the contributions they might receive from international cooperation so that their respective naval forces can reach the desired levels of mobility and flexibility.

Human and Material Resources. The member states of the system will target these resources on achieving the levels of recruitment and compatibility of equipment required by the system.

Information Technology. Timely and reliable information will be the key to success of operations carried out by the system. This will demand not only effective intelligence operations and adequate exchange of information but also technological compatibility in systems and equipment.

Limited Resources. Just as with individuals, governments often must reach national goals that exceed the resources available. All countries must choose among competing needs and alternatives that are mutually exclusive. The armed forces compete for resources with many other governmental entities, especially when no serious threat to the national security is perceived. It is then important to emphasize that the degree of investment in security and national defense is in direct proportion to the society's perception of the threats it has to confront.

Conclusions

Regional maritime strategy will contribute to consolidating a cooperative system of regional security that allows an effective response to the disruption of peace and international stability and to new threats of a transnational character. It is not the perfect solution, because it requires the participation of many regional actors to obtain a total solution; nevertheless, it can strengthen a cooperative regional security system.

Security cooperation is complicated and diverse, and each country assigns a specific weight to it, according to its perception of the threat and its own circumstances. Maritime strategy seeks unified criteria that can stimulate cooperation and mutual support.

It is essential to create, develop, and maintain processes of mutual confidence in the face of new threats; otherwise, obstacles will arise in the treatment of sensitive matters that could put at risk the achievement of the intended strategic goals.

Strategy depends on the commitment of the countries involved in it. The political will of states to fight against new threats will be a determining factor in getting agreements. The willingness of states and navies to contribute the material and human resources that naval forces embody, as well as other economic resources that contribute to lasting peace in the region, will flow from this political disposition.

Making equipment compatible, along with ensuring efficient and timely exchange of information, is the key to the success of these operations. The great challenge is to achieve the compatibility of information technologies required for suitable and efficient command and control.

Resources are always limited, especially budgetary ones. In this context, what is assigned by the countries to regional security in the context of the dichotomy of

security versus social expenditure will be a limitation that must be considered for any joint operation against the new common threats.

Notes

1. Henry Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, "El arte de la estrategia y el planeamiento de fuerzas," originally published as "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," chap. 2 in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), available at [www.nwc.navy.mil/academics/courses/nsdm/spanish/Chap2\(SP\).pdf](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/academics/courses/nsdm/spanish/Chap2(SP).pdf).
2. Signed 2 September 1946 at Rio de Janeiro, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance establishes in Article 3.1 that "an armed attack by any State against an American State will be considered as an attack against all American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."
3. Adm. Ricardo Arbocco Licetti, "Strategic Conceptions of the Navy of Peru," *Revista de Marina* (Chile), 2003, no. 4.

Grey on Grey

The Critical Partnership between the Canadian and U.S. Navies

DR. JAMES BOUTILIER, CANADIAN NAVY

The Canadian Navy is a midsized navy. It consists of three *Iroquois*-class destroyers, twelve *Halifax*-class guided-missile frigates, two tankers, four *Victoria*-class conventional submarines, and twelve coastal defense vessels, all of which are supplemented by a modest array of helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft.

Born the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) on 4 May 1910, the Navy was, in many ways, a product of the Royal Navy (RN). The infant, seagoing service embraced RN culture and remained a de facto subset of the Royal Navy until World War II, when it began to drift into the gravitational field of another great navy, the U.S. Navy (USN).

During the Cold War the RCN (and after 1968, the Canadian Navy) became more and more profoundly influenced by the USN. Being a small navy, the Canadian Navy sought from the outset to leverage its way upward in the councils of power by exploiting niche capabilities. Thus, during World War II it became, perforce, an antisubmarine navy, hunting and destroying German U-boats in the North Atlantic. It maintained that capability and reputation thereafter, seeking to function as a partner to larger navies. This paper explores the growth of what is, arguably, the most intimate naval relationship anywhere in the world, namely, the relationship between the Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy. How did it come into existence, what are its characteristics, and how is it likely to develop?

The contemporary Canadian Navy is in some respects an accident of history. While the Navy's destroyers and tankers were commissioned in the 1970s, the frigates were built in the 1980s and delivered in the 1990s. Thus, they are Cold War vessels that entered service in a post-Cold War world. It is extraordinarily unlikely that any Canadian government would have authorized such a class of muscular, elegant, long-range warships in the penurious 1990s.

What made the frigates even more valuable was the fact that the twelve coastal defense vessels entered service at very much the same time, freeing up the larger vessels for blue-water deployments. These serendipitous developments were compounded by a decision to amend the traditional disposition of Canadian naval assets in recognition of the growing importance of the Pacific Ocean. Prior to the mid-1990s, roughly 70 percent of the Canadian Navy had been stationed in Halifax. This was hardly surprising in view of the imperatives of antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic, not to mention the institutional ties that linked Canada with NATO and Halifax's 250-year association with sea power.

The west coast of Canada, by way of contrast, was seen as remote from the Cold War contest and as best suited for training. This perception began to change after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Defense and foreign-policy white papers in 1994 highlighted the growing importance of Asia (transpacific trade having surpassed transatlantic trade in 1983) and enjoined the Canadian Forces to engage Asia more closely. The Canadian Navy was the obvious vehicle for doing so, and ships were transferred from Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) in Halifax to Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF) in Esquimalt, British Columbia.

However, equality was not achieved. The Navy's overall disposition remained asymmetric, with roughly 55 percent of the fleet based in Halifax. Tradition, the Navy's administrative structure, NATO commitments, and the abundance of repair facilities argued persuasively in favor of this east-coast weighting. This paper, however, focuses on the Pacific, because it was in that ocean that partnering between the Canadian Navy and the USN reached unexpected heights.

To begin with, the sheer scale of the Pacific and the lack of an institutional framework like NATO placed a premium on cooperation in that ocean. A Canadian-U.S. agreement allocated the northeastern quadrant of the Pacific to the commander of MARPAF in the event of war. At the same time, training areas in southern California were ideally suited for destroyer and frigate crews eager to escape from the cold and turbulent winter seas of the North Pacific.

Some would have argued that the presence of firing ranges, missile telemetry, and logistical facilities in the Esquimalt–San Diego–Pearl Harbor triangle discouraged more demanding long-range deployments. Nevertheless, in the mid-to-late 1990s this argument began to lose its validity, and MARPAF ships were committed to a regular schedule of deployments to Hawaiian waters for the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises and beyond to Northeast and Southeast Asia for the purposes of naval diplomacy.

The frigates, by virtue of their “long legs,” were ideally suited for these deployments. It would be misleading to imply that the Canadian Navy was operating very much on its own, because the late 1990s saw a steady deepening of technological cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the USN, particularly in the C4ISR realms. This cooperation was due in no small part to the vision and boldness of flag officers in the USN who realized not only that their navy was shrinking in size (and, like the Royal Navy of pre–World War I fame, needed support from friends and allies) but also that there was a multiplier effect inherent in common operating systems and in information/intelligence sharing. This was not, of course, a risk-free strategy at a time when the confidence of the American defense and intelligence establishments had been rocked by the lethal security breaches associated with the Walkers, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen. Nonetheless, a deep reservoir of trust existed between the two naval communities after half a century of working together, and it was decided to elevate the partnership to a new level.

At first this involved Canadian warships supplementing vessels in U.S. carrier battle groups (CVBGs) or surface action groups (SAGs). This meant months of arduous workups and prolonged deployments to the Persian Gulf and north Arabian Sea. In many ways, that was easier said than done. While the American and Canadian naval cultures were broadly similar, there were technological and organizational impediments to cooperation.

The USN is the most technologically advanced navy in the world, and any navy opting to act as a partner must make its communications suite congruent with American equipment. This is a major challenge, because technology is changing so fast that small navies must sustain considerable and ongoing expenses to remain abreast of the USN. The practical outcome of this adaptive process is that ships tend to be “laddered” technologically—that is to say, the most recent deployer with a CVBG or SAG will be fully modernized while her sister ships are in various stages of technological regression. For better or for worse, the USN appears to be in no hurry to slow the pace of modernization for the purpose of benefiting smaller partners.

These technological challenges, primarily in the world of C4ISR, are only the tip of the iceberg, in the sense that communications compatibility is only the first step toward full partnership. An equally compelling challenge is informational interoperability. Thus, data from certain sources or judged to be of a certain sensitivity will rapidly (some non-American and even American observers would suggest that the process is too rapid and comprehensive) be labeled “NOFORN,” so that no non-U.S. nationals can gain access to it. Fortunately for the Canadians, this prohibition has begun to wane after years of close and highly effective collaboration. But access is still not

untrammelled, and, paradoxically, Canadian naval commanders often find themselves barring the further dissemination of data to other coalition partners because the latter do not share the inestimable advantages of being part of the “Four Eyes” community of Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States.

Deployments to the Indian Ocean area present a challenge of a different sort—the tyranny of distance. Frigates or destroyers deploying to the north Arabian Sea to join Coalition Task Force 150, a force dedicated to prosecuting the war on terrorism, find themselves taking thirty-five to forty days to take up station. Depending on the circumstances, their passage could be in company with a carrier battle group, but frequently it is on their own. Either situation permits the honing of seafaring and warfighting skills but cuts heavily into the time remaining for service on station.

There is, nonetheless, a positive dimension to these global deployments, in the sense that ships’ tracks usually take them close to preferred destinations for naval diplomacy and exercises, like Australia, Singapore, or India. In fact, in February 2007 HMCS *Ottawa*, transiting out of the Persian Gulf area, stopped off the west coast of India to take part with her American and Indian counterparts in Exercise MALABAR.

In the post-9/11 era, Canadian Navy and USN cooperation intensified. In the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks, the Canadian Navy had four east- and west-coast vessels on station in the north Arabian Sea. This was clearly an unsustainable level of participation, and gradually the number of Canadian warships was scaled back. Nonetheless, over the years the Canadian Navy has deployed every one of its major surface combatants to the Indian Ocean, in some cases twice.

This has meant, among other things, that the Canadian Navy has had to develop elaborate, worldwide supply and repair chains—no mean feat for a midsized navy. On the other side of the coin, Canadian naval personnel have gained access to hugely impressive situational-awareness systems while in theater. Arguably, the greatest contributions to coalition warfare came in two disparate spheres: the role of Canadian commodores as deputy task force commanders and the role of Canadian ships’ companies hailing or boarding hundreds of vessels for seagoing inspections.

Another post-9/11 phenomenon is related to Maritime Domain Awareness. The conservative, far-flung, and private (not to say secretive) world of commercial shipping has long defied the sort of comprehensive informational mastery that we associate with air travel, where every major airliner is tracked on its scheduled course. No such knowledge exists with respect to ship movements, particularly at a time when those movements are increasing dramatically in number as a consequence of ever-accelerating globalization. Maritime Domain Awareness—the achievement of a comprehensive understanding of worldwide ship movements—involves not only technical tracking

devices but also collaborative inter- and intra-agency cooperation. This is a challenge in the maritime realm, because, typically, so many government departments have mandates that cover the waterfront or extend out to sea.

While cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the USN has long been close, it has become equally close in recent years between the Canadian Navy and the various U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) districts. Unfortunately, the concept of a seamless continental security presence is particularly difficult to achieve because of the lack of cultural congruence between the U.S. Coast Guard and its Canadian counterpart. Whereas the USCG constitutes one of the largest armed naval forces in the world, the Canadian Coast Guard is a modest-sized, unionized merchant marine service content to observe and report on vessels of interest and maritime threats.

Another challenge thrown up by the global war on terror (GWOT) is the tension between the “home” and “away” games—a debate over the most appropriate utilization of national naval forces, one that has a direct impact on partnership between the Canadian Navy and the USN. While the U.S. Navy can concede coastal security to the USCG, the Canadian Navy does not enjoy that luxury, for the reasons just outlined.

Instead, there is or has been a debate in some quarters as to whether the Canadian Navy should confine itself to patrolling Canada’s national waters at the expense of long-range naval diplomacy, exercising, and coalition endeavors—the so-called Away Game. This either-or representation was pleasing at the journalistic level but facile when it came to addressing the complexity of maritime threats.

Fortunately, this false dichotomy appears to have been set aside as politicians and policy makers have come to realize that the Home Game concept is altogether too parochial as a strategy. Influencing the points of origin of international threats is clearly a priority and can best be achieved with global deployments. Global deployments also permit the Canadian Navy to fulfill Canada’s commitments to the Proliferation Security Initiative, one of a number of post-9/11 regulatory initiatives designed to strike at the roots of terrorism and at the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their component parts.

More recently—that is to say, in 2006—the concept of naval partnership was further refined and advanced with the USN’s articulation of the “thousand-ship navy” concept. This concept has two drivers, one practical and one principled. As Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale University has observed, Western navies appear to be in decline while Asian navies are on the rise. This thesis certainly holds true for the Royal Navy and the USN; the latter, the world’s greatest navy, has been halved, numerically, since the mid-1980s. One can argue that the naval vessels currently in service are more sophisticated,

far reaching, and lethal than their predecessors, but the fact remains that a single destroyer cannot be in two locations at the same time.

This quantitative reduction might be that much more bearable if America's global commitments were not on the rise. But they are, and this reality has given rise to what Kennedy has called, in another context, "imperial overstretch." In practice, the situation is reminiscent of the one confronting the Royal Navy on the eve of World War I, when in desperation the Admiralty turned to the dominions seeking contributions of men and materiel for a Grand Fleet facing the mounting threat posed by the German High Seas Fleet. A century later, the USN is seeking to bridge the gap between ends and means by appealing to the maritime fraternity to share the burden of maintaining peace and good order at sea.

There is, of course, a further motivation, one that derives from a realization that the oceans are the world's last great commons and that it is incumbent on all seafaring communities to embrace that principle. Here again, the long-standing partnership between the Canadian Navy and the USN comes into play. The exercise of that partnership is not a luxury but an imperative, particularly at a time when the Indo-Pacific region has begun to exhibit a troubling degree of brittleness at sea.

Of course, the fact that Canadian warships have first supplemented American CVBGs, SAGs, and related formations and then replaced U.S. naval vessels within these formations does not necessarily mean that Canada can sustain that partnership in every circumstance. Clearly, the Canadian Navy has not been party to the war in Iraq, even if, in practice, there may be a fine line between tracking vessels as part of the GWOT and tracking vessels that may turn out to have some association, on closer examination, with hostile elements in Iraq. The same is true when it comes to Taiwan or North Korea. Canadian ships might be working up in Asian waters with their American counterparts, but it would be highly unlikely that they would remain in the company of those USN vessels in the event of hostilities associated with Taiwan or North Korea. The ultimate determination would come in the form of a cabinet decision in Ottawa, and the most likely scenario would see Canadian warships standing away on their own.

In other instances the Canadian Navy/USN partnership is constrained by third-party considerations. Thus, while there is an increasingly close relationship between the Canadian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), complete with goodwill exercises and navy-to-navy talks, Japan's concerns about collective security have, until recently at least, inhibited that nation from engaging in robust naval exercises with the Canadian Navy or in Canadian Navy/U.S. Navy/JMSDF exercises.

One of the great advantages that the Canadian Navy enjoys is its common ground with such navies as the JMSDF, the South Korean navy, and the Royal Australian Navy, in the sense that they all have long-standing associations with the USN. That said, the Canadian Navy is entirely without historical or ideological baggage and thus is perfectly situated to be a partner for these other midpower navies.

Nevertheless, partnership will be increasingly difficult to achieve as the Canadian Navy enters a period of extensive recapitalization in which long-serving warships will be taken out of the line pending replacement and others will be sidelined for midlife refits. Thus, the Canadian Navy is entering a particularly demanding period in which the transformation of the Canadian Forces, the demands associated with campaigning in Afghanistan, and the expenses and dislocations associated with revitalizing the fleet will have the effect of qualifying the Navy's overall effectiveness at the very moment when advancing maritime partnerships in general, and with the USN in particular, represent a national imperative.

By virtue of its size, history, and location, the Canadian Navy has always been a niche navy. It has come to the table in times of peace and war with an array of talents designed to enhance the overall effectiveness of naval coalitions. From the outset, the RCN, and then the Canadian Navy, has been a blue-water naval force. The centripetal and parochial forces at work in Canada might very well have dictated otherwise, but the Canadian Navy's long association with the world's greatest imperial navies ensured that blue-water aspirations were an inherent part of the Canadian naval experience. These two phenomena—the niche-navy reality and the blue-water legacy—when taken together have ensured that the Canadian Navy is the quintessential naval partner. This was certainly the case during the Cold War, with the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic, and it has remained the case in the post-Cold War era, in which the association between the Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy has matured and deepened on a global scale, to the mutual benefit of all who put to sea.

Note

The views presented in this paper are those of the author only and do not represent the official policy of Canada's Department of National Defence.

Cooperation on National Security Toward a New Hemispheric Security System

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In a changing world, the twenty-first century begins with an overwhelming reality, that while the United States consolidates its position as a leading power, many Latin American countries are still immersed in their usual political and social turbulence. The fact is that all these countries share a continent with the world's premier superpower, but diverse ideological currents, as well as divergent visions, make it difficult to operate jointly against common threats.

It is undeniable that these threats exist, but it is also certain that each state reacts in its own way, according to its particular perception of the threats. Nevertheless, all the states ought to equip themselves with the necessary means and resources to provide a suitable level of security to their citizens, developing their potentials in a free and balanced way and in a social and economically stable atmosphere. This also demands that they be ready to defend their corresponding interests effectively against actors who can threaten them.

Unfortunately, this scheme does not seem to be responding to the challenges posed by the new security threats, which to a great extent are transnational and asymmetrical in nature. These threats include terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental pollution, illegal immigration, illegal arms trafficking, smuggling, piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the overexploitation of natural resources. With the panorama posed as it is, it is increasingly necessary that states act in a cooperative way so they can defend themselves against these new threats. This reality leads us to identify interests and common objectives in the realm of security and defense, and it is there that our continent would seem to confront its greatest difficulties.

So, although in October 2003 the countries belonging to the Organization of American States (OAS) committed themselves to working "to revitalize and strengthen the

organs, institutions and mechanisms of the inter-American system related to the various aspects of hemispheric security to achieve greater coordination and cooperation . . . to meet the traditional threats, as well as the new threats, concerns and other challenges to hemispheric security,” specifically the matter has advanced very little.¹ An example of that is the low effectiveness of the system of hemispheric defense and its mechanisms of action—so low that in practice it can be considered nonexistent. This generates continuous questions by the countries that are members of the OAS.

Analysis of Threats

Situation

After the demise of the Soviet Union and with it the main promoter of communism, the Western countries had to redirect their security schemes, because until then their multilateral and regional defense organizations had been founded on the assumption that communist influence would be manifested in direct conflict. In this sense, for more than forty-five years, defense doctrines of the main powers were focused on symmetrical threats with conventional and nuclear capabilities, taking into account the possibility of using chemical and bacteriologic weapons. In our continent, this kind of threat was represented by Cuba and the leftist movements that opted for armed struggle. In parallel, several Latin American countries experienced border disputes that, to a greater or lesser extent, prevented them from consolidating a scheme of cooperative security.

The disappearance of the communist threat eliminated one of the main arguments for the operation of the system of hemispheric security and again brought into the arena old disagreements and mistrust, which are still reflected today in the documents related to security generated in the OAS and in other regional and subregional forums. In fact, in spite of the effort undertaken by heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs and defense, the American continent has not consolidated its mechanisms for peaceful solution of controversies as foreseen by the Bogotá Pact.² Although these mechanisms have performed successfully in some cases, those rare exceptions were due to the intervention of extracontinental mechanisms, such as arbitration or the International Court of Justice.³

The new threats today hanging over the continent are not absolutely new but now have a size and extent that transcends state borders. Problems like terrorism that previously were concentrated in the territory of some countries and were promoted generally by radical, Marxist-style political ideologies have given way to true criminal organizations funded by illegal activities and extending from country to country according to their needs for funding. In that sense, threats to security that formerly were the

responsibility of each state have been superseded by a complex network of organized crime that has consolidated for economic reasons and that often hides behind apparently lawful businesses. This situation is intensified by poverty and social exclusion and often exceeds the capability of states to counter the threat it poses without the support of other countries of the region.

In spite of the complexity of these security problems, the Western Hemisphere constitutes one of the minor risk zones of conflict in the world, so that the focus of attention of the United States is centered on other areas. North Korea, Iran, China, India, and Russia are given ever-greater attention as potential threats to North American interests, and most of the defense efforts are focused upon them, with understandably less attention paid to this continent. Not even the turn to the left of some governments or the clearly anti-American rhetoric of some of their leaders has changed this situation. What does seem to worry the United States to a greater extent is the possibility that new threats could overflow and unbalance the region and finally affect its interests.

Projection

This situation permits us to see that in the middle term the threats currently hanging over the hemisphere are gaining ground in the face of the incapacity of states to counter them. In this scenario, it is possible that drug trafficking could extend its networks of influence through corruption, using funds obtained through drug trafficking and money laundering. Also, it could support solidarity movements of cocaine, marijuana, and poppy farmers that could possibly become political groups of great influence in countries like Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. Also, one can imagine that the means for transferring narcotics to the markets of the United States and Europe will continue evolving to adjust to law enforcement measures, adopting any and all means to get the merchandise to its destination.

For that reason, no country can be considered safe from the influence of drug trafficking by virtue of not being a producer of the raw material, because a great part of the activity of the large trafficking organizations is carried out in nonproducing countries. In the same way, the growth of links between drug-trafficking organizations and violent groups is considered likely, with the purpose of carrying out actions as “smoke screens” to distract the local authorities. International terrorism will find this atmosphere of confusion a fertile field for preparing or even mounting its attacks.

Other illegal activities, like piracy, illegal trafficking of people, and arms smuggling, will continue to threaten the security of countries of the region. One cannot rule out the possibility that a future outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East or in Asia could force countries of this hemisphere to take a position with respect to it. This possibility

could bring threats to the region and reinforce the need for a cooperative security system to deal with them.

Scenarios

One could imagine a series of specific scenarios that, if analyzed, could provide insights into how to organize to protect security interests.

Pessimistic. In this scenario, the increasing openness of Asian markets, especially the Chinese, produces an increase in drug demand, impacting illicit drug trafficking of the region proportionately. This effect generates greater activity by the armed groups operating with drug traffickers, leading them to take control of broader territories in the countries in which drugs are produced, in the Andean area and in Central America. This situation generates a spiral of violence, causing social chaos and serious problems of governability, spreading over borders into neighboring countries.

Probable. In this scenario, new threats continue operating in the entire region but are concentrated in the countries where drugs are produced. Other countries are affected by drug trafficking as suppression compels the dealers to vary their means and traditional routes. The unsafe situation within the region continues due to the mobilization of criminals and to their funding, which in many cases exceeds that of security and law enforcement agencies. Other criminal groups take advantage of these favorable conditions to continue operating.

Optimistic. In a final scenario, drug trafficking is reduced as a consequence of suppression measures implemented in the hemisphere. This situation induces the drug traffickers to find new areas in Asia, to which they transfer their cultivation fields and processing laboratories. Declining incomes reduce the activities of violent criminal groups linked to drug trafficking. The need to work jointly to fight these threats is reduced, allowing each country to control illegal activities within its territory.

System of Hemispheric Security

Situation

The system of hemispheric security was born with the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (JID) in 1942 and was fortified with the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) in 1947 and with the creation of the Inter-American Defense College (CID) in 1962. Nevertheless, and in spite of more than a half-century of operation, the system has not been totally consolidated. For example, the Organization of American States never organized the Advisory Defense Committee, established in its charter “to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military

cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.”⁴

In 2006, by virtue of a decision of the General Assembly of OAS adopted in 1994, JID became an organ of technical, consultative, and educational advice on military and defense subjects in the hemisphere, under the auspices of the Hemispheric Security Commission and the General Assembly. In this way, the hemispheric defense system has been entirely subordinated to the power legitimately constituted by the members of the OAS. Nevertheless, in spite of the multiple statements and documents intended to articulate common measures to face the new threats, the system still lacks a truly functional structure that allows it to make decisions, define goals, establish strategies, and above all, define and execute the necessary actions to fight against threats jointly.

Projection

The three scenarios on the possible evolution of the threats demonstrate the necessity of a cooperative security system at the hemispheric level. In any of the cases posited we must consider that the threats described as “new” are in fact problems that have existed for a long time but that in recent years have acquired importance and have exceeded the capability of states acting alone. For that reason, it is clear that even though in an optimistic scenario the threats could recede, they could resurge at any moment. In the other two scenarios (probable and pessimistic), the need to articulate an effective system becomes even more urgent.

Certainly, the effectiveness of the hemispheric defense system depends to a great extent on the political will of its member countries, because without appropriate support of that kind, every effort will be reduced merely to good intentions. For that reason, to advance along the long path toward obtaining this political support, it is essential to look for points of consensus and to establish the bases upon which to redefine the current hemispheric defense system. This process must be undertaken through an objective appreciation of threats, an effort to depoliticize the regional agenda to avoid differences or pending disputes that would prevent the achievement of concrete agreements.

The system of hemispheric security must be an instrument of operational cooperation and not just a forum for discussion or an instrument to impose the will of one over another. This mechanism must be redesigned so as to deal with the threats that exceed the capabilities of individual states or transcend national borders.

This process must be made on the basis of mutual confidence. As pointed out by Hernán Patiño Mayer, first chairman of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS, confidence building is one of the fundamental characteristics of a

cooperative security model.⁵ The reconfiguration of the security system must be pursued in a progressive but effective way; it will be necessary to elaborate a program considering specific phases and actions until it is totally operational as a regional organism. Although it must be totally subordinated to the legitimate civil power of the member states, it must be nonpolitical in character and solely operational in nature.

Additionally, taking into account that participation must be always free and voluntary, the system must consider the possibility that some of the members may participate only in a limited way or even refrain from doing so when they decide not to or when their internal situation does not allow it. In the same way, because we are dealing with a cooperative system, it is essential to respect the sovereignty of the member countries, for which reason not including certain zones within the system must be considered if countries require that. In the same way, national forces must have priority for acting within their territories, reserving multinational intervention for exceptional and clearly defined cases and circumstances. Remarking on a cooperative security system, Randall Caroline Forsberg, chief executive officer of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, asserts that “in general, a cooperative security system would cause the world to embark on the way leading to the end of the war.”⁶

Scenarios

In the middle term, there are three possible scenarios with respect to the scope of cooperation and hemispheric security.

Pessimistic. The outlook is complicated. Governability problems and disparities among states, linked to extreme national positions and the resurgence of old disputes, preclude reaching a minimum level of agreement on cooperative security measures. Each state deals with threats according to its particular vision and with its own means.

Probable. Most of the governments are conscious that the threats are transnational and that they need to act together, but the disparate positions of some states and the lack of political will to specify intentions confine them to statements of a general character, without agreeing on binding instruments, leaving most of the actions to bilateral, situational agreements encompassing only isolated and incomplete efforts to deal with threats.

Optimistic. The states of the hemisphere choose to face the threats jointly, articulating a genuinely operational system of cooperative security with the capacity to face these threats in a continuous (nonsituational) way, with a continental focus that contributes to the consolidation of democracy and governability in the middle and long terms.

Proposal for the Redesign of the Hemispheric Security System

Previous Phases

As has been mentioned, the redesign of the hemispheric security system requires a political decision to carry it out and a depoliticized process to define its scope of action and the threats it is to face, as well as a structure and the parameters within which it is to develop. Obviously, its operation will be subordinated to the legitimate power of states and will be situated within the framework of absolute respect for the sovereignty of member countries and the rights of individuals. In that sense, as a basis for the redesign of the current system of hemispheric defense, it is necessary to achieve the following stages:

- Solution of all the pending controversies between the member states using peaceful means and proactive action by the OAS over a term of ten years
- Identification of common threats, accepted by consensus, so that they are not subject to particular policy perspectives of governments or states
- Establishment of concrete (nonpolitical) security objectives that reflect the concerns of most of the countries of the region
- Elaboration of mechanisms to obtain consensus and commitment of countries of the Americas to participation in a cooperative security system
- Redesign of the current system of hemispheric security in order to make the structure truly functional and effective.


Proposed Structure

The system of hemispheric security must be developed on the basis of four levels that define, on the one hand, its relation with the member states and the control by governments of the activities that such a system develops, and on the other hand, that determine objectives, plans, and actions to deal with threats effectively (see figure).

Political Level. This level is represented by the Hemispheric Security Council, constituted by the heads of state of the hemisphere or their representatives (ministers of foreign affairs or defense), the highest-level organ of the system.

Strategic Level. The current Hemispheric Security Commission would reinforce its organization and empanel a hemispheric staff that would advise on strategic planning for the system. The operation must be separated from all political connotations and be focused on achieving consensus directly related to cooperative security.

STRUCTURE OF THE HEMISPHERIC SECURITY SYSTEM



Operational Level. This level would be addressed by the current Inter-American Defense Board, which would be adjusted structurally to perform the functions the Hemispheric Security Commission would assign it, which would be strictly operational in character. The board would be under direct control of the commission and would have a directive body of a civil nature, assisted by an operational staff.

Tactical Level. Represented by specific operational commands, this level would be activated or deactivated by command of the operational level, depending on the situation, and maintaining a flexible structure to fit specific situations and permit economy of effort and resources.

Conclusions

- The new threats to hemispheric security assume to a great extent a transnational and asymmetric character, and the probable scenario for their evolution demonstrates the need to act in a cooperative way at the level of the Americas to defend the common interest.
- The current system of hemispheric security is moribund and without any real capacity to face new or traditional threats.
- The possibility of creating a truly effective system of hemispheric security will depend on the political commitment of the member countries.
- Once the appropriate political decision is made, it will be necessary to carry out a depoliticized process to define the scope of action of the hemispheric security

system and the threats to be opposed, as well as the system's structure and the parameters in which it will be developed.

- The hemispheric security system must be developed jointly among the states and controlled by legitimately constituted authorities.
- The hemispheric security system must be constituted as a regional organism, with a nonpolitical character and totally operational nature.

Notes

1. Organization of American States, *Declaration on Security in the Americas* (Mexico City: 28 October 2003), OAS/Ser.K/XXXVIII CES, art. 42, available at www.oas.org/36ag/espanol/doc_referencia/DeclaracionMexico_Seguridad.pdf.
2. "American Treaty on Pacific Settlement," signed in Bogotá, 30 April 1948.
3. As in the case of Peru and Ecuador, which resolved their differences in 1998 with the intervention of guarantor countries to the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil, Argentina, the United States, and Chile).
4. Article 66 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, subscribed to in Bogotá in 1948 and revised by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1985, by the Protocol of Washington in 1992, and by the Protocol of Managua in 1993, available at www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html.
5. Hernán Patiño Mayer, "Aportes a un nuevo concepto de Seguridad Hemisférica—Seguridad Cooperativa," *Revista SER en el 2000*, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 84–89.
6. Randall Forsberg, "La Creación de un Sistema Global de Seguridad Cooperativa," *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* 10, no. 4 (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1995), p. 1.

Final Thoughts

The papers in this volume present a variety of approaches, perspectives, and national attitudes. What strikes the reader above all, though, is the strong tendency among them toward consensus on essentials. Perhaps this result was predictable. Men and women of the sea and those who reflect their commitment to the maritime domain invariably find that their shared experiences drive them toward common perceptions and cooperation. This may begin as a primordial urge to protect fellow mariners from perils at sea, but it rapidly extends to an appreciation for the potential of the oceans to provide for mankind through the bounty of the sea itself or by the improvements in well-being that flow from international commerce. Accordingly, men and women of the sea are drawn together when they see threats to fisheries or to the environment, and they feel an urge to work with one another when they perceive attempts to use the seas to endanger life anywhere in the world.

Several common themes run through the essays.

Enduring Interests in the Maritime Domain

Rear Admiral Martínez stresses the importance of the sea, reminding the reader that two-thirds of all states are coastal states, that most people live near the sea, that the overwhelming portion of international trade is transported on the oceans, and that waterborne trade has been growing rapidly. Globalization, according to Captain Del Alamo and his colleagues, has, by increasing the commercial and financial interchanges among countries, only increased the importance of the oceans. Admiral Niemann states flatly that Chile's prosperity can grow only in an environment of stability, security, and respect for international law.

In his essay, Captain Sidders reminds readers that interests at sea go far beyond commerce. Scientific exploration and technological development are essential activities, and protection of human life and the environment are too. Captain Teixeira Martins reminds the reader that while 90 percent of world trade travels by sea, a significant

portion of oil and gas is also produced at sea and, therefore, economic expansion and stability depend on a secure maritime environment.

New Threats and Traditional Challenges

Rear Admiral Martínez sees a paradigm change in maritime strategy since the end of the Cold War. He argues that maritime strategy “no longer exists merely to fight and win wars at sea.” Instead, maritime strategy should be redesigned along cooperative lines “with a view to consolidating peace, cooperation, and security in . . . maritime areas.”

Addressing another change in the international environment, Captain Del Alamo and his colleagues argue that terrorist attacks on 9/11 and since represent a new international threat, from which Peru and other countries of the region are not exempt. Similarly, illegal trafficking in drugs and radioactive materials pose new transnational threats. Frequently, they note, these threats are asymmetrical; therefore they demand imaginative, new responses.

Furthermore, if nobody knows for certain who will be the probable enemy, according to Admiral Balaesque and his colleagues, changes in the international environment will always be very difficult to confront. They observe that many Latin American countries do not consider state terrorism a real menace. In most cases, it is considered an internal problem where only the state security organisms must act—a view that expressly denies the employment or even the cooperation of the armed forces.

Professor Möller and her associates judge that the particular features of emerging threats tend to exceed the capacities that states develop individually to neutralize the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats to their vital interests and that this feature generates a “need for coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral responses that must be incorporated into a” multilateral, transnational environment through cooperative security.

Adding yet another dimension to the consideration of maritime strategy, and drawing insights from colonial history, Admiral Troitiño credits maritime strategy with playing a key role in the formation of the Argentine nation as Spain sought to protect the transport of treasures from the Viceroyalty of Peru to the European homeland. Sea power was subsequently employed to integrate various regions of Argentina and, in Admiral Troitiño’s judgment, could contribute further to this task in the current era.

The Need to Work Together

Captain Sidders sees maritime strategies developed by different actors but somehow linked together as having the “advantage of the synergistic power of cooperation, which multiplies the gains of all participants.” Admiral Niemann agrees that “the improvement of international security must be a shared effort” and adds that when security is

improved through cooperation “it is unethical to benefit from the security conditions and subsequent stability without participating actively in their achievement.” Speaking for his own country, Admiral Niemann offers the view that “Chile [has] to participate actively in the international scene, contributing to the governance of globalization and to the development of our region.”

Admiral Niemann writes, “Chile would be willing to cooperate—according to its capabilities—with the U.S. maritime strategy, taking into consideration the national interest, humanitarian motivations, and the international legal order.” He suggests that identifying areas of cooperation can start with an examination of U.S. and Chilean naval missions.

Because 95 percent of Brazil’s trade moves through the oceans and 90 percent of his country’s oil is produced at sea, Captain Teixeira Martins believes cooperation with the United States to enhance maritime security is appealing—“if such cooperation includes mutual support in the field of military security, in the exchange of intelligence, in the implementation of joint exercises, in academic and doctrinal exchanges, and in the exchange of technology.”

Stressing a similar point, Captain Roth states that the success of any strategy involving international partners must focus on the importance of sharing intelligence. Technological superiority allows for acquiring a great amount of data in a short period of time, but unprocessed data are just data, not intelligence. Frequently, data must be considered in light of other information in order to be processed into intelligence. One “single vessel in the right place, at the right time, and under the right conditions to curb a threat” can be “worth more than several vessels wandering through the vastness of the ocean.”

Professor Möller and her team recall that “ultimately, the region presents a situation of changing and dynamic security conditions”; in general, however, “it also exhibits a very high degree of cooperation. Some steps have been taken to reduce the level of conflict among states and to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, cooperative security measures have been developed that have improved transparency and stabilized relations in the realm of defense.” Examples are “mutual confidence-building measures, defense publications, and the development of methodologies for comparing defense expenditures between Argentina and Chile” and between Peru and Chile, as well as between Peru and Ecuador.

Captain Del Alamo and his colleagues propose new domestic and international organizational arrangements to meet the new threats. In the first instance, the Peruvian Navy should work more closely with the National Police; the authors underscore the need for

closer cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence organizations. Similarly, they argue that the new threats call for greater cooperation among navies.

Drawing lessons from North America, Dr. Boutilier recalls that after the Cold War “the sheer scale of the Pacific and the lack of an institutional framework like NATO placed a premium on [Canadian-U.S. naval] cooperation in that ocean. A Canadian-U.S. agreement allocated the northeastern quadrant of the Pacific to the commander of [Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific] in the event of war. At the same time, training areas in southern California were ideally suited for destroyer and frigate crews eager to escape from the cold and turbulent winter seas of the North Pacific.”

According to Dr. Boutilier, “this cooperation was due in no small part to the vision and boldness of flag officers in the [U.S. Navy] who realized not only that their navy was shrinking in size (and, like the Royal Navy of pre–World War I fame, needed support from friends and allies) but also that there was a multiplier effect inherent in common operating systems” and in the sharing of information and intelligence. Moreover, “a deep reservoir of trust existed between the two naval communities after half a century of working together, and it was decided to elevate the partnership to a new level.”

The Complexity of Maritime Security

In Admiral Niemann’s view, “maritime security is achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats.” This observation tracks well with the comprehensive approach taken by the U.S. sea services in developing a new maritime strategy.

Professor Möller and her colleagues suggest that better Chilean “cooperation with the new U.S. maritime strategy would be possible if we intensified control and surveillance over our maritime spaces, over such important oceanic passages as the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, the Drake Passage, and our *Presencial* Sea, preventing any illegal activity from being carried out in the high seas adjacent to our coasts.” Furthermore, the exercise of the authority supported by international and national laws could be applied more rigorously as a flag state, coastal state, and port authority state.

Addressing organizational aspects of cooperation, Captain Roth points out that the strategic interests of the Brazilian Navy are not just those associated with the area of responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, as traditionally thought, but extend also over the area of the future U.S. Africa Command.

Captain Thornberry and his colleagues approach strategy through a process of positing several different but plausible scenarios and then considering their strategic implications and available responses. This approach was one technique employed at the U.S.

Naval War College in organizing certain war games and workshops as part of the Maritime Strategy Project.

The Difficulties of Working Together

Captain Sidders recognizes a conceptual tension between governance of the sea and freedom of navigation. The challenge, he writes, is to find a way “to respect the international order and each nation’s interests and within a framework of indisputable cooperation.” He posits a dilemma: “whether to preserve the customary principle of freedom of the sea or to exercise increased control over all maritime areas—that is, by guaranteeing their use to those who have the right to use them and denying their use to those who intend to carry out unlawful acts.” Addressing the same issue, Admiral Balaresque and his colleagues see as the most sensitive aspect of operational integration the free access to areas where coastal states have sovereign rights. They see no substitute for deferring to the authority established by international maritime law.

In Admiral Niemann’s view, the Chilean concept of a *Presencial* Sea is to oversee and “be part of the activities that take place on the high seas, [confronting] the threats that may come from the common space, without weakening the [UN Convention on the Law of the Sea] or affecting the freedom that governs those common areas.” Making a strategy both persuasive for friends and allies and a threat to opposing powers is, in the judgment of Captain Teixeira Martins, “the most difficult challenge.” He cautions that Brazil’s decision to participate or refuse to participate in a world network proposed by the United States will depend largely on whether that country will engage as a participant and not as a mentor and also whether the United States will show a real intention to implement an operational and tactical exchange.

Admiral Balaresque and his group observe with regard to the integration of small navies that it is possible to foresee schemes where they can integrate with U.S. operational groups (as in PANAMAX) or simply where they could assume surveillance of their own maritime spaces, with an organization in charge of common administration of networked information and operational control. Whatever these options, one must take into account a realistic and objective vision of Latin American allies.

Contrasting Strategies

Characterizing U.S. foreign policy as “hegemonic,” Captain Rogerio contrasts it with Brazil’s policy of “cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind.” In the Brazilian case, he writes, “‘cooperation’ comes up as a way to achieve peace, not as a way of increasing our military power.” Nonetheless, Captain Rogerio suggests that the Brazilian and U.S. navies could better stand up to terrorist threats if they integrated naval means of communication.

Professor Möller and her colleagues observe that while the governments of many Andean countries “consider their armed forces responsible for combating drug trafficking,” governments in countries of the Southern Cone insist that the military must be kept away from that task, considering it the responsibility of local police forces.

They see a contrast between the Chilean and the U.S. approaches. The Chilean Navy is willing to participate, according to its capabilities and resources, in such international operations as crisis management, peace operations, or humanitarian assistance. For Chile, the international commitments it accepts must be linked to international law. In the Chilean view, the United States considers

that security in the maritime domain can be attained only by the simultaneous employment of all the tools of its national power, in concert with other nation-states and under international law. Likewise, it recognizes a common interest with other nations in obtaining economic security and protecting against hostile acts performed at sea. The United States believes that all the nations that benefit must be jointly responsible for maintaining maritime security. It asserts, at the same time, that only through an integrated approach among maritime partners—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—will it be possible to increase security in the maritime domain.

Interoperability

Admiral Niemann’s concept of interoperability includes mutual knowledge, common procedures, and trust: compatibly trained units, shared real-time information, shared goods and services, efforts united to meet common interests. He sees technological developments in connectivity as presenting an ever-changing challenge. Above all, though, Admiral Niemann stresses the need to build the capacity required to become partners. In this respect, training is key, and interactions at the tactical level between the navies of Chile and the United States have produced improvements. Similar progress at the operational level is needed, and improvements in the training of human resources and the sharing of the maritime picture would help achieve that.

Captain Teixeira Martins argues that because navies usually have their own rules, systems, and procedures, issues related to command, control, and technology may become challenges to be overcome, requiring the standardization of equipment and procedures.

Interoperability starts at the politico-strategic level, according to Admiral Balaesque and his colleagues, with rules of engagement designed to allow political leaders to apply force gradually and manage the political consequences.

Admiral Balaesque’s group also notes that if the United States is involved in a multinational operation, great technological differences become the main factor hindering interoperability at the strategic-operational level. They caution that if no interface and code arrangements are made to permit fast, effective, and timely data links among units and commands, the operations will lose the synergistic benefits of cooperation and only modest, or perhaps even risky, operational results will be achieved.

Admiral Balaresque and his colleagues argue that the reduced logistical capability of Latin American navies, considering the need for training to perform their priority roles in the field of national defense, requires “compensations” to facilitate the use of their resources on tasks or activities that are not always understood by the national political community. “Agreements on access to professional training and education, exchange of personnel, no-cost use of U.S. naval bases, supply of fuel for operations under UN authorization, opportunity to purchase naval material of interest, and support for upgrading weapon systems . . . could undoubtedly enhance political support and facilitate the execution of these operations.”

Stressing human factors in interoperability, Professor Möller and her colleagues argue that when countries work together it is the responsibility of both sides to understand the other, build confidence, develop common procedures, train in the means, and share information in real time, if they are to complement each other’s efforts in pursuit of common interests.

Dr. Boutilier draws from the Canadian experience to write that the U.S. Navy is the most technologically advanced navy in the world and that any navy opting to act as a partner must align its communications suite so that it is congruent with American equipment. This is a major challenge; technology is changing so fast that small navies must sustain considerable ongoing expenses to remain abreast. The practical outcome of this adaptive process is that ships tend to be ladderized technologically—that is to say, the most recent ship to deploy with a carrier battle group or surface action group will be fully modernized while its sister ships are in various stages of technological regression. “For better or for worse,” he observes, the U.S. Navy “appears to be in no hurry to slow the pace of modernization for the purpose of benefiting smaller partners.”

An equally compelling challenge is informational interoperability. Thus, data from certain sources or judged to be of a certain sensitivity will rapidly . . . be labeled “NOFORN,” so that no non-U.S. nationals can gain access to it. Fortunately for the Canadians, this prohibition has begun to wane after years of close and highly effective collaboration. . . .

While cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the [U.S. Navy] has long been close, it has become equally close in recent years between the Canadian Navy and the various U.S. Coast Guard . . . districts. Unfortunately, the concept of a seamless continental security presence is particularly difficult to achieve because of the lack of cultural congruence between the U.S. Coast Guard and its Canadian counterpart.

Adding another element, Captain Rogerio cautions that “interoperability cannot be dissociated from the national defense industry and must not affect strategic developments and innovations.”

The Importance of International Law

Professor Möller and her colleagues stress the belief that if we are “to have a more secure world,” nations must act within “the international community and under the rule of law.” Relating cooperation on maritime security to international law, Admiral Balaesque and his associates state that a basic requirement for obtaining the necessary political support for joint employment of forces is that it “be undertaken in the letter and spirit of international agreements approved by the United Nations.”

Referring to Resolution 41/11 of the UN General Assembly in October 1986, which declares the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America the “Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic” (ZPCAS), Rear Admiral Martínez describes the arrangement as a major tool for protecting Argentina’s national interests.

Captain Teixeira Martins sees a serious problem related to the posture of the United States on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and comments that “most countries will not trust someone who, backed by his military power, ignores the decisions made by a consensus of nations.” He asserts that the country “willing now to rely on international support in the area of maritime security is the same country that so far has refused to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued the U.S. Ocean Policy Statement, which declared, in essence, that the United States would follow the non-seabed-mining provisions of the convention because they fairly balanced the interests of the United States and all states with respect to traditional uses of the oceans. President Clinton subsequently signed the UNCLOS document after provisions on seabed mining were renegotiated, but the U.S. Senate has not yet ratified it. Despite the continuing voluntary compliance of the United States with the convention, one is entitled to be concerned that the United States is not bound to it by international law. Recognizing this problem, President George W. Bush has called for ratification, and the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have followed suit with an unusual joint letter urging Senate passage. As if to underscore the relevance of the treaty to our consideration of maritime strategy, a broad coalition has formed in favor of UNCLOS among U.S. diplomats, defense experts, environmentalists, and petroleum and fishing interests.

New Institutional Arrangements

Captain Sidders observes that “at present, when a critical situation arises, the immediate response is provided by an ad hoc coalition.” He suggests that we could “probably arrive at a more effective and efficient solution for the region” if we made “a combined capabilities assessment based on a principle of strategic complementarity.” He

advocates the development of a “common surface picture” through the exchange of information and suggests as a model the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination—CAMAS—formed in 1965 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with the United States and South Africa recently added as observers.

Noting that full operational integration with the United States is complex politically, Admiral Balaesque and his colleagues call for the establishment of “a regional agenda reflecting objective and reciprocal interests . . . so that initiatives of strategic integration can gain backing and authorization at the political level.” Professor Möller and her team recall that at the regional level, geographically close countries have sought to share activities leading to the achievement of conditions of peace and security at sea and of restoring these conditions when they are altered. Because this might be impossible for one state acting alone, “it is indispensable to develop cooperative strategies and joint actions” with neighboring countries.

In this regard, Captain Rechkemmer and his colleagues call for the creation of a regional maritime strategy as a mechanism by which the American states could carry out, within the framework of regional security cooperation, multinational combined naval operations against the new threats. Building on existing hemispheric agreements and institutions, they advocate the establishment and operation of multilateral military organizations against new threats, controlling aerial and maritime spaces of common interest, and establishing efficient systems of intelligence to facilitate the exchange of timely and accurate information.


They recognize that their proposals presume a new atmosphere of confidence and commitment among the partners. This factor can be achieved only through an intense professional dialogue within an effective legal framework. An important challenge to be addressed in their scheme is the disproportionate distribution of resources among countries of the hemisphere. Understandings will have to be sought to allow each country to participate in accordance with its own ability and, perhaps, to find ways to share resources among participating countries with different means.

Consideration of ways to respond to various hypothetical scenarios leads Captain Thornberry and his colleagues to question the adequacy of hemispheric security arrangements to deal with contingencies that could plausibly arise. This realization suggests an array of new institutions. These range from a hemispheric security council that would coordinate positions on security matters at the political level to a hemispheric security commission at the strategic level, a reconstituted inter-American defense board at the operational level, and a series of operational commands to work tactically.

Conclusion

We may indeed be grateful that a knowledgeable and thoughtful group of military and academic thinkers and leaders have taken the time and devoted the effort to writing down their thoughts and sharing their varied experiences. In the process, they have furthered the debate over maritime strategy and explored ways in which the sea services of the Americas can cooperate to improve maritime security in our hemisphere.

One could draw from these essays plenty of reasons to conclude that the glass of inter-American maritime security cooperation is half-empty. The countries of the Americas do not share exactly the same perception of the threats they face; in any case, no one is suggesting that current challenges reach the level of the existential threat that brought democratic nations together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most noteworthy manifestation of an international security alliance in recent memory. Furthermore, several writers have underscored difficulties in the realm of interoperability, ranging from incompatible equipment to the inability to share codes and intelligence, to incompatible systems of command and control, and, perhaps most vexing of all, to the human problem of culture, both organizational and national.



Nonetheless, the papers also give encouragement to a more optimistic outlook. Two or more countries do not have to have identical perceptions of threats in the maritime domain to have a basis for working together on maritime security. They need only some overlap in their threat perceptions to be able to find common cause. Clearly, as writer after writer reminds us, seaborne commerce plays a vital role in the well-being of all the countries of the Americas. The great bulk of international trade by countries in the Western Hemisphere is conducted with other countries of the hemisphere, and most of that trade moves by ship. Furthermore, contributions from every country acknowledge that international terrorism and other forms of transnational crime pose some threat to that country, even if not all give it the same priority as U.S. policy makers might assign.

Questions of interoperability loom large, in part because the solution to them seems to be so dependent on capturing scarce resources. Dr. Boutilier's comment that the U.S. Navy "appears to be in no hurry to slow the pace of modernization for the purpose of benefiting smaller partners" could be taken as a challenge to leaders of the U.S. sea services—to ask themselves what it costs in terms of American interests to seek to be always faster, more secure, or stealthier. If we start from the point, made over and over in these papers, that no unilateral maritime strategy can be as effective as one that engages partners, and if we add to that the realization that the U.S. sea services can always benefit from local knowledge that only regional partners can provide, a more conscious effort to avoid leaving our friends in our technological wake might be a good investment.

Some of the human factors in interoperability will take years to correct, but again the Canadian-U.S. relationship offers some useful insights. Dr. Boutilier reminds us that "a deep reservoir of trust existed between the two naval communities after half a century of working together." This relationship started with a shared continent, a shared language, and similar histories and institutions. These factors do not pertain in quite the same way to U.S. relations with other countries. Nonetheless, there are specific features in the manner in which the United States and Canada have worked together that could be applied elsewhere. A long tradition of naval exercises, war games, educational and training exchanges, exchanges of staff officers, and joint planning have built trust and confidence and made joint responses to new threats easier and more rapid. Some of these activities are already under way elsewhere in the hemisphere. A clear message of the essays in this work is that effective interoperability is an edifice that must be built one brick at a time. The task is long and potentially arduous, and it cannot be completed except by taking it up.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

(Parentheses) indicate English renderings of proper names; amplifying information is in [brackets].

A	AIS	automatic identification system
	APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
C	C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
	CAMAS	(South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination)
	CEMA	[Brazilian] (Chief of Staff of the Navy)
	CHDS	Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
	CICAD	[Inter-American] (Drug Abuse Control Commission)
	CICTE	[Inter-American] (Committee against Terrorism)
	CID	(Inter-American Defense College)
	CIRDN	[Inter-American] (Committee on Natural Disaster Reduction)
	CNO	[U.S.] Chief of Naval Operations
	CON	[Brazilian] (Chief of Naval Operations)
	CVBG	[U.S.] carrier battle group
	DGTM	[Chilean] (Directorate General of Maritime Space)
E	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
	EEZ	exclusive economic zone
F	FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
G	GFS	Global Fleet Station
	GMP	Global Maritime Partnerships

	GWOT	global war on terror
I	IMO	International Maritime Organization
	IMR	intelligence, monitoring, and naval reconnaissance
	ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security [Code]
J	JID	(Inter-American Defense Board)
	JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
L	LRIT	Long Range International Tracking System
M	MAP	Mutual Assistance Program
	MARLANT	[Canadian] Maritime Forces Atlantic
	MARPAC	[Canadian] Maritime Forces Pacific
	MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
	MERCOSUR	(Southern Cone Common Market)
N	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
	NCAGS	Naval Cooperation and Guidance Shipping
	NDP	[Brazilian] National Defense Policy
	NOFORN	[U.S.] no foreign dissemination
	NSHS	[U.S.] <i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i>
	NSMS	[U.S.] <i>National Strategy for Maritime Security</i>
	NSS	<i>National Security Strategy of the United States of America</i>
	NWC	[U.S.] Naval War College
O	OAS	Organization of American States
	ONC	[U.S.-Chilean] Operational Naval Committee
R	RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
	RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
	RN	[British] Royal Navy

	ROCRAM	(Operational Network of Regional Cooperation of Maritime Authorities for Latin America, Panama, Mexico, and Cuba)
	ROE	rules of engagement
S	SADC	Southern African Development Community
	SAG	surface action group
	SALVAMAR	[Brazilian] (Search and Rescue Service)
	SAR	search and rescue
	SISTRAM	(Information System for Maritime Traffic)
	SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
T	TIAR	(Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)
U	UCC	[U.S.] Unified Combatant Command [system]
	UN	United Nations
	UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
	USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
	USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
	USN	U.S. Navy
W	WTO	World Trade Organization
Z	ZPCAS	(Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic)

Contributors

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Rear Admiral Alvaro J. MARTÍNEZ is Chief of Naval Education and Training of the Argentine Navy. A graduate of his country's Naval Academy and Naval War College, he also graduated from the Venezuelan Naval War College and the Naval Command College of the U.S. Naval War College. Among his many assignments at sea and ashore, Rear Admiral Martínez commanded the F.P.B. *Indómita* and the corvette *Espora*. He received postgraduate degrees in business organization from the Central University of Venezuela and in negotiation from the Catholic University of Argentina and was a visiting scholar at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington and director of the Argentine Naval War College.

Captain Ricardo Alfonso MENÉNDEZ Calle of the Peruvian Navy is qualified in naval aviation. He completed the Basic Staff Course and the course in Command and General Staff of the Air War College. He currently is enrolled in the Naval Command Course of the Peruvian Naval War College. He has served on board surface units of the Peruvian Navy, *Carvajal* and *Aguirre*, and as executive officer and commander of Exploration Squadron 11, as well as on the General Staff and as naval attaché in the Embassy of Peru in Ecuador.

Professor Francisca MÖLLER is a professor of international law at the Naval War College and a researcher in the Center for Naval Strategic Studies. Her bachelor's degree in social and juridical science is from the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso. She served as an adviser to the Maritime Authority from 1982 to 2001 and participated in Chilean delegations to various meetings of the South Pacific Permanent Commission. She was a consultant to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the meetings of Maritime Authorities of Latin American Countries in Cartagena, Colombia, in 1992 and in Panama in 1994. An alternate Chilean representative to the IMO in 1998, she also serves on the board of the Chilean Society of International Law.

Rear Admiral Federico NIEMANN Figari graduated from the Chilean Naval Academy in 1976, the U.S. Naval Academy in 1980, and the Naval Command College in Newport. He has completed more than twelve years of embarked duty at sea. He commanded the missile strike craft *Covadonga*, the guided-missile frigate *Condell*, and the destroyer leader *Blanco Encalada*. Ashore, he was head of the Planning and Doctrine Department of the General Staff of the Navy, from 2003 to 2005, and Director of Joint Operations, Planning, and Doctrine of the National Defence Staff in 2006. Rear Admiral Niemann presently is Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Navy.

Mr. Marcelo PALMA graduated from the Gabriela Mistral University and earned the degree of master of arts in security and defense at the National Academy for Political and Strategic Studies—ANEPE. He also completed studies at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University in Washington and at the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a researcher of the Center for Naval Strategic Studies and Naval War College.

Captain Carlos Arturo PILCO Pérez of the Peruvian Navy is qualified in surface warfare and naval engineering. He completed the Basic Staff Course and the Command and General Staff course and is currently enrolled in the Naval Command Course of the Peruvian Naval War College. He holds a master's in business administration from the Université du Québec in Montreal, Canada, and the Postgraduate School of the Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola. He served as executive officer of the *Mariátegui* and as secretary to the commander of the General Staff and of the Navy Industrial Service.

Captain Federico RECHKEMMER Prieto of the Peruvian Navy is qualified in both submarines and surface warfare. Serving in corvettes, frigates, and missile destroyers, he commanded the *Santillana* and the *Mariátegui*. He completed courses in defense resource administration and command and general staff as well as the submarine course of the Naval Academy of Livorno (Italy), the course on the law of armed conflict in San Remo (Italy), the Advanced Business Administration Program of the Graduate School of Business Administration (ESAN), and the Strategic Business Management course of the Universidad del Pacífico. He currently participates in the Naval Command Course of the Peruvian Naval War College.

Captain Claudio ROGERIO de Andrade Flôr is retired from the Brazilian Navy (2003). He worked in port security (2004) and has served as a war-game surface controller and instructor in the Brazilian Naval War College since 2005. He is also pursuing studies toward a master's degree in political science in Fluminense Federal University. While on active naval duty, he served as defense attaché in Japan and the Republic of Indonesia (2001–2002) and as director of the Navy Documents Service (2000), and commanded the Aratu Naval Base (1998–99), the Mato Grosso Flotilla (1994), and fluvial transport boat *Piraim* (1983).

Captain Luiz Carlos de Carvalho ROTH is retired from the Brazilian Navy. He currently heads the Department of Analysis in the Center of Political and Strategic Studies and is an instructor at the Brazilian Naval War College. He is also pursuing graduate studies toward a master's degree in political science at the Fluminense Federal University. On active duty he served as Vice Director of Navy Telecommunications and commanded the Naval Academy training ship *G. M. Jansen*, the high-sea towboat *Alte. Guillobel*, the training ship *Brasil*, and the 1st Escort Squadron of *Niterói*-class frigates.

Captain Jaime SEPÚLVEDA is retired from the Chilean Marine Corps. He holds master's degrees in naval and maritime sciences and in political science. During thirty-three years of active military duty, he served as a military observer with the United Nations in Lebanon during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1982 and was posted in Brazil, Germany, South Africa, South Korea, and Spain and as assistant naval attaché in Washington. He heads the Department of Social Science and Law of the Naval War College and is managing director of the naval magazine.

Captain Cristian SIDDERS of the Argentine Navy is head of the International Department of Naval Policy and Strategy. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1980 and qualified as an antisubmarine warfare officer; completed the Command and General Staff course; and commanded the *Clorinda* patrol boat, the *Formosa* minehunter, the *Comodoro Somellera* oceangoing tug, and the Fast Patrol Boat Squadron. He headed the Naval Officers Application Course and served on the *25 de Mayo* aircraft carrier, the *Drummond* corvette, the *Intrepida* fast patrol boat, the *Neuquén* minesweeper, the *Almirante Brown* destroyer, and on the *Rio Gallegos* cargo ship and in the Naval Transportation Command.

Ambassador Paul D. TAYLOR (Ret.) is a senior strategic researcher in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College and teaches elective courses on Latin America and the United States and on international economics. After service at sea as a naval officer, he spent a career in the U.S. Foreign Service, during which he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and ambassador to the Dominican Republic. He was also a staff member of the Peace Corps and was assigned as a diplomat for periods of two or three years each in Ecuador, Thailand, Brazil, Spain, and Guatemala. He earned academic degrees at Princeton and Harvard.

Captain Antonio Carlos TEIXEIRA MARTINS of the Brazilian Navy is an instructor at the Naval War College. A 1965 graduate of the Naval Academy, he has completed command and general staff courses and maritime policy and strategy courses of the Naval War College. He has served as supply officer of the aircraft carrier *Minas Gerais*, Chief of Cabinet of the Secretary General of the Navy, and director of the Naval Press and in naval housing construction.

Captain James THORNBERRY Schiantarelli of the Peruvian Navy graduated from the Peruvian Naval Academy and is qualified in submarines. He has served aboard the *Villavicencio*, the *Aguirre*, the *Casma*, the *Piragua*, the *Chipana*, and the *Antofagasta*. He completed the course in submarine engineering in the Ausbildungszentrum Uboote of Germany and the Command and General Staff course of the Peruvian Naval War College and earned the degree of master of business administration at the Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola in Peru.

Rear Admiral Miguel Angel TROITIÑO (Ret.) joined the Argentine Navy in 1958 and retired in 1996. He studied with the Naval Infantry of the Kingdom of Spain and completed the course in defense administration of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Among his important Navy commands was commander of the Naval Infantry (Marine Corps) in 1995 and 1996. Currently, he is associated with the Academy of Strategy, the Center of Strategic Studies of the Argentine Army, and the Center of Strategic Studies of the Argentine Navy.

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